One of the results of the war has been to raise in the minds of all
peoples, to an extraordinary degree, the most earnest questions about
the nature and validity of government. The political sense of all
peoples has been stimulated. We see on every hand new conceptions of
government and demands for more and better government, but also the
most radical criticism and the denial of all government.
The
determination in very fundamental ways of what government is, and must
be, what ideas must prevail, what must be suppressed, what an ideal
government is, if such an ideal can be formed, the question of evils
inherent in the idea of government itself (if such evils there be),
the laws of development of government in all their practical
aspects--all these questions now come up for examination, and will not
be repressed. If we do not take them at one level we must upon
another. Naively or scientifically, philosophically or radically, the
nature of government must be dealt with.
Government is now being examined, we all see, from points of view not
hitherto taken. The conscientious objector raises the question of the
ultimate basis of the right of the many to control the lives of
individuals, and he asks especially whether there is any ground for
the assumption that in this sphere, more than in any other, might
makes right. Conscription, in fact, has driven us to consider the
meaning of liberty and the foundations upon which the right to it
rests. This stern fact of conscription, the realization that in a
moment the most democratic governments in the world are capable of
bringing to bear, quite constitutionally, absolute control over the
most basic possessions of the individual, has led many to ask
seriously whether government is after all a good in itself, or is
merely a necessity having many attendant evils. They wish to know
whether there is in the principle of government something that takes
precedence over all the assumed rights of the individual. Does
government, they inquire, have a _right_ to the individual; or is it
only in _serving_ the individual that it is entitled to exercise
authority that limits the individual?
These are questions, manifestly, that involve the whole foundation of
sociology, but we need not be unduly dismayed at that.
This is a time
when naïve thinking and exact science must make compromises with one
another. For better or for worse we must find some working hypothesis
upon which a fair adjustment may be made in the practical life of the
present moment. This _working hypothesis_ must also serve--and perhaps
that is after all its main function--as something to guide us,
something having solidity upon which we can stand, in performing our
work as educators.
What we need, what we believe all feel now the need of, is a
conception of government satisfying to the multitude of common people.
We wish to know whether we live for the state, we say, or whether the
state lives for us. We wish to understand what the basic rights and
duties of the individual are. As average individuals, willing to give
service in any cause that seems good, we do not ask so much to have
determined for us precisely what type of government best satisfies the
requirements of science or philosophy, but what the best working basis
for harmonious adjustment in the social life of the future is to be.
These enquiring moods on the part of the people are a part of the
temperament that has issued from the war. We shall make a mistake if
we regard it as a mere passing effect, however; _it means a deep
stirring of the political consciousness of people throughout the
world_.
Significant differences may be observed in the general attitude toward
government among the people in the great nations of the world. Each
nation appears to have its own political temperament, and this quite
apart from the views represented especially by political parties and
the like, and quite independently of the scientific and philosophical
conceptions of government and its functions of which there are a great
number, and among them certainly no agreement upon the main issues and
values.
Taking public opinion as a whole, Germany, England, France and America
seem to represent distinctly different attitudes toward government. The
State in the German philosophy of life, as every one is now aware, is
all; the individual derives his reality and his value, so to speak,
from the idea of the supreme state. Individuality and freedom in this
philosophy of life do not refer to _political_
individuality and
freedom at all. In England, and perhaps to some extent in all
democratic countries, the prevailing thought seems to be that the
government that governs the least is, on the whole, the best
government. The English government is supposed to be the servant of the
people, and the individual has been in the habit of looking to the
government for many services. The individual, free and self-determined,
is the unit of value and of society, and the regulation of his conduct
by government is at best a necessary evil. It came as a surprise to the
Englishman when he realized that the state could command the most
personal service and the most complete surrender of the property rights
of the individual.
Le Bon says that the Frenchman, too, thinks of the state as something
to be kept at a minimum and to a certain extent to be opposed.
Opposition to the government is a part of the Frenchman's plan of
life. Boutroux says the same--that in France the habit of thinking of
the government and of society as two rivals has not been overcome.
Our own idea of government is certainly somewhat different from these.
