This very subordination in a republic might make it necessary for the father to continue in the possession of his children’s fortune during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the spirit of monarchy.
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CHAP. VIII.
In what Manner the Laws ought to be relative to the Principle of
Government in an Aristocracy.
IF the people are virtuous in an aristocracy, they enjoy very near the same happiness as in a popular government, and the state grows powerful. But, as a great share of virtue is very rare where mens fortunes are so unequal, the laws must tend as much as possible to infuse a spirit of moderation, and endeavour to re-establish that equality which was necessarily removed by the constitution.
The spirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an aristocracy; it supplies the place of the spirit of equality in a popular state.
As the pomp and splendor, with which kings are surrounded, form a part of their power, so modesty and simplicity of manners constitute the strength of an aristocratic
*
nobility . When they affect no distinction, when they mix with the people, dress like them, and with them share all their pleasures, the people are apt to forget their subjection and weakness.
Every government has its nature and principle. An aristocracy must not, therefore, assume the nature and principle of monarchy; which would be the case, were the
nobles to be invested with personal privileges distinct from those of their body.
Privileges ought to be for the senate, and simple respect for the senators.
In aristocratical governments, there are two principal sources of disorder: excessive inequality between the governors and the governed; and the same inequality between the different members of the body that governs. From these two inequalities hatreds and jealousies arise, which the laws ought ever to prevent or repress.
The first inequality is, chiefly, when the privileges of the nobility are honourable only as they are ignominious to the people. Such was the law, at Rome, by which the patricians
*
were forbidden to marry plebeians ; a law that had no other effect than to render the patricians, on the one side, more haughty, and, on the other, more odious. The reader may see what advantages the tribunes derived from thence in their harangues.
This inequality occurs, likewise, when the condition of the citizens differs with regard to taxes: which may happen four different ways; when the nobles assume the privilege of
†
paying none; when they commit frauds to exempt themselves ; when they engross the public money, under pretence of rewards or appointments for their respective
employments; in fine, when they render the common people tributary, and divide
among their own body the profits arising from the several subsidies. This last case is very rare; an aristocracy so instituted would be the most intolerable of all governments.
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While Rome inclined towards an aristocracy, she avoided all these inconveniences. The magistrates never received any emoluments from their office: the chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest, nay, heavier; and sometimes the taxes fell upon them alone. In fine, far from sharing among themselves the revenues of the state, all they could draw from the public treasure, and all the wealth that fortune flung into their laps, they bestowed freely on the people, to be excused from accepting public honours∥.
It is a fundamental maxim, that largesses are pernicious to the people in a democracy, but salutary in an aristocratical government. The former make them forget they are citizens, the latter bring them to a sense of it.
If the revenues of the state are not distributed amongst the people, they must be convinced, at least, of their being well administered: to feast their eyes with the public treasure is, with them, the same thing almost as enjoying it. The golden chain displayed at Venice, the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs, the treasures preserved in the temple of Saturn, were, in reality, the wealth of the people.
It is a very essential point, in an aristocracy, that the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes. The first order of the state, in Rome, never concerned themselves with it; the levying of taxes was committed to the second; and even this, in process of time, was attended with great inconveniences. In an aristocracy of this kind, where the nobles levied the taxes, the private people would be all at the discretion of persons in public employments, and there would be no such thing as a superior tribunal to check their power. The members, appointed to remove the abuses, would rather enjoy them: the nobles would be like the princes of despotic governments, who confiscate whatever estates they please.
Soon would the profits, hence arising, be considered as a patrimony, which avarice would enlarge at pleasure. The farms would be lowered, and the public revenues
reduced to nothing. This is the reason that some governments, without having ever received any remarkable shock, have dwindled away to such a degree, as not only their neighbours, but even their own subjects, have been surprized at it.
The laws should likewise forbid the nobles all kind of commerce: merchants of such unbounded credit would monopolize all to themselves. Commerce is a profession of people who are upon an equality; hence, among despotic states, the most miserable are those in which the prince applies himself to trade.
‡
The laws of Venice debar the nobles from commerce, by which they might, even
innocently, acquire exorbitant wealth.
The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the nobles do justice to the people. If they have not established a tribune, they ought to be a tribune
themselves.
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Every sort of asylum, in opposition to the execution of the laws, destroys aristocracy, and is soon succeeded by tyranny.
They ought always to mortify the lust of dominion. There should be either a temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the nobles in awe; as the Ephori at Sparta, and the State-Inquistors at Venice, magistrates subject to no formalities. This sort of
§
government stands in need of the strongest springs: thus a mouth of stone is open to every informer at Venice; a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of tyranny.
