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2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment

The 2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) identifies the money laundering risks that are of priority concern to the United States. The purpose of the NMLRA is to explain the money laundering methods used in the United States, the safeguards in place to address the threats and vulnerabilities that create money laundering opportunities, and the residual risk to the financial system and national security. The terminology and methodology of the NMLRA is based on the guidance of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing safeguards. The underlying concepts for the risk assessment are threats (the predicate crimes associated with money laundering), vulnerabilities (the opportunities that facilitate money laundering), consequence (the impact of a vulnerability), and risk (the synthesis of threat, vulnerability and consequence).

 

Threats

Money laundering1 is a necessary consequence of almost all profit generating crimes and can occur almost anywhere in the world. It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy how much money is laundered in the United States. However, while recognizing the limitations of the data sets utilized, this assessment estimates that about $300 billion is generated annually in illicit proceeds. Fraud and drug trafficking offenses generate most of those proceeds.

 

Fraud encompasses a number of distinct crimes, which together generate the largest volume of illicit proceeds in the United States. Fraud perpetrated against federal government programs, including false claims for federal tax refunds, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, and food and nutrition subsidies, represent only one category of fraud but one that is estimated to generate at least twice the volume of illicit proceeds earned from drug trafficking. Healthcare fraud involves the submission of false claims for reimbursement, sometimes with the participation of medical professionals, support staff, and even patients. Federal government payments received illegally by check can be cashed through check cashing services, some of which have been found to be complicit in the fraud.

 

Use of the Internet to commit identity theft has expanded the scope and impact of financial fraud schemes. Personal identifying information and the information used for account access can be stolen through hacking or social exploits in which the victim is tricked into revealing data or providing access to a computer system in which the data is stored. A stolen identity can be used to facilitate fraud and launder the proceeds. Stolen identity information can be used remotely to open a bank or brokerage account, register for a prepaid card, and apply for a credit card.

 

Drug trafficking is a cash business generating an estimated $64 billion annually from U.S. sales. Mexico is the primary source of supply for some drugs and a transit point for others. Although there are no reliable estimates of how much money Mexican drug trafficking organizations earn overall (estimates range from $6 billion to $39 billion), for cocaine, Mexican suppliers are estimated to earn about 14 cents of every dollar spent by retail buyers in the United States. It is the thousands of low level drug dealers and distributors throughout the country who receive most of the drug proceeds.

 

The severing by U.S. banks of customer relationships with Mexican money exchangers (casas de cambio) as a result of U.S. enforcement actions against U.S. banks between 2007 and 2013, combined with the U.S. currency deposit restrictions imposed by Mexico in 2010, are believed to have led to an increase in holding and using drug cash in the United States and abroad, because of placement challenges in both countries. This shifted some money laundering activity from Mexico to the United States.

 

International organized crime groups target U.S. interests both domestically and abroad. The criminal activity associated with these groups includes alien smuggling, drug trafficking, extortion, financial fraud, illegal gambling, kidnapping, loan sharking, prostitution, racketeering, and money laundering. Some groups engage in white-collar crimes and co-mingle illegal activities with legitimate business ventures.

 

Vulnerabilities

The size and sophistication of the U.S. financial system accommodates the financial needs of individuals and industries globally. The breadth of products and services offered by U.S. financial institutions, and the range of customers served and technology deployed, creates a complex, dynamic environment in which legitimate and illegitimate actors are continuously seeking opportunities.

 

This assessment finds that the underlying money laundering vulnerabilities remain largely the same as those identified in the 2005 United States Money Laundering Threat Assessment. The money laundering methods identified in this assessment exploit one or more of the following vulnerabilities:

  • Use of cash and monetary instruments in amounts under regulatory recordkeeping and reporting thresholds;
  • Opening bank and brokerage accounts using nominees to disguise the identity of the individuals who control the accounts;
  • Creating legal entities without accurate information about the identity of the beneficial owner; ???? Misuse of products and services resulting from deficient compliance with anti-money laundering obligations; and
  • Merchants and financial institutions wittingly facilitating illicit activity.

 

Cash (bank notes), while necessary and omnipresent, is also an inherently fungible monetary instrument that carries no record of its source, owner, or legitimacy. Cash generated from drug trafficking or fraud can be held or spent as cash. Alternatively, criminals can buy cashier’s checks, money orders, nonbank wire transfers, prepaid debit cards, and traveler’s checks to use instead of cash for purchases or bank deposits. Transactions with cash and cash alternatives can be structured to stay under the recordkeeping and reporting thresholds, and case examples demonstrate that some merchants will accept more than $10,000 in cash without reporting the transaction as required.

 

To move funds into an account at a bank or broker-dealer, case examples show criminals may use an individual, serving as a nominee, to open the account and shield the identities of the criminals who own and control the funds. Alternatively, the account may be opened in the name of a business that was created to hide the beneficial owner who controls the funds.

 

Trade-based money laundering (TBML) can involve various schemes that disguise criminal proceeds through trade-related financial transactions. One of the more common schemes is the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) which involves money brokers making local currency available in Latin America and Asia for drug dollars in the United States. Another form of TBML involves criminals using illicit proceeds to purchase trade goods, both to launder the cash and generate additional profits.

 

Risks

Any financial institution, payment system, or medium of exchange has the potential to be exploited for money laundering or terrorist financing.2 The size and complexity of the financial system in the United States, and the fertile environment for innovation, create legitimate and illegitimate opportunities. However, the potential money laundering risks are significantly reduced by anti-money laundering regulation, financial supervision, examination, and enforcement. The risks that remain, including those that are unavoidable, are:

  • Widespread use of cash, making it difficult for authorities to differentiate between licit and illicit use and movement of bank notes;
  • Structured transactions below applicable thresholds to avoid reporting and recordkeeping obligations;
  • Individuals and entities that disguise the nature, purpose, ownership, and control of accounts;
  • Occasional AML compliance deficiencies, which are an inevitable consequence of a financial system with hundreds of thousands of locations for financial services;
  • Complicit violators within financial institutions; and
  • Complicit merchants, particularly wholesalers who facilitate TBML, and financial services providers.