CHAPTER XVIII.
Wherein Captain Galligasken treats of the Corinth Campaign, and admiringly calls Attention to the splendid Abilities of the illustrious Soldier as a District Commander.
During the quiet repose of the grand army of the Tennessee before Corinth, events of vast importance had transpired in the West and South. Island No. 10 had been captured by the indomitable flag-officer Foote; New Orleans had been taken by the tremendous operations of Farragut. In the East, Fort Pulaski had been battered down, Fredericksburg captured; Fort Macon had fallen, following Burnside's success in North Carolina; and Huntsville, Alabama, was occupied by General Mitchell. McClellan had at last commenced a hopeful forward movement with the army of the Potomac. With vast armies in the East and in the West, with strong naval forces ascending and descending the Mississippi towards its obstructed points, the national cause looked exceedingly promising as the summer of 1862 opened. But the promise was not realized. The summer sun glared on many a lost battle in the East, though the conquest was uninterrupted in the West.
Halleck made no efficient pursuit of the enemy after they had abandoned Corinth. Beauregard had been successfully hiding his weakness from his prudent checker-board adversary, and, understanding his man, outwitted him completely and handsomely. Grant had fought and won Corinth, whether it was occupied in a week or in two months. He had taught the vaunting rebels a lesson by which Halleck was too willing to profit, as he peacefully pursued his siege operations till the 1st of June. Buell was a prudent man, and he was sent out to catch the retreating and demoralized foe. Pope had been despatched on the same errand; but their united forces accomplished nothing. During this time, Grant remained at Corinth. The grand army was then broken up, and Buell sent in the direction of Chattanooga. From Shiloh the vast army marched up the hill and then marched down again, in humble imitation of the King of France in the nursery rhyme. Nothing was done except what Grant had accomplished.
By the continued successes of the flotilla on the Mississippi, Memphis, after a brilliant naval engagement, fell into the hands of the Union force. Grant, as the commander of the Tennessee district, established his headquarters at this city. Pope was ordered to Virginia, to supersede Fremont, where he established his celebrated "headquarters in the saddle."
McClellan had gradually felt his way down to the vicinity of Richmond, when the rebels, out of patience with him, fell upon his forces, and drove him to the shelter of the gunboats on the James, after his glorious army had fought some of the most brilliant defensive battles of the war. The country cried out against him for this delay, derided his use of the pick and shovel, and unhorsed him because he neglected his opportunities. While he was still resting from his hard-fought but useless battles, the government removed him from his position of general-in-chief, and assigned General Halleck to his place, probably on account of his brilliant operations before Corinth, where he had played through the farce of "regular approaches," though with none of the tragic features which attended it before Richmond.
Halleck was now in power, and one of his first acts, even before he left for Washington, was to offer the command of the army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen, a quartermaster. This gentleman, who was to be promoted to the required rank, to enable him to accept the command, had the good sense to decline it, and Grant was permitted to retain his position. He was deprived of nearly his entire force, and left to maintain a defensive position. He made his headquarters at Corinth, protecting the railroad communications, and holding what had before been gained. He spent the summer in this manner, though with enough to do to keep him busy, for he was continually harassed and threatened by the enemy under Van Dorn and Price.
Halleck, in his new capacity of general-in-chief, had his hands full in attending to McClellan and Pope. Grant seems to have been forgotten, and was thereby permitted to manage the affairs of his district without being hampered with instructions. The North was in danger of invasion in Maryland, rendered possible by the disastrous battles of Pope, and in Ohio by the rebel army under General Bragg, who had out-generaled the prudent and deliberate Buell. In these emergencies, Grant's men were taken from him, till the smallness of his force afforded even him no little anxiety.
