The events that took place in France in June of 1940 and especially how so abruptly and swiftly the French army disintegrated in the face of the massive and efficient German invasion was a major shock to the world. However, in the United States the events in France were viewed with a great deal of uncertainty because from a technical standpoint it would be another seventeen months before the Americans would enter the conflict and a diplomatic decision as to whether to recognize the new Vichy government would be forthcoming. The Americans faced the delicate problem of dealing with a defeated but still existent France, and was faced with the problem of working out a course of action that would be of maximum benefit to the anti-Hitler forces.[39]
The Americans had since September of 1939 supported the British by a variety of measures short of war, however, in the summer of 1940 were confronted with a decision to recognize the Vichy government even though the British refused to do so. The British did not want to offend Charles de Gaulle and the Free French who they had allowed to set up a base in London. Even so, President Roosevelt made the decision to accept Marshal Pétain as the legal and spiritual head of the French people and maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime until the invasion of North Africa in November 1942 when Pierre Laval broke off diplomatic relations with the United States. Dr. Hammer wrote: “As to General de Gaulle, in 1940 there were doubts as to both his politics and his representative character. We regarded him as an unknown quantity.” [40]
Dr. Hammer brings up some important and interesting questions about the United States policy toward Pétain: Was the United States policy toward Pétain a necessary preliminary to the liberation of France? And to what extent was there a causal connection between our political maneuvers and our military success? Dr. Hammer wrote: “Underlying the specific details of our relations with Vichy was a valuation of democracy, not in sentimental terms, but as a weapon in American foreign affairs.”[41]
The United States policy toward the Pétain regime was necessary because by recognizing Pétain as the legitimate leader of France the United States was able to continue diplomatic relations with the French government on the ground in France. This was a vital link to many Vichy French leaders that otherwise would have been lost. The intelligence that diplomats like Admiral William D. Leahy, United States Ambassador to Vichy France and Robert D. Murphy, who served as President Roosevelt’s personal representative in French North Africa and was instrumental in the planning of Operation Torch, provided was critical. The political maneuvers that were developed by Leahy and Murphy in the planning for the North African invasion and their ability to stay in direct communication with Vichy leaders was critical to the Allied cause and instrumental in bringing France back into the war.
The delicate situation that developed when Churchill and the British made the decision to recognize General Charles de Gaulle and the Free French as the legitimate leader of the French people vis-à-vis President Roosevelt’s and the American’s decision to recognize Marshal Pétain was a critical one. However, the results proved affective to both because through the American’s continued diplomatic activity in France the Allies were the beneficiaries of critical intelligence that otherwise would have been lost.
From an internal perspective after Pétain established the Vichy regime in June of 1940, a program was established called the ‘National Revolution’. French historian Paul Vaucher contends that in the early stages of the ‘National Revolution’ not much information was available about the proposed reforms and even less about the attitude of the French public toward them was reaching foreign countries. Even when legal texts were available about the proposed reforms, it is not clear how far the changes on paper are in fact taking place. Marshal Pétain acknowledges that even after eighteen months in power, that his work is still hampered by much resistance which is a reminder that promises are not performance. Vaucher points out that these reforms as a result of the ‘National Revolution’ would include constitutional, administrative, economic, and social reforms. Vaucher wrote: It [National Revolution] tends to establish a dictatorship freed from any parliamentary control and in command of a powerful administration system. Individual citizens are given no place in such a regime, but social groups are permitted to tender advice and look after their own professional interest.”[42]
It is significant to note that the Pétain regime and its proposed programs were digested and accepted differently by those Frenchmen living in the occupied zone from those living in the unoccupied zone and in the colonies. Also prior to the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942 most of the Frenchmen living in the occupied zone were more focused on getting by each day and were less focused on politics and those in the unoccupied zone where support for the Vichy regime was stronger. All that changed after the invasion when Germany occupied the entire country. The Vichy years were complex but it is difficult to deny that once the tide of the war began to turn against the Germans that many leaders and people of Vichy France were ready and did aid in the Allied cause.