We are watchful of individual right, but we do not tend to think of
government either as opponent or as servant. We do not ask the
government to take care of us as individuals, and we do not feel in
the public attitude the resistance to government that the French
writers observe in France. The American expects on the whole to look
out for his own interests and he has never felt the pressure and
over-powering force of government--until perhaps now.
Mabie says that
the American has conceived of his government as existing to keep the
house in order while the family lived its life freely, every
individual following the bent of his own genius.
These temperamental attitudes toward government, we said, seem quite
apart from scientific and philosophic conceptions of state. We see,
however, something of the temperament reflected in the philosophies.
Philosophers do not wholly detach themselves from the mores of their
race. The monarchy of Germany, Munsterberg says, appeals to the _moral
personality and the æsthetic imagination_. Its main function, however,
is to safeguard the German people. Its faults are the faults of its
virtues. Other German writers praise the German government especially
for its efficiency, for its incomparable body of officials--indeed for
its very clock-work perfection that Bergson hates in Prussian life.
Lehmann goes so far as to say that the German state had reached the
_perfect balance_ between individualism and communism.
These writers
see plenty of self-realization in German society, and quite enough of
participation, on the part of the individual, in the government.
Schmoller (51) denies that Germany ever lacked the spirit of free
institutions, and even compares Germany with ancient Attica, which he
thinks was great not because of the rule of the _demos_, but because
the people followed their aristocratic leaders.
Troeltsch tries to
show that the German idea of freedom is different from, and indeed
superior to, that of all other peoples. The French, he says, rest
their idea of freedom upon the doctrine of the equality of all
citizens, but in reality lawyers and plutocrats prevail.
The English
idea of freedom comes from Puritanic ideas; the individual's
independence of the state is based upon the idea of natural rights,
and upon the theory of the creation of the state by the individual.
But German freedom is something entirely different. Here freedom is in
education, and in the spiritual content of individuality. German
freedom is the freedom that comes from the spontaneous recognition of
rights and duties. Parliaments are good in their place, but after all
they are not the essence of freedom.
Totally different conceptions of state are easily found.
Consider, for
example, the views of Russell. Through every page of his book there
shines the determined belief in the inalienable rights of the
individual. Self-expression of the individual through creative
activity is the basic value, or at least the fundamental means of
realizing values. Russell sees nothing sacred or final in any form of
existing government. He would like to see government expanded in some
directions and contracted in others, for the functions of government
cannot all be vested in one body or organization. For defense the
nation is _not large enough_. For all civic government the nation is
_too large_. In its internal control it treats the individual too
ruthlessly. Wasteful and in large part even unnecessary, it
antagonizes the free development of the individual.
Government should
cease its oppression, it should no longer support unnatural property
rights, or interfere with the personal affairs of individuals. At the
present time, however, we should not expect a radical cure for all the
evils of government. If only we can find the right direction in which
to make advance, we should be satisfied with something less perfect
than an ideal.
The state in Russell's view, instead of being an ideal institution, is
even harmful in many ways and terribly destructive. It promotes war.
It makes the individual helpless, and crushes him with a sense of his
unimportance. It abets the injustice of capitalism. It excludes
citizens from any participation in foreign affairs. We must indeed not
let this incubus of state overwhelm us. We must keep it in its proper
place, even in performing its necessary functions, such as preserving
public health. It is better to take some risk, even in such matters,
than to override too much the individual's personal rights. All the
functions of the state must be made to center more about the welfare
of the individual, and in doing this the state must plainly regard as
fundamental the right of the individual to free growth and the
development of all his powers. We must learn to think more in terms of
individual welfare and less in terms of national pride.
In syndicalism in some form Russell sees the most promise for reform
of government. Some type of government at least which does not make
the geographical unit the basis of everything must be the government
of the future. This would lead in the end to a higher state than that
based primarily upon law, for it would be a government in which free
organization would be the first principle.
Plainly we are to-day in a time of flux in which ideas and
institutions are unsettled, and there is a great variety of political
theories of all kinds. We can hope to find no agreement among
theorists and certainly no common ground for the reconciliation of
conflicting parties. Still, even for the most practical daily life we
must find some guiding principles. We must look for some means of
bringing order out of the present diversity and conflict. Some
valuation of government, some idea of the ultimate purpose of
government ought to be agreed upon, if for no other reason that we may
have some principle which will give us continuity in our educational
work.
