Chapter VI

Looking back and Henry Rousso's Vichy Syndorme

French Historian Henry Rousse attempts to explore what he and others perceive as the continuing malady of memory of World War II in France.  When Rousso began this study, he was well aware that even half a century after the war; the topic of Vichy France was still too troubling and too fresh in the minds of the French populace to achieve the distance necessary to write a strict history of the Vichy regime.  Therefore, he decided to attempt to reconstruct the ways the memory of the Vichy regime had been repressed during the twentieth century.  Additionally, Rousso attempted to interpret the ways in which the Vichy regime had been reinterpreted to suit contemporary needs.

Rousso depicted the period directly following the war as a time of mourning for the French people.  Then, the period under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle during the 1960’s, he noted that the memory of the Vichy regime was repressed which served as a catalyst for student demonstrations which accentuated an obsession with the war and the Vichy government.  Rousso points out that many diverse groups in France interpreted the conduct of the Vichy regime and the French populace during the war years in a multitude of ways that only added to the perceived illness Rousso termed the “Vichy Syndrome.”

Rousso argues that the trauma France experienced during the devastating period between 1939 and 1940 occurred so rapidly and abruptly that it was difficult for the French people to make sense of the changes while they were happening.  This perception helps explain why de Gaulle and the post war French government appeared to be in denial that the Vichy government had existed during World War II.  General de Gaulle saw Vichy France as an abnormality, an aberration and refused to believe that it was ever really France. 

Rousso asserts that General de Gaulle created this myth of the post Vichy period when on August 25, 1944 de Gaulle stated: 

Paris! Paris humiliated! Paris broken! Paris martyrized! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, by its own people with the help of the armies of France, with the support and aid of France as a whole, of fighting France, of the only France, of eternal France.[47]  

In respect to General de Gaulle’s August 25 proclamation, Rousso acknowledges that thanks to de Gaulle’s efforts it was a French division that first entered Paris and it was also true that in the southwest of France that French troops did most of the heavy lifting, however, for de Gaulle to discount the Allie’s major role in supporting these actions was pure fantasy.   From de Gaulle’s perspective,” the republic never ceased to exist.  Free France, fighting France, [and] the French Committee of National Liberation have by turns embodied it.  Vichy was and is null and void; I myself am the president of the government of the Republic.  Why should I proclaim it?”[48] Some historians argue that General de Gaulle viewed the two world wars as a single unit in order to focus on military matters and thus divert attention from the unique aspects of World War II.  For example, the role played by irregular partisans, ideological conflict, and the genocide were some of those unique aspects.[49]  Rousso, in his study, presents a good argument for de Gaulle’s role in contributing to “the Vichy Syndrome” in post war France.

Rousso wrote: “The post war citizen clung to the reassuring image of a resisting France, but the desire for a return to normality and the wish to forget the exceptional circumstances of the Occupation stood in the way of any real consecration of the resistance.”[50]  This period ends with both a revival of memories of Marshal Pétain, Vichy France and increased visibility of the stories of survivors of the war.

In regards to some of the divisions in French society Rousso wrote: “When the French public is asked about actual or possible political decisions bearing on wartime memories, the results are diverse.  The public is even less capable than the politicians of dealing rationally with symbols stemming from the 1940s.”[51] Rousso cites a survey of opinion that was conducted in 1971 over the transfer of Pétain’s ashes to Douaumont.  The survey revealed that seventy two percent approved and of those twenty six percent were in favor because they believed it would do justice to the man, Pétain; twenty one percent believed it was time to forgive and forget; and twenty five percent believed that the transfer would cause no problems.  Eleven percent was adamantly opposed and seventeen percent had no opinion.[52] Surveys like this further accentuate the division of opinion in French society over the reality and legitimacy of the Vichy regime.  However, it should be noted that Pétain’s choices in 1940 were extremely limited as he was faced with the daunting problem of what he perceived as saving France’s national sovereignty or capitulate to France’s traditional and long standing enemy Germany and lose all national identity.

Rousso contends that internal quarrels left deeper scars than either the defeat or German occupation.  He suggests three structural factors “that make this crisis an archetype of Franco-French conflict have also shaped the way it has been remembered since the end of the war.”[53]    The first is the role traditional Catholicism played in shaping and sustaining a Pétainist view of history.   Rousso points out that after 1951 many of the original hard core Pétain supporters were joined by others from various parts of the political spectrum, including members of the resistance.  Rousso wrote: “In other words, Pétainism, in this interpretation, was a kind of ideal for those who in one way or another remained loyal to some form of a counterrevolutionary Catholic tradition.”[54]    The second structural factor was ideological and had to do with the nature of traditional political divisions in France.  The right-wing and extreme right-wing led the way for Vichy France but were joined by members of the left who embraced the fascist totalitarian methods and ideology of the regime.  Importantly, the third structural factor affecting the Vichy syndrome was anti-Semitism.[55]   The reality that these divisions exist in traditional French society provide further evidence that the Vichy regime was more in line with the democratic principles of the Allied cause even though circumstances dictated collaboration with Nazi Germany and the Axis powers.   Even so, there were key members of the Vichy regime who were ready and did aid the Allied cause.

In conclusion, the opportunities for collaboration and resistance in Vichy France during World War II were affected by one’s location.  Resistance in the Northern Zone was much more difficult due to the presence of German soldiers and authorities.  However, if one resided in the Southern Zone the absence of occupying German soldiers until November 1942 made it more difficult to convince the ordinary citizens to resist. This allowed the citizens of the south to form a stronger allegiance to the Vichy government.  Many of the French still had a strong affection to Marshall Pétain.   It should be noted that in the period before November 1942 many historians have debated if the resistance to the Germans was different or the same as the resistance to the Vichy regime.  In the south there is evidence that it was not the same but in the north it arguably was the same.  After November 1942, resistance to the Germans became much stronger in all of France.

Chronology and geography both affected collaboration and resistance during the Vichy years.  During these years the chronology of events must be considered because of the wider developments of the war outside of Vichy were of extreme importance.  For example, when Hitler broke the non-aggression pact of 1939 with Stalin and the USSR in June 1941 and launched Operation Barbarossa the French communist quickly joined the resistance.

 There was little similarity between Vichy France in 1940 and what it had become in 1944.  As time went on during the war, the Vichy regime became increasingly repressive.  This caused the populace to resent the Vichy government even more and demanded the Germans out of France at all cost.  There is arguably little doubt that the Vichy years are extremely complex but the evidence before, during and after the invasion of North Africa in 1942 prove a significant number of Vichy leaders and a large portion of the populace of Vichy France and in the North African colonies did aid the Allied cause.

As a result, some Vichy leaders and some Vichy French citizens aided the Allies during World War II.  Their collaboration with the Allies before and during the invasion of North Africa was essential.  Intelligence gathering by the Vichy was part of their collaboration.  Their active participation in supporting the Allies after Germany occupied southern France helped the Allies defeat Hitler and the Nazi regime.  Post war memories of Vichy France differ.  These various differences of opinion contribute to “The Vichy Syndrome”.

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