Again, it is corrupted, when mean and abject souls grow vain of the pomp attending their servitude, and imagine that the motive which induces them to be entirely devoted to their prince exempts them from all duty to their country.
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But if it be true, (and indeed the experience of all ages has shewn it,) that, in proportion as the power of the monarch becomes boundless and immense, his security diminishes, is the corrupting of this power, and the altering of its very nature, a less crime than that of high-treason against the prince?
CHAP. VIII.
Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of monarchical Government.
THE danger is not when the state passes from one moderate to another moderate
government, (as from a republic to a monarchy, or from a monarchy to a republic,) but when it precipitates from a moderate to a despotic government.
Most of the European nations are still governed by the principles of morality. But if, from a long abuse of power, or the fury of conquest, despotic sway should prevail to a certain degree, neither morals nor climate would be able to withstand its baleful influence: and then human nature would be exposed, for some time at least, even in this beautiful part of the world, to the insults with which she has been abused in the other three.
CHAP. IX.
How ready the Nobility are to defend the Throne.
THE English nobility buried themselves, with Charles the first, under the ruins of the throne; and, before that time, when Philip the second endeavoured to tempt the French with the allurement of liberty, the crown was constantly supported by a nobility who think it an honour to obey a king, but consider it as the lowest disgrace to share the power with the people.
The house of Austria has ever used her endeavours to oppress the Hungarian nobility; little thinking how serviceable that very nobility would be one day to her. She would fain have drained their country of money, of which they had no plenty; but took no notice of the men, with whom it abounded. When princes combined to dismember her dominions, the several parts of that monarchy fell motionless, as it were, one upon another. No life was then to be seen but in those very nobles, who, resenting the affronts offered to the sovereign, and forgetting the injuries done to themselves, took up arms to avenge her cause, and considered it as the highest glory bravely to die and to forgive.
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CHAP. X.
Of the Corruption of the Principle of despotic Government.
THE principle of despotic government is subject to a continual corruption, because it is, even in its nature, corrupt. Other governments are destroyed by particular accidents, which do violence to the principles of each constitution; this is ruined by its own intrinsic imperfections, when some accidental causes do not prevent the corrupting of its principles. It maintains itself, therefore, only when circumstances, drawn from the climate, religion, situation, or genius of the people, oblige it to conform to order, and to admit of some rule. By these things its nature is forced, without being changed; its ferocity remains; and it is made tame and tractable only for a time.
CHAP. XI.
Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of
Government.
WHEN once the principles of government are corrupted, the very best laws become bad, and turn against the state: but, when the principles are sound, even bad laws have the same effect as good; the force of the principle draws every thing to it.
The inhabitants of Crete used a very singular method, to keep the principal magistrates dependent on the laws; which was that of insurrection. Part of the citizens rose up in
¶
arms, put the magistrates to flight, and obliged them to return to a private life. This was supposed to be done in consequence of the law. One would have imagined that an institution of this nature, which established sedition to hinder the abuse of power, would have subverted any republic whatsoever; and yet it did not subvert that of Crete. The
*
reason is this:
When the ancients would express a people that had the strongest affection for their
†
country, they were sure to mention the inhabitants of Crete: Our country, said Plato, a name so dear to the Cretans. They called it by a name which signifies the love of a
‡
mother for her children. Now, the love of our country sets every thing to right.
The laws of Poland have likewise their insurrection: but the inconveniences thence arising plainly shew that the people of Crete alone were capable of using such a remedy with success.
The gymnic exercises, established among the Greeks, had the same dependence on the goodness of the principle of government. “It was the Lacedæmonians and Cretans (said http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Montesquieu0187/CompleteWorks/0171-01_Bk.html
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Plato∥) that opened those celebrated academies which gave them so eminent a rank in the world. Modesty at first was alarmed; but it yielded to the public utility.” In Plato’s
§
time these institutions were admirable, as they had a relation to a very important object, which was the military art. But, when virtue fled from Greece, the military art was destroyed by these institutions; people appeared then on the arena, not for
¶
improvement, but for debauch.
*
Plutarch informs us, that the Romans in his time were of opinion that those games had been the principal cause of the slavery into which the Greeks were fallen. On the contrary, it was the slavery of the Greeks that corrupted those exercises. In Plutarch’s
†
time their fighting naked in the parks, and their wrestling, infected the young people with a spirit of cowardice, inclined them to infamous passions, and made them mere dancers: but, under Epaminondas, the exercise of wrestling made the Thebans win the
‡
famous battle of Leuctra.
There are very few laws which are not good, while the state retains its principles. Here I may apply what Epicurus said of riches: “It is not the liquor, but the vessel, that is corrupted.”