Consider the varieties of political creed now offered us, and there
can be little doubt both of the difficulty and the necessity of
finding guiding principles for the practical life and to preserve
sanity of mind. The monarchical idea still lingers; there is a variety
of conceptions of democracy, differing widely; there are socialists--state socialists, Marxian socialists of the old line,
Bolshevists, regionalists, syndicalists, and others--and anarchists of
pure blood. Of internal and party differences, policies, and plans
there is no end. Through all these we have to thread our way, and
reach what conclusions we can.
No American can of course be expected to see the question of
government otherwise than through American eyes. He is to some extent
prejudiced and bound to the ideas of liberty, individualism, and
democracy, whatever his variety of party politics be.
Democracy he may
regard as an assumption, but it will seem now even more than ever a
necessary assumption upon which to build a working conception of
government.
We have to look somewhere in actual life for the elements and
principles of government. Why should we not look for them in American
life, where government has grown up comparatively free from traditions
and prejudices and where it has been by all the ordinary tests
_successful_? There has been something both ideal and generic in
American life. Whatever personal equation may be involved in saying
this, the point of view has some objective justification. It is a
genetic method, at least. In early American life society was simple,
and life was earnest, and we see government and the individual in
their essential relations to one another.
In this primitive and yet modern society we see the individual as a
collection of functions, so to speak, existing in a group. The
individual also has various desires, which do not appear to be wholly
in agreement with his social functions. Some of these desires of
individuals are strongly antagonistic to society. In this society,
government is plainly the means of protecting the individual or the
group, by the suggestion or the exertion of lawful force, from the
threat of lawless force. Law is a means of enabling and also
compelling the individual _to perform the various functions which_
belong to him as an individual or as a member of the group. To some
extent the law also _aids_ the individual in performing his functions.
But this simple social order already shows certain basic disharmonies.
It is an experimental regulation of the individual.
Every restriction
the individual helps to put upon other individuals by participating in
or acquiescing in the establishment of government and law reacts to
limit his own freedom, in ways which he cannot wholly predict. Freedom
of the individual, even in the simplest social order, becomes greatly
limited, if not necessarily, at least naturally--and indeed
necessarily, since the only choice appears to be between lawful and
lawless limitation of freedom. From the beginning, therefore, there
can be no perfect satisfaction of individual desires or of either
general or individual needs, in the ordered social life.
Society as a
whole regulates the conduct of the individual both by aiding and by
inhibiting his activities, and must do so. In doing this, it is plain,
it promotes all or most of the functions of the individual. Ordered
society widens the total sphere of action of the individual. The
individual left to himself tends to become an end-in-himself. Law
makes him to a greater extent a means. In doing this it serves him and
it also uses him, and there can never be any guarantee, in any
individual case, of what the sum of these services and restraints
shall be. Society uses the individual in part, but not exclusively, in
his own service. The good and the evil, the necessity and the dilemma
of all government are outgrowths of this primitive service of the
social organization and this original disharmony among the wills of
individuals and the will of the group to serve the individual and also
at the same time certain general purposes which may not in any given
case coincide with either the desire or the need of the individual.
For this reason we conclude that there can be no _perfect_ government.
All government is experimental and exists by compromise.
What, then, in the most general way, can we say is the legitimate
function or purpose of government? Hocking says that government is the
means of assuring the individual that his achievements will be
permanent. To this end it puts order into the structure of society. In
our view something similar, but not identical with this, is true. We
can say that in its complex forms it is in principle only what we
found it to be in its primitive or simple forms.
_Government is
ideally a means of aiding all the functions of every individual._
_Functions_, let us observe and not primarily desires are served.
These functions are such functions as the individual has as a member
of every group to which he naturally belongs.
Government, then, so to
speak, has no standing of its own. Its proper function is to
facilitate all other functions. Neither individuals nor governments
have any rights as abstracted from the sum of functions which they
essentially are.