These arbitrary magistrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to the censorship in democracies, which, of its own nature, is equally independent. And, indeed, the censors ought to be subject to no enquiry in relation to their conduct during their office; they should meet with a thorough confidence, and never be discouraged. In this respect, the practice of the Romans deserved admiration; magistrates of all denominations were
¶
*
accountable for their administration , except the censors .
There are two very pernicious things in an aristocracy; excess either of poverty or of wealth in the nobility. To prevent their poverty, it is necessary, above all things, to oblige them to pay their debts in time. To moderate the excess of wealth, prudent and gradual regulations should be made; but no confiscations, no agrarian laws, no
expunging of debts; these are productive of infinite mischief.
†
The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles , to the end, that, by a continual division of the inheritances, their fortunes may be always upon a level.
There should be no substitutions, no powers of redemption, no rights of majorasgo, or adoption. The contrivances, for perpetuating the grandeur of families, in monarchical
‡
governments, ought never to be employed in aristocracies .
When the laws have compassed the equality of families, the next thing is to preserve a proper harmony and union amongst them. The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly decided; otherwise the contests of individuals become those of families. Arbiters may terminate, or even prevent the rise of, disputes.
In fine, the laws must not favour the distinctions raised by vanity among families, under pretence that they are more noble or ancient than others: pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weaknesses of private persons.
We have only to cast an eye on Sparta; there we may see how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings, as well as those of the nobility and common people.
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CHAP. IX.
In what Manner the Laws are relative to their Principle in Monarchies.
AS honour is the principle of a monarchical government, the laws ought to be relative to this principle.
They should endeavour to support the nobility; in respect to whom, honour may be, in some measure, deemed both child and parent.
They should render the nobility hereditary; not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people, but as the link which connects them both.
In this government, substitutions, which preserve the estates of families undivided, are extremely useful, though in others not so proper.
Here the power of redemption is of service, as it restores to noble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent.
The lands of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their persons. The monarch’s dignity is inseparable from that of his kingdom, and the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief.
All these privileges must be particular to the nobility and incommunicable to the people, unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government, and to diminish the power of the nobles together with that of the people.
Substitutions are a restraint to commerce; the power of redemption produces an infinite number of processes; every estate in land, that is sold throughout the kingdom, is, in some measure, without an owner for the space of a year. Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power very burthensome to those governments which tolerate them. These are the inconveniences of nobility; inconveniences, however, that vanish when confronted with its general utility. But, when these privileges are communicated to the people, every principle of government is wantonly violated.
In monarchies, a person may leave the bulk of his estate to one of his children; a permission improper in any other government.
The laws ought to favour all kind of commerce∥ consistent with the constitution, to the end that the subjects may, without ruining themselves, be able to satisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his court.
They should establish some regulation, that the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more burthensome than the taxes themselves.
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The weight of duties produces labour, labour weariness, and weariness the spirit of indolence.
CHAP. X.
Of the Expedition peculiar to the executive Power in Monarchies.
GREAT is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic. As the state is conducted by a single person, the executive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition: but, as this expedition may degenerate into rapidity, the laws should use some contrivance to slacken it: they ought not only to favour the nature of each constitution, but likewise to remedy the abuses that might result from this very nature.
§
Cardinal Richelieu advises monarchs to permit no such things as societies or
communities that raise difficulties upon every trifle. If this man’s heart had not been bewitched with the love of despotic power, still these arbitrary notions would have filled his head.
The bodies, intrusted with the depositum of the laws, are never more obedient than when they proceed slowly, and use that reflection in the prince’s affairs which can scarcely be expected from the ignorance of a court, or from the precipitation of its
¶
councils .
What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world, if the magistrates, by their delays, their complaints, and entreaties, had not checked the rapidity even of their princes virtues, when these monarchs, consulting only the generous impulse of their minds, would fain have given a boundless reward to services performed with an
unlimited courage and fidelity?
CHAP. XI.
Of the Excellence of a monarchical government.
MONARCHY has a great advantage over a despotic government. As it naturally requires there should be several orders or ranks of subjects, the state is more permanent, the constitution more steady, and the person of him who governs more secure.
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sensible that the affair depends upon himself, and therefore he thinks; but the people, in their impetuosity, are ignorant of the danger into which they hurry themselves.” This reflection may be applied to a despotic government, which is a people without tribunes, and to a monarchy, where the people have some sort of tribunes.
Accordingly, it is observable, that, in the commotions of a despotic government, the people, hurried away by their passions, are apt to push things as far as they can go.