CHAP. XII.
The same Subject continued.
IN Rome the judges were chosen at first from the order of senators. This privilege the Gracchi transferred to the knights: Drusus gave it to the senators and knights; Sylla to the senators only; Cotta to the senators, knights, and public treasurers: Cæsar excluded the latter: Antony made decuries of senators, knights, and centurions.
When once a republic is corrupted, there is no possibility of remedying any of the growing evils, but by removing the corruption and restoring its lost principles: every other correction is either useless or a new evil. While Rome preserved her principles entire, the judicial power might, without any abuse, be lodged in the hands of senators: but, as soon as this city became corrupt, to whatever body that power was transferred, whether to the senate, to the knights, to the treasurers, to two of those bodies, to all three together, or to any other; matters still went wrong. The knights had no more virtue than the senate; the treasurers no more than the knights; and these as little as the centurions.
After the people of Rome had obtained the privilege of sharing the magistracy with the patricians, it was natural to think that their flatterers would immediately become arbiters of the government. But no such thing ever happened. It was observable, that http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Montesquieu0187/CompleteWorks/0171-01_Bk.html
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the very people, who had rendered the plebeians capable of public offices, ever fixed their choice upon the patricians. Because they were virtuous, they were magnanimous; and, because they were free, they had a contempt of power. But, when their morals were corrupted, the more power they were possessed of, the less prudent was their conduct; till, at length, upon becoming their own tyrants and slaves, they lost the strength of liberty, to fall into the weakness and impotency of licentiousness.
CHAP. XIII.
The Effect of an Oath among virtuous People.
THERE is no nation, says Livy∥, that has been longer uncorrupted than the Romans; no nation where moderation and poverty have been longer respected.
Such was the influence of an oath among those people, that nothing bound them stronger to the laws. They often did more, for the observance of an oath, than they would ever have performed for the thirst of glory, or for the love of their country.
When Quintus Cincinnatus the consul wanted to raise an army in the city against the Æqui and the Volsci, the tribunes opposed him. “Well, said he, let all those, who have
§
taken an oath to the consul of the preceding year, march under my banner.” In vain did the tribunes cry out that this oath was no longer binding, and that, when they took it, Quintus was but a private person: the people were more religious than those who pretended to direct them; they would not listen to the distinctions or equivocations of the tribunes.
When the same people thought of retiring to the Sacred Mount, they felt some remorse
¶
from the oath they had taken to the consuls that they would follow them into the field.
They entered then into a design of killing the consuls, but dropped it when they were given to understand that their oath would still be binding. Now, it is easy to judge of the notion they entertained of the violation of an oath, from the crime they intended to commit.
After the battle of Cannæ the people were seized with such a panic, that they would fain have retired to Sicily: but, Scipio having prevailed upon them to swear they would not stir from Rome, the fear of violating this oath surpassed all other apprehensions. Rome was a ship held by two anchors, religion and morality, in the midst of a furious tempest.
CHAP. XIV.
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How the smallest Change of the Constitution is attended with the
Ruin of its Principles.
ARISTOTLE mentions the city of Carthage as a well regulated republic. Polybius tells
*
us, that there was this inconvenience, at Carthage, in the second Punic war, that the senate had lost almost all their authority. We are informed, by Livy, that, when Hannibal returned to Carthage, he found that the magistrates and the principal citizens had abused their power, and converted the public revenues to their private emolument.
The virtue, therefore, of the magistrates, and the authority of the senate, both fell at the same time; and all was owing to the same cause.
Every one knows the wonderful effects of the censorship among the Romans. There was a time when it grew burthensome; but still it was supported, because there was more
†
luxury than corruption. Claudius weakened its authority; by which means the
‡
corruption became greater than the luxury, and the censorship dwindled away of itself.
After various interruptions and resumptions, it was entirely laid aside till it became altogether useless; that is, till the reigns of Augustus and Claudius.
CHAP. XV.
Sure Methods of preserving the three Principles.
I shall not be able to make myself rightly understood, till the reader has perused the four following chapters.
CHAP. XVI.
Distinctive Properties of a Republic.
IT is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation: there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.
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abuses have less extent, and of course are less protected.
The long duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to her having continued in the same extent of territory after all her wars. The sole aim of Sparta was liberty; and the sole advantage of her liberty glory.
It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with their territories as with their laws. Athens was first fired with ambition, and gave it to Lacedæmon; but it was an ambition rather of commanding a free people than of governing slaves; rather of directing than of breaking the union. All was lost upon the starting up of monarchy, a government whose spirit is more turned to increase of dominion.