Van Dorn, in command of the rebels in this section, ordered Price to seize Iuka, which was done. Van Dorn himself was four days' march to the south-west, threatening Corinth. Grant wished to overwhelm Price at Iuka, without exposing Corinth to capture by Van Dorn. He sent out two columns, one under Rosecrans and the other under Ord, to accomplish this purpose. A sharp battle followed, but the intention to capture Price's army failed, on account of a delay of one of the columns in reaching the point of attack. The rebels escaped, and effected a junction with Van Dorn.
Placing Rosecrans in command of Corinth, Grant established his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee, where he could better control the affairs of his district. On the 2d of October, the rebels united all their forces in this vicinity, and attacked Corinth, making a good fight, and gaining decided advantages; but in the end they were defeated, and the place saved. The force of the enemy was double that of Rosecrans, who behaved with distinguished gallantry. The defensive works which had been erected under Grant's direction proved to be of immense service, and showed that the general who had been severely criticised for neglecting them before knew when and where to use them—knew when they were necessary, and where they were a hinderance.
Grant had marked out this campaign himself; and though the battle of Corinth had been fought, and the rebels defeated, there was to be a sequel to the affair. Reading the intention of the foe to attack his strong place, he sent McPherson with a brigade to the assistance of Rosecrans; but he arrived only in season to witness the conclusion of the fight, being obliged to make a detour in order to effect his junction. Grant, with his usual confidence in the success of his combinations, had also sent Generals Ord and Hurlbut, each with a brigade, to punish still further the audacious foe in his retreat. He had notified Rosecrans of his plan, and directed him to follow up the retreating enemy vigorously, as well to insure his complete discomfiture, as to save either Ord or Hurlbut from being separately overwhelmed by a superior force. But these two commanders had joined their brigades, and Ord posted the whole so as to cover a bridge on the Hatchie River.
Van Dorn's column pushed on, and its advance crossed the bridge, when Ord's force attacked vigorously, and immediately routed it. A battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance scattered, many of the rebels being drowned in their attempt to cross the river. Ord held the bridge, but had not strength enough to attack the entire rebel army, which he compelled to retrace its steps, and seek another bridge six miles distant. Unfortunately, Ord was wounded in the conflict, and Hurlbut, who succeeded to the command, did not deem it prudent even to harass the fleeing rebels in the rear or on the flanks.
Rosecrans permitted his men, weary after their two days' hard fight, to rest till the next morning, when he started to obey Grant's order. Then he mistook his road, marched eight miles in the wrong direction, but he corrected his error, and marched towards the Hatchie. He was behind time, having disregarded the order of Grant to march the day before, arriving at the bridge, where the rebels had crossed, just as the rear-guard was going over. Had he obeyed his orders, he would have fallen on Van Dorn's rear, while his front was engaged with Ord; and nothing could have saved the rebel army from total destruction. Grant decided that the favorable moment had passed, and he ordered Rosecrans back to his post.
These movements relieved West Tennessee from any further peril at the present time. The rebels had been whipped at Iuka, at Corinth, and at the Hatchie. All these movements and all these victories were achieved under the direction of Grant. The success of these operations was gratifying, though not all it would have been if the general had selected his own subordinates, as he did subsequently in a wider sphere. If Grant had any fault as a soldier in the field, it was the result of the amiability of his character, which prompted him to save the feelings of others, even at the expense of his own reputation. He was not always obeyed, because he was not a stormy and demonstrative man, because he did not bluster and put on airs. There was nothing personally imposing or grand in him, and the officers of the army estimated him too low—so low that some of them evaded his orders.
But Grant could be terribly severe, terribly just, when the emergencies of the service demanded, when his devotion to the glorious cause he had espoused required it. During his brief sojourn in Memphis, which was the very hotbed of treason and treachery, he breathed the spirit of loyalty to the government into the souls of the rebels, who did not scruple to carry on war by divers underhand methods within the still hostile city. No letters not examined by the provost marshal could be carried out of town without subjecting the offender to arrest. Arms and ammunition were prohibited from being taken out of the city, or carried within it, on severe penalty. As these orders failed to suppress the illicit traffic with foes outside of the lines, all passes were refused, except to such as took the oath of allegiance, or parole. As Confederate officers and soldiers found opportunities to communicate with their families in Memphis, thereby obtaining important military information, the families of all such were banished beyond the lines. This order included the connections of other specified persons in the Confederate government, and there was not much room left for rebel sympathizers to operate.
