On the Art of War by Sun Tzu - HTML preview

XIII. THE USE OF SPIES

1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and

marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and

a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will

amount to a thousand ounces of silver.

[Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.]

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop

down exhausted on the highways.

[Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered,

brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be

reminded of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in plunder.' Why

then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the

highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of

munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the

injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is

deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided

against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for

corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow

of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where

provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be

dispensed with."]

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their

labor.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "Men will be lacking at the plough- tail." The

allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each

consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on

behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also,

so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be

used by all in common. [See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of

the families had to serve in the army, while the other seven

contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning

one able- bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000

families would be affected.]

2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the

victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in

ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the

outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments,

["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned

at this point.]

is the height of inhumanity.

[Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting

to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure

which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept

informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to strike at the right

moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this

information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain

trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But

it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount

for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an

incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders

of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of

spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity.]

3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his

sovereign, no master of victory.

[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the

national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C.,

these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Chù

State: "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess' is made up of [the

characters for] 'to stay' and 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military

prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of

weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm

establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people,

putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]

4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to

strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary

men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.

[That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what

he
 means to do.]

5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;
 it

cannot be obtained inductively from experience,

[Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be
 gained by

reasoning from other analogous cases."]

nor by any deductive calculation.

[Li Chùan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and

magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination;

human actions cannot be so calculated."]

6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from

other men.

[Mei Yao-chèn has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the

spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural

science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the

universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the

dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies

alone."]

7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local

spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5)

surviving spies. 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none

can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of

the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry

leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to

collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts

and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the

previous knowledge of the enemy's moves thus gained." [1] ]

9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of

the
 inhabitants of a district.

[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by
 kind

treatment, and use them as spies."]

10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of

the
 enemy.

[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service

in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office,

criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite concubines

who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in

subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in the

distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side should be

defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their

ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in

each boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one's interests by means of rich

presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs in

the enemy's country, ascertain the plans that are being formed

against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach

between the sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme

caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an

historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou,

sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his

stronghold at Pì. After each side had experienced a number of

victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a

certain Pò-tài, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped

until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he

was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from inside the city,

and to give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general

assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march out all his best

troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to

attack at Pò-tài's bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li

Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; and Pò-

tài, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now

lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal

and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others

were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of

Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom

was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces,

both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely."

[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the

story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his

father Li Tè, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.]

11. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's spies

and using them for our own purposes.

[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from

the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false

information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the

other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have

detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false impression of

what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an

alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is

conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the

converted spy generously (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three

occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous

success: (1) by Tìen Tan in his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90);

(2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily

Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien Pò was conducting a defensive

campaign against Chìn. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of

Lien Pò's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to

avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the

reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and

were already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which

causes Chìn anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien

Pò they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in

the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the famous Chao

She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study

of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there

was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against

him. His father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and

the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and

solemnly declared that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would

bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of

earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin

Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien Pò. Needless to say, he

proved no match for the redoubtable Po Chì and the great military

power of Chìn. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into

two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance

lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one

another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force,

amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword.]

12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for

purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and

report them to the enemy.

[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously

do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to

believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these

spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely

false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to

find that we do something quite different. The spies will thereupon be

put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the

prisoners released by Pan Chào in his campaign against Yarkand.

(See p. 132.) He also refers to Tàng Chien, who in 630 A.D. was

sent by Tài Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied

security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against

him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing

Tàng Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the

New Tàng History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that

he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar

part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful

negotiations with Chì. He has certainly more claim to be described a

"doomed spy", for the king of Chì, being subsequently attacked

without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered

the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled

alive.]

13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news from

the enemy's camp.

[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a

regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a

man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby

exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed

with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all

sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with

shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Tàhsi Wu

of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Chìn, Shen-

wu of Chì made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor

Tài Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was

accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and

wore the enemy's uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few

hundred feet away from the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to

listen, until they succeeded in catching the passwords used in the

army. Then they got on their horses again and boldly passed through

the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once,

happening to come across a soldier who was committing some

breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound

cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible

information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm

commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report

was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]

14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are

more
 intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.

[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-chèn point out that the spy is
 privileged to

enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.]

None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should

greater secrecy be preserved.

[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be

carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be

quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any

previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them

most, he who pays them ill is never served. They should never be

known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When they

propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your

possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity.

Never communicate anything to them but what is absolutely

necessary that they should know. [2] ]

15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive

sagacity.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from

falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-

dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the

lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before

using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of character

and the extent of their experience and skill." But he continues: "A

brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than

mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." So

that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage."]

16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and

straightforwardness.

[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial

offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work

for you with all their might."]

17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make
 certain of

the truth of their reports.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "Be on your guard against the
 possibility of

spies going over to the service of the enemy."]

18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind
 of

business.

[Cf. VI. ss. 9.]

19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is

ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the

secret was told.

[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard

before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's main point in this

passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for

letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as

Chèn Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any

further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would not

be gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of

inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man

deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told

the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."]

20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to

assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding

out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp,

[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally

necessitates frequent interviews with him.]

and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies

must be commissioned to ascertain these.

[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of
 these

important functionaries can be won over by bribery.]

21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought

out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus

they will become converted spies and available for our service. 22. It

is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are

able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.

[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn the

enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the

converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which of

the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are

open to corruption."]

23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can
 cause the

doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how

the
 enemy can best be deceived."]

24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used

on appointed occasions. 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five

varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be

derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.

[As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but

makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.]

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost

liberality. 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

[Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name

was changed to Yin by Pàn Keng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman
 who

took part in Chèng Tàng's campaign against Chieh Kuei.]

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou

dynasty was due to Lu Ya

[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he

afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as Tài Kung, a title

bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a

treatise on war, erroneously identified with the LIU TÀO.]

who had served under the Yin.

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