*
Excepting particular circumstances , it is difficult for any other than a republican government to subsist longer in a single town. A prince of so petty a state would naturally endeavour to oppress his subjects, because his power would be great, while the means of enjoying it, or of causing it to be respected, would be inconsiderable. The consequence is, he would trample upon his people. On the other hand, such a prince might be easily crushed by a foreign, or even a domestic, force; the people might every instant unite and rise up against him. Now, as soon as the sovereign of a single town is expelled, the quarrel is over; but, if he has many towns, it only begins.
CHAP. XVII.
Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy.
A monarchical state ought to be of a moderate extent. Were it small, it would form itself into a republic; were it very large, the nobility, possessed of great estates, far from the eye of the prince, with a private court of their own, and secure moreover from sudden executions, by the laws and manners of the country, such a nobility, I say, might throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too slow and too distant a punishment.
Thus, Charlemagne had scarce founded his empire when he was obliged to divide it: whether the governors of the provinces refused to obey; or whether, in order to keep them more under subjection, there was a necessity of parcelling the empire into several kingdoms.
After the decease of Alexander, his empire was divided. How was it possible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, or
commanders at least of the victorious bands dispersed throughout that vast extent of conquered land, how was it possible, I say, for them to obey?
Attila’s empire was dissolved soon after his death; such a number of kings, who were http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Montesquieu0187/CompleteWorks/0171-01_Bk.html
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no longer under restraint, could not resume their fetters.
The sudden establishment of unlimited power is a remedy, which, in those cases, may prevent a dissolution. But how dreadful the remedy, which, after the enlargement of dominion, opens a new scene of misery!
The rivers hasten to mingle their waters with the sea; and monarchies lose themselves in despotic power.
CHAP. XVIII.
Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy.
LET not the example of Spain be produced against me; it rather proves what I affirm.
To preserve America, she did what even despotic power itself does not attempt; she destroyed the inhabitants. To preserve her colony, she was obliged to keep it dependent even for its subsistence.
In the Netherlands, she essayed to render herself arbitrary, and, as soon as she abandoned the attempt, her perplexity increased. On the one hand, the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards; and, on the other, the Spanish soldiers refused to
†
submit to Walloon officers .
In Italy, she maintained her ground merely by exhausting herself and by enriching that country. For those, who would have been pleased to have got rid of the king of Spain, were not in a humour to refuse his gold.
CHAP. XIX.
Distinctive Properties of a despotic Government.
A large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person who governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the prince’s resolutions should supply the distance of the places they are sent to; that fear should prevent the remissness of the distant governor or magistrate; that the law should be derived from a single person, and should shift continually, according to the accidents which incessantly multiply in a state in proportion to its extent.
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CHAP. XX.
Consequence of the preceding Chapters.
IF it be therefore the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic; of middling ones, to be subject to a monarch; and of large empires, to be swayed by a despotic prince; the consequence is, that, in order to preserve the principles of the established government, the state must be supported in the extent it has acquired, and that the spirit of this state will alter in proportion as it contracts or extends its limits.
CHAP. XXI.
Of the Empire of China.
BEFORE I conclude this book, I shall answer an objection that may be made to the foregoing doctrine.
Our missionaries inform us that the government of the vast empire of China is
admirable, and that it has a proper mixture of fear, honour, and virtue. Consequently, I must have given an idle distinction, in establishing the principles of the three governments.
But I cannot conceive what this honour can be, among a people who act only through
‡
fear of being bastinaded .
Again, our merchants are far from giving us any such accounts of the virtue so much talked of by the missionaries; we need only consult them in relation to the robberies and extortions of the mandarines∥. I likewise appeal to another unexceptionable witness, the great lord Anson.
Besides, father Perennin’s letters, concerning the emperor’s proceedings against some
§
of the princes of the blood , who had incurred his displeasure by their conversion, plainly shew us a settled plan of tyranny, and barbarities committed by rule, that is, in cold blood.
We have, likewise, monsieur de Mairan’s, and the same father Perennin’s, letters on the government of China. I find, therefore, that, after a few proper questions and answers, the whole mystery is unfolded.
Might not our missionaries have been deceived by an appearance of order? Might not they have been struck with that constant exercise of a single person’s will? an exercise http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Montesquieu0187/CompleteWorks/0171-01_Bk.html
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by which they themselves are governed, and which they are so pleased to find in the courts of the Indian princes; because, as they go thither only in order to introduce great changes, it is much easier to persuade those princes that there are no bounds to their
¶
power, than to convince the people that there are none to their submission .