The disorders they commit are all extreme; whereas, in monarchies, matters are
seldom carried to excess. The chiefs are apprehensive on their own account; they are
†
afraid of being abandoned; and the intermediate dependent powers do not choose that the populace should have too much the upper hand. It rarely happens that the states of the kingdom are entirely corrupted: the prince adheres to these; and the seditious, who have neither will nor hopes to subvert the government, have neither power nor will to dethrone the prince.
In these circumstances, men of prudence and authority interfere; moderate measures are first proposed, then complied with, and things at length are redressed; the laws resume their vigour, and command submission.
Thus all our histories are full of civil wars without revolutions, while the histories of despotic governments abound with revolutions without civil wars.
The writers of the history of the civil wars of some countries, even those who fomented them, sufficiently demonstrate the little foundation princes have to suspect the authority with which they invest particular bodies of men; since, even under the unhappy circumstance of their errors, they sighed only after the laws and their duty, and restrained, more than they were capable of inflaming, the impetuosity of the revolted∥.
Cardinal Richelieu, reflecting perhaps that he had too much reduced the states of the
‡
kingdom, has recourse to the virtues of the prince and of his ministers for the support of government: but he requires so many things, that indeed there is none but an angel capable of such attention, such resolution, and knowledge; and scarce can we flatter ourselves ever to see such a prince and ministers, no not while monarchy subsists.
As people, who live under a good government, are happier than those who, without rule or leaders, wander about the forests; so monarchs, who live under the fundamental laws of their country, are far happier than despotic princes, who have nothing to regulate either their own passions or those of their subjects.
CHAP. XII.
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The same Subject continued.
LET us not look for magnanimity in despotic governments. The prince cannot impart a greatness which he has not himself: with him there is no such thing as glory.
It is in monarchies we behold the subjects encircling the throne, and cheered by the irradiancy of the sovereign: there it is that each person, filling, as it were, a larger space, is capable of exercising those virtues which adorn the soul, not with
independence, but with true dignity and greatness.
CHAP. XIII.
An Idea of despotic Power.
WHEN the savages of Louisiana are desirous of fruit, they cut the tree to the root, and
*
gather the fruit. This is an emblem of despotic government.
CHAP. XIV.
In what Manner the Laws are relative to the Principles of despotic
Government.
THE principle of despotic government is fear: but a timid, ignorant, and faint-spirited people have no occasion for a great number of laws.
Every thing ought to depend here on two or three ideas: hence there is no necessity that any new notions should be added. When we want to break a horse, we take care not to let him change his master, his lesson, or his pace. Thus an impression is made on his brain by two or three motions, and no more.
If a prince is shut up in a seraglio, he cannot leave his voluptuous abode without alarming those who keep him confined. They will not bear that his person and power should pass into other hands. He seldom, therefore, wages war in person, and hardly ventures to intrust the command to his generals.
A prince of this stamp, unaccustomed to resistance in his palace, is enraged to see his will opposed by armed force: hence he is generally governed by wrath or vengeance.
Besides, he can have no notion of true glory. War, therefore, is carried on, under such a government, in its full natural fury, and less extent is given to the law of nations than in http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Montesquieu0187/CompleteWorks/0171-01_Bk.html
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other states.
Such a prince has so many imperfections, that they are afraid to expose his natural stupidity to public view. He is concealed in his palace, and the people are ignorant of his situation. It is lucky for him that the inhabitants of those countries need only the name of a prince to govern them.
When Charles XII. was at Bender, he met with some opposition from the senate of Sweden: upon which he wrote word home that he would send one of his boots to
command them. This boot would have governed like a despotic prince.
If the prince is a prisoner, he is supposed to be dead, and another mounts the throne.
The treaties made by the prisoner are void; his successor will not ratify them. And, indeed, (as he is the law, the state, and the prince,) when he is no longer a prince, he is nothing: were he not, therefore, deemed to be deceased, the state would be subverted.
One thing which chiefly determined the Turks to conclude a separate peace with Peter I.
was the Muscovites telling the vizir, that, in Sweden, another prince had been set upon
†
the throne.
The preservation of the state is only the preservation of the prince, or rather of the palace where he is confined. Whatever does not directly menace this palace, or the capital, makes no impression on ignorant, proud, and prejudiced, minds; and, as for the concatenation of events, they are unable to trace, to foresee, or even to conceive, it.
Politics, with its several springs and laws, must here be very much limited; the political
*
government is as simple as the civil.
The whole is reduced to reconciling the political and civil administration to the domestic government, the officers of state to those of the seraglio.
Such a state is happiest when it can look upon itself as the only one in the world, when it is environed with deserts, and separated from those people whom they call
barbarians. Since it cannot depend on the militia, it is proper it should destroy a part of itself.