If this be true, we can certainly define no one best and eternal type
of government, any more than a fixed and perfect plan of life for an
individual can be defined. Government might be supposed properly to
change according to the functions which from time to time were most
important for the society in question. Social life, under government,
differs from a free and unorganized social life mainly in that a
certain _objectivity_ is acquired in regard to the functions of the
individual. The individual becomes a creature of functions rather than
of desires and needs. Common interests, or the interests of the group
are served, we say; in doing this the individual is made to serve his
own interests, perhaps, but the most outstanding fact is that in this
organized life the _immediate desires of the individual are likely to
be thwarted_. Regularity is put into conduct, and conduct is made to
serve multiple and distant ends. The functions of the individual, left
to the desire of the individual, will seldom be harmoniously
performed. They will lack precisely objective consideration. But in
the organized social life there will also be no perfect order and
harmony, no final balance of functions. Everything is still relative
and experimental. Government is a system in which any one individual
at any moment may gain or may lose. But _on the whole_, under the good
government, both more freedom for the individual and better conditions
and better life for the individual will presumably be obtained than in
any possible disordered or unorganized society. But government will
really add nothing that does not already belong to the functions that
naturally develop in any social group.
The actual functions of governments are, therefore, highly complex,
because it is in some way involved in all the functions of the
individuals themselves. Governments will be judged good or bad in two
particulars: according to the completeness with which they include all
the social functions, and as regards their efficiency in facilitating
these functions. We must not make the mistake of judging a government
merely by its form. Under the same constitution and holding the same
ideals, there is room for widely different forms of activity on the
part of the government, and great differences in efficiency and in the
functions performed. The same functions may be performed and the same
degree of efficiency reached apparently with different organizations.
Cleveland shows, for example, how our own government might become much
more efficient and make radical changes in the mechanism of the
legislative and executive functions without sacrificing any principle
we hold to, and perhaps without any change in our constitution.
It is this idea of the proper functions of government and the relative
adequacy of existing governments to perform them that seems to be
deeply questioned. Life has suddenly grown more complex.
The
individual is brought face to face with new demands upon him. He
becomes, it may be, a member of new groups, having new functions.
Government also, and correspondingly, expands. The question is not now
of the efficiency of government in doing what it has hitherto
undertaken; we wish to feel sure that government is adequate to meet
the requirements of a rapidly changing social order.
That just now is
indeed a very vital question. Governments, we say, may be obliged to
adapt themselves to entirely new tasks. Society assumes new external
relations, and therefore we should expect that new organs would be
needed for performing these new functions.
In all this we have been making _objective_ valuations of government.
An ideal or a definition of government in terms of its functions and
the degree of efficiency in the performance of them might still, we
ought to observe, leave a wide scope for preference in regard to
forms, and other subjective valuations. Even between aristocratic and
democratic forms, there may be still room for valid appreciations on
æsthetic or moral grounds. Our objective valuations of government must
in fact in various ways impinge upon fundamental questions in which no
purely scientific considerations will be wholly decisive.
We can certainly find no precise way of valuing in detail or in their
totality existing or proposed forms of government. Our most valid
method, however, appears to be to refer at every step the functions of
government back to the functions of the individuals who make up
society. Every phase of legitimate government must thus go back to the
individual, and his desires and functions. If we do this we shall see
again why in national life we have the same kind of experimental
problem that we have in the life of the individual.
There can be no
perfect adjustment among the acts of an individual, and no final
valuation of them. There is no perfect balance between present use and
future good, between individual and social values, between desires or
needs and functions. The reason for this, we say, is that life is so
complicated and made up of so many functions and of so many
conflicting desires that it cannot be conducted according to any
single principle or combination of principles. If we think of
government as only a phase of the widest social living, and so as
being through and through of the nature of the life of the individual,
we ought to have the right point of view for all practical
consideration of it. We must not expect consistency or perfection in
government, and we can have no hope of passing absolute and final
judgments upon it. Radical politics, in our present situation, must be
regarded as one of our greatest dangers.
Democracy has become the "great idea of the age." It is our own
fundamental principle, so we of all people ought to be able to
understand and to defend it--and to _define it_. Yet many writers
complain and more imply that the idea of democracy has never been very
clear, and perhaps not even ver