CHAPTER XII
THE INCENDIARY AT WORK
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GERMAN NAVY
No one in England felt in the least uneasy about the German navy. Nothing but contempt was entertained for the “Emperor’s toy.” It was compared to a crow, which had adorned itself with a parrot’s feathers; and everywhere proofs were adduced of the superiority of the English fleet, alike as regards quantity and quality. Such were the views held in well-informed circles. But none the less was the German Navy, even when still very small, held up as a terrible instrument of war. Already in the first years of the new century the following argument was frequently to be met with in England, whence it was transmitted to the whole world: Germany, and more especially the German Emperor, is planning to attack and destroy the British fleet, after which it is intended to send across the North Sea an army, that shall land on the holy coasts of Great Britain and reduce the liberty-loving Britons to slavery. It will suffice if we mention these absurd stories; it is not necessary to refute them here in detail, but we must lay stress on the fact that they were never believed for a moment by a single serious politician or naval expert in Great Britain. Such stories were invented and circulated, simply because they were considered to be politically useful. In this way the German Empire could be conveniently represented as the Power which was carefully preparing for an aggressive war, and which was bent on disturbing the peace of Europe. Being past masters in the art of organising such campaigns of slander, the English knew that the most idiotic lie will be believed, if only it be repeated often enough and in the proper tone of virtuous indignation. And this is what did, in fact, happen. The real motives underlying British policy since 1902 all find their expression in the motto: Germaniam esse delendam; and these motives were skilfully concealed behind the humbug relating to the German navy. It is evident that the British Government did not desire such motives, dictated by mere vulgar jealousy of German industry and German maritime trade, to be recognised as the real basis of its policy. Therefore it was sought to conceal, wherever possible, these motives behind a veil. The German navy proved an admirable “veil.” Whoever takes the trouble to compare the number and the size of the warships then existing in either country, will at once admit this.
After King Edward had succeeded, by means of the entente cordiale with France, in bringing about the great change of front in England’s foreign policy; and whilst he was consistently and perseveringly pursuing his work along the lines laid down; the British Admiralty, on the other hand, commenced taking steps with a view to modifying the conditions of national defence, so as to adapt them to the requirements of the new political situation. A thorough reorganisation of the Navy began in 1905; not only was the fleet’s readiness for war largely increased, but above all was its distribution over the various seas completely rearranged. As soon as France had become England’s faithful vassal, it was no longer necessary that the Mediterranean should remain the center of gravity of British naval policy. This center of gravity was now transferred to the North Sea. The Russian fleet had been destroyed at Tsushima; the strong British squadron hitherto maintained in Chinese waters was henceforth superfluous, and was consequently recalled to the English coast. A considerable number of cruisers, which had been stationed in different parts of the world, were likewise ordered home. In short, in the course of a few years, nearly the whole of the British fleet was concentrated in front of the eastern shores of Great Britain. Ample measures had been taken in Great Britain itself in view of this concentration. New harbors and dockyards were constructed, new naval stations called into being, all along the North Sea-coast; it was something entirely new in British history, for the British naval front had always extended from the South East to the South West—along the shores of the Channel in the direction of the Atlantic. Of course, this truly epoch-making redistribution of the British fleet had only one object: namely, the safeguarding of the British Isles. The entire fleet must be concentrated in order to prevent its destruction by the German navy, and in order to defend Great Britain against invasion. A movement in favor of compulsory service in the army accompanied the reorganisation and redistribution of the navy. The movement in question was organised by Lord Roberts; the fleet, it was urged, could not be absolutely relied upon to prevent a German landing—and such landings were planned, and would take place in a moment when none expected them. Lord Roberts commenced his agitation in 1905, and threw the whole weight of his authority—which in England was great—into the balance. In Germany his “invasion speeches” were taken seriously, and people really thought that this cunning old fox believed what he said. To-day, after documentary proofs of the Anglo-Belgian negotiations have been brought to light, these credulous Germans will perhaps understand that Lord Roberts’s propaganda was a well-organised “fake”—seeing that Lord Roberts could not possibly tell the truth as to his real motives. In reality, he and his supporters did undoubtedly wish the army to be increased by means of compulsory service in view of an invasion. But the invasion of which they were thinking was a British invasion of Belgium! The author of the present book has defended this thesis for the last eight years; the documents found in Brussels, and the operations of the war themselves, confirm it entirely. The projected invasion was not the least of the causes which prompted the British Admiralty to concentrate almost the entire fleet in the North Sea; for that fleet was necessary, if troops were to be transported safely to Belgium. Lord Roberts did not succeed with his programme of compulsory service; but British Ministers of War, and notably the “pro-German idealist” Haldane, were able none the less, with the already existing means at their disposal, to prepare the invasion of Belgium in such a way as to excite general surprise—especially in Germany.
King Edward and his Ministers wished, if possible, to prevent a further increase of the German navy; they wished to save expenses for their own country, and to be able—as was later on frequently said in England—to undertake without any risk the destruction of every European fleet. Solely with this aim in view did a new epoch in the annals of British warship-building begin—in the year 1905. This epoch is known as the “Dreadnought era,” from the name of the first battleship of that type. The leading men in Germany, however, realised the importance of the hour. They understood that it was not only the future of the German navy as such which was at stake, but that the question was wider still: namely, the question of the possibility, for Germany, to pursue henceforth, whether in Europe or beyond the seas, a policy which should not be dependent on England’s good will or displeasure. It is possible that the German Reichstag, and a large section of German public opinion, did not see so far ahead; but it was sufficient that they understood the welfare of the navy to be involved. The result was, that Germany at once proceeded, on the basis of the already existing Naval Law, to construct Dreadnoughts; and that the work of widening-up and deepening the canal between the Baltic and the North Sea, as well as all other canals, harbors, etc., was immediately begun. The naval and political decisions taken, in Germany, in 1905 and 1906, were of the highest importance; and their consequences have made themselves—and will continue to make themselves—felt far beyond naval circles. England’s attempt to “outdo” Germany by the invention of Dreadnoughts, had failed. For some years still it was believed, in England, that the Germans would not overcome the technical difficulties entailed by the construction of the new type of warship; but this illusion was destroyed in 1908.
If we consider the above-discussed attempt to “outbuild” the German navy in the light of England’s general policy, we shall see that the former was entirely consistent with all British historical traditions. The German Empire had never done England any harm, it pursued no hostile aims, it had not intrigued against British interests, it had not endeavored to engineer an anti-British coalition. The German Empire had, on the contrary, invariably acted in pure self-defence, whether from a political or from an economic point of view. History has never known a policy more peaceful than that pursued by German statesmen. The German fleet could not possibly, either in its conception or in its development, constitute a danger for Great Britain. None the less Germany was a great Continental Power, her trade and industry flourished, she claimed the right of protecting her national production, she tried to build herself a fleet: therefore must she be destroyed. How monstrous the English lies about the “German danger on the sea” were, is proved—but this is merely en passant—by the fact that in August 1914, after fifteen years’ activity, the German fleet, viewed as a whole, was not even half as strong as the British.