As a check upon guerrillas, who were doing much mischief, Grant authorized reprisals upon the personal property of those in the vicinity who were in sympathy with the rebellion, to an extent sufficient to remunerate the government for all losses by their depredations. A bitter partisan organ, the Memphis Avalanche, which published incendiary and treasonable articles, was promptly suppressed. He took possession of unoccupied premises belonging to persons absent and in arms against the government, rented them, and paid the proceeds into the treasury of the United States. For the benefit of the fugitive negroes, who crowded into his lines, he issued humane and just orders, particularly defining the manner in which they should be employed and paid. Persons from the South who were willing to bluster, but not to fight, for the Confederacy, and hastened to Memphis to escape the remorseless rebel conscription, were made liable to draft.
In dealing with the troops under his own command, Grant was just and humane; but "bumming" and marauding on private account were prohibited. When the soldiers, in some instances, disobeyed the strict orders on this subject, the value of property taken or destroyed by them was charged to the account of their regiment, and deducted from their pay, if the offenders could not be discovered.
In dealing with civil affairs, in the multitudinous details which come within the scope of a department commander, he displayed a decided talent and ability to adjust the most difficult matters. He always knew where he was, and what to do. For every difficulty he had a remedy; for every infraction of law or discipline he had a check. In the management of the trying affairs of a military district, which has so frequently proved to be the severest demand upon the wisdom, skill, and patience of the soldier holding it under martial law, he displayed the highest order of ability. His judgment, tact, and discretion would have been more than creditable in one who had spent a lifetime in the study and practice of the principles of political economy, or who had served a long apprenticeship as a magistrate. Without being a politician, he was a statesman.
But Grant had hardly made his mark yet, and, except as the hero of Donelson and Shiloh, he was scarcely known to the country, before which he was soon to stand as the foremost man of his time. I watched Grant at Memphis, I watched him at Corinth and at Jackson, as he controlled the difficult details of his department, kept the rebel civilians in subjection, and directed his forces to certain conquest, and I would rather have been Ulysses S. Grant than my illustrious ancestor Sir Bernard Galligasken, whose knightly prowess and whose glittering title had early tickled my imagination. Even then I loved the man, and almost adored him, as I realized that a brilliant destiny was in store for him.
As far back as May, 1862, when McClellan had only proved that he was great as the organizer of an army,—and it must be conceded that he has not since proved any more than this,—my excellent friend Mr. Washburne, in his noble speech in Congress, deemed it expedient to use these remarkable words: "Let no gentleman have any fears of General Grant. He is no candidate for the presidency." Surely with only the lustre of Donelson and Shiloh reflected upon him, he never thought of aspiring to that magnificent position. Why was it necessary, when the illustrious soldier had only taken a couple of steps towards fame, to make this astounding declaration? Was it seen even then that he was a probable or a possible candidate in the future? The noble-minded and patriotic representative made this declaration to save Grant from the persecution of the wire-pullers, whose friends, the possible candidates, would be damaged by the appearance of a new aspirant, who, with a fitness for the office, added thereto the merit of availability. It was well for the politicians to take the bull by the horns, but they might as well attempt to nullify the laws of nature as to defeat the will of the people.
Grant had then no thought of being president. His modesty, if nothing else, would have forbidden the aspiration. He was a pure patriot then, as he is now; and the only consideration with him was to suppress the rebellion. He never "pulled the wires," even for a brigadier's commission, which was not above the ambition of thousands of fourth-rate politicians. He was ready to serve the country in any capacity, obeyed his orders, and quietly submitted to disgrace and insult for the good of the cause. The people are not blind. They see and know their man.