In fine, there is frequently some kind of truth even in errors themselves. It may be owing to particular, and perhaps very extraordinary, circumstances, that the Chinese government is not so corrupt as one might naturally expect. The climate, and some other physical causes, may, in that country, have had so strong an influence on their morals, as, in some measure, to produce wonders.
The climate of China is surprizingly favourable to the propagation of the human species.
The women are the most prolific in the whole world. The most barbarous tyranny can put no stop to the progress of propagation. The prince cannot say there, like Pharaoh,
“Let us deal wisely with them lest they multiply.” He would rather be reduced to Nero’s wish, that mankind had all but one head. In spite of tyranny, China, by the force of its climate, will be ever populous, and triumph over the tyrannical oppressor.
China, like all other countries that live chiefly upon rice, is subject to frequent famines.
When the people are ready to starve, they disperse, in order to seek for nourishment: in consequence of which, gangs of robbers are formed on every side. Most of them are extirpated in their very infancy, others swell, and are likewise suppressed. And yet, in so great a number of such distant provinces, some band or other may happen to meet with success. In that case, they maintain their ground, strengthen their party, form themselves into a military body, march up to the capital, and place their leader on the throne.
From the very nature of things, a bad administration is here immediately punished. The want of subsistence, in so populous a country, produces sudden disorders. The reason why the redress of abuses, in other countries, is attended with such difficulty, is, because their effects are not immediately felt; the prince is not informed in so sudden and sensible a manner as in China.
The emperor of China is not taught, like our princes, that, if he governs ill, he will be less happy in the other life, less powerful and less opulent in this. He knows, that, if his government be not just, he will be stript both of empire and life.
*
As China grows every day more populous, notwithstanding the exposing of children , the inhabitants are incessantly employed in tilling the lands for their subsistence. This requires a very extraordinary attention in the government. It is their perpetual concern that every man should have it in his power to work, without the apprehension of being deprived of the fruits of his labour. Consequently, this is not so much a civil, as a domestic, government.
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Such has been the origin of those regulations which have been so greatly extolled. They wanted to make the laws reign in conjunction with despotic power; but whatever is joined to the latter loses all its force. In vain did this arbitrary sway, labouring under its own inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its chains, and is become still more terrible.
China is therefore a despotic state, whose principle is fear. Perhaps, in the earliest dynasties, when the empire had not so large an extent, the government might have deviated a little from this spirit; but the case is otherwise at present.
Endnotes
[¶ ] See Plutarch, in the lives of Timoleon and Dio.
[* ] It was that of the six hundred, of whom mention is made by Diodorus.
[† ] Upon the expulsion of the tyrants, they made citizens of strangers and mercenary troops, which gave rise to civil wars. Aristot. Polit. lib. 5. cap. 3. The people having been the cause of the victory over the Athenians the republic was changed. Ibid. cap. 4.
The passion of two young magistrates, one of whom carried off the other’s boy, and, in revenge, the other debauched his wife, was attended with a change in the form of this republic. Ibid. lib. 7. cap. 4.
[‡ ] Aristot. Polit. lib. 5. cap. 4.
[∥ ] Ibid.
[§ ] The aristocracy is changed into an oligarchy.
[¶ ] Venice is one of those republics that has enacted the best laws for correcting the inconveniences of an hereditary aristocracy.
[* ] Justin attributes the extinction of Athenian virtue to the death of Epaminondas.
Having no farther emulation, they spent their revenues in feasts; frequentius scenam quam castra visentes. Then it was that the Macedonians emerged from obscurity: l. 6.
[† ] Compilement of works made under the Mings, by father Du Halde.
[‡ ] Under the reign of Tiberius, statues were erected to, and triumphal ornaments conferred on, informers; which debased these honours to such a degree, that those who had really merited them disdained to accept of them. Frag. of Dio, book 58. taken from the extract of virtues and vices, by Constantine Porphyrog. See, in Tacitus, in what http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Montesquieu0187/CompleteWorks/0171-01_Bk.html
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manner Nero, on the discovery and punishment of a pretended conspiracy, bestowed triumphal ornaments on Petronius Turpilianus, Nerva, and Tigellinus. Annal. book 14.
See, likewise, how the generals refused to serve, because they contemned the military honours; pervulgatis triumphi insignibus. Tacit. Annal. book 13.
[∥ ] In this state, the prince knew extremely well the principle of his government.
[§ ] Herodian.
[¶ ] Aristot. Polit. book 2, chap. 10.
[* ] They always united immediately against foreign enemies; which was called
syncretism. Plut. Mor. p. 88.
[† ]