As fear is the principle of despotic government, its end is tranquillity: but this tranquillity cannot be called a peace; no, it is only the silence of those towns which the enemy is ready to invade.
Since the strength does not lie in the state, but in the army that founded it; in order to defend the state, the army must be preserved, how formidable soever to the prince.
How, then, can we reconcile the security of the government to that of the prince’s person?
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Observe how industriously the Russian government endeavours to temper its arbitrary power, which it finds more burthensome than the people themselves. They have broke their numerous guards, mitigated criminal punishments, erected tribunals, entered into a knowledge of the laws, and instructed the people. But there are particular causes that will probably once more involve them in the very misery which they now endeavour to avoid.
In those states religion has more influence than any where else: it is fear added to fear.
In Mahometan countries it is partly from their religion that the people derive the surprizing veneration they have for their prince.
It is religion that amends, in some measure, the Turkish constitution. The subjects, who have no attachment of honour to the glory and grandeur of the state, are connected with it by the force and principle of religion.
Of all despotic governments there is none that labours more under its own weight than that wherein the prince declares himself proprietor of all the lands, and heir to all his subjects. Hence the neglect of agriculture arises; and, if the prince intermeddles likewise in trade, all manner of industry is ruined.
†
Under this sort of government nothing is repaired or improved. Houses are built only for the necessity of habitation: there is no digging of ditches, or planting of trees: every thing is drawn from, but nothing restored to, the earth: the ground lies untilled, and the whole country becomes a desert.
Is it to be imagined, that the laws, which abolish the property of land and the succession of estates, will diminish the avarice and cupidity of the great? By no means: they will rather stimulate this cupidity and avarice. The great men will be prompted to use a thousand oppressive methods, imagining they have no other property than the gold and silver which they are able to seize upon by violence or to conceal.
To prevent, therefore, the utter ruin of the state, the avidity of the prince ought to be moderated by some established custom. Thus, in Turkey, the sovereign is satisfied with
‡
the right of three per cent. on the value of inheritances. But, as he gives the greatest part of the lands to his soldiery, and disposes of them as he pleases; as he seizes on all the inheritances of the officers of the empire at their decease; as he has the property of the possessions of those who die without issue, and the daughters have only the usufruct; it thence follows that the greatest part of the estates of the country are held in a precarious manner.
*
By the laws of Bantam the king seizes on the whole inheritance, even wife, children, and habitation. In order to elude the cruellest part of this law, they are obliged to marry their children at eight, nine, or ten years of age, and sometimes younger, to the end that they may not be a wretched part of the father’s succession.
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In countries where there are no fundamental laws the succession to the empire cannot be fixed. The crown is then elective, and the right of electing is in the prince, who names a successor either of his own or of some other family. In vain would it be to establish here the succession of the eldest son: the prince might always choose another. The successor is declared by the prince himself, or by a civil war. Hence a despotic state is, upon another account, more liable, than a monarchical government, to dissolution.
As every prince of the royal family is held equally capable of being chosen, hence it follows that the prince who ascends the throne immediately strangles his brothers, as in Turkey; or puts out their eyes, as in Persia; or bereaves them of their understanding, as in the Mogul’s country; or, if these precautions are not used, as in Morocco, the vacancy of the throne is always attended with the horrors of a civil war.
†
By the constitutions of Russia the Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his
successor, whether of his own or of a strange family, Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions, and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary.
The right of succession being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know, the best is that which most sensibly strikes them, such as a certain order of birth. A settlement of this kind puts a stop to intrigues, and stifles ambition: the mind of a weak prince is no longer enslaved, nor is he made to speak his will as he is just expiring.
When the succession is established by a fundamental law, only one prince is the successor, and his brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to dispute the crown with him. They can neither pretend to, nor take any advantage of, the will of a father.
There is then no more occasion to confine or kill the king’s brother than any other subject.
But, in despotic governments, where the prince’s brothers are equally his slaves and his rivals, prudence requires that their persons be secured; especially in Mahometan countries, where religion considers victory or success as a divine decision in their favour; so that they have no such thing as a monarch de jure, but only de facto.
There is a far greater incentive to ambition in countries where the princes of the blood are sensible, that, if they do not ascend the throne, they must be either imprisoned or put to death, than amongst us, where they are placed in such a station as may satisfy, if not their ambition, at least their moderate desires.
The princes of despotic governments have ever perverted the use of marriage. They generally take a great many wives, especially in that part of the world where absolute power is in some measure naturalized; namely, Asia. Hence they come to have such a multitude of children, that they can hardl