CHAPTER EIGHT
HARRIS
To this day, RAF Bomber Command’s role in World War Two is considered possibly the most controversial. Arguments continue to rage over his conduct, effectiveness, and morality in wartime. Some going to the extreme of suggesting it was a war crime. At the centre of this controversy stands ‘Bomber’ Harris, Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command. Many named him ‘Butcher’ and accuse him of irresponsibly and incompetently sending his crews on ‘missions impossible’. He is also accused of mistakenly believing that bombing alone would win the war. Conversely, others counter by arguing that by applying all the means available to him, combined with his hard work and dedication brought the war to a successful conclusion.
Arthur Travers Harris, born in England in 1892, left school at the age of sixteen years and went to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), taking a variety of jobs ranging from gold mining to farming. When World War One broke out in 1914, he joined the 1st Rhodesia Regiment as a bugler and participated in South African General Botha’s campaign in German South West Africa (Namibia). At the end of the campaign, he sailed to England and joined the Royal Flying Corps. For the remainder of the war he was in Home Defence fighter squadrons and in an artillery spotter squadron on the Western Front, finishing with the rank of major. He was decorated with an Air Force Cross and offered a permanent commission as Squadron Leader in the post-war RAF and stationed in India. For the remaining inter-war years, Harris was mainly posted overseas gaining promotion and experience in operations and intelligence.
From the start of World War Two, Harris was engaged in a variety of roles at the Air Ministry, until 23rd February 1942, when he took over as RAF Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command. For the next three years of war, there was seldom a night on which Bomber Command was not involved in some type of operation. His years of experience in the Air Ministry had given him a virtually limitless capacity for paperwork and the sheer volume he produced each day was huge by any standards. He had a good grasp for detail, both technical and non-technical, gleaned through his own experience. Once a week he would chair a Group Commanders' conference at High Wycombe, and similarly he would attend Marshall of the RAF, Sir Charles Portal's weekly conference in London. For these reasons, he did not show himself to his crews, yet they all felt his presence. He had been well known for his characteristics of bluntness and single-mindedness in the peacetime RAF. Harris's gruffness and cold, penetrating stare made him a difficult man to get to know well.
Harris assumed command of Bomber Command at a dark time for the Allies. Admittedly, Russia was fighting desperately, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had precipitated America's entry into the war, but otherwise the outlook was bleak. In the Far East the Japanese were sweeping all before them, while in North Africa, the British were on the back foot. Merchant shipping losses in the Atlantic were increasing alarmingly. The Russians had held the Germans before Moscow, but they were now clamouring for munitions from the Western Allies and increasingly agitating for the opening of a Second Front.
Harris maintained that, although he lacked the resources at this stage to carry out a decisive campaign, he had the only force in the West which then could take any offensive action at all against Germany. At least, his bombers would force the Germans to keep their fighters at home rather than use them against the Russians. Indeed, it would tie down a significant proportion of enemy manpower on defence of the homeland. Harris was no sooner ensconced at High Wycombe, however, when bombing policy was questioned. During 24/25th February 1942, a two-day debate on the conduct of the war was held in the House of Commons. A number of MPs complained of the seeming independence of Bomber Command, and Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, argued that the escape of the German warships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau after the incessant pounding which Bomber Command had given them 'does suggest that we are putting too much energy and too much of our manpower into the long-distance bombing policy'.
With aircraft available in operational squadrons being greater than the number of crews, the first requirement for Harris, was to try and increase the latter. At the same time, Harris wanted to force the Germans to spread their anti-aircraft defences as widely as possible in order to reduce their concentrations in the Ruhr and other prominent and important targets. It was then a question of finding a point in the enemy's air defence crust through which the bombers could be escorted by fighters and then choosing a route inland where they were unlikely to meet heavy fighter opposition. Harris needed a suitable and worthwhile target which could be easily located, and which could be attacked in daylight with the bombers returning in darkness.
Harris’s first major raid was against Augsburg, and in particular the MAN factory which produced diesel-engines, and was reputed to be the largest of its kind in Germany. The aiming-point was to be the machine assembly shop. Seven crews each from the first two Lancaster squadrons were chosen, under the command of South African Squadron Leader J. D. Nettleton. They pressed home and attacked, losing 7 aircraft; the remainder, all damaged, eventually made it back, including Nettleton himself, who was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross. While all applauded the gallantry shown and the fact that the machine assembly shop had been hit, it was quite clear to Harris that such raids, although spectacular, were too costly to be pursued in daylight with heavy bombers.
By the beginning of May 1942, Harris estimated that with 1 000 bombers, utilising operational training aircraft and crews, and calling on other Commands, especially Coastal, it was possible to attack the Ruhr or the vicinity. Harris decided on Cologne during the next full moon, which would be at the end of May. Having worked out his plan in some detail, Harris now had to sell his plan to Churchill, which he did on the 17th May.
Churchill was enthusiastic, and next day Harris saw Portal, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, asking him to seek assurance from the Admiralty that a sizeable Coastal Command contribution would be made. This Portal achieved and thus, Harris had his 1 000 bombers and more. Harris informed his Group Commanders of the plan. The objective was to cause a complete and uncontrollable conflagration throughout the target area. To that end the maximum number of incendiary bombs would comprise the main load. The date was fixed at 28th May or the first suitable night thereafter.
The operation order went out dated 23rd May, 1942. A significant amount of redeployment of aircraft was needed, especially of those from the other Commands. It was essential, however, that maximum secrecy be maintained. Then on 25th May, in the midst of the preparations, Harris was hit by a bombshell. The Admiralty suddenly stepped in and removed the whole of the Coastal Command contribution. No reasons appear to have been given. A further dredging of the Bomber Command Groups managed to raise the aircraft availability figure to 916, which still was not enough to reach the magic figure of 1 000. Harris decreed that all training and conversion flights within the operational groups would also be used. Although, the concentration of bombers over a target had been steadily increasing, there was now to be a 'quantum leap', with more than 1 000 bombers expected to deliver their loads in a period of only 90 minutes.
At his daily 09 00 hours conference, Harris decided that he could wait no longer for a suitable target within range, and Cologne was selected for that night. No less than 1 050 bombers took off from 55 airfields. When the first aircraft, arrived over the target, flak was light and they noticed that dummy fires had been lit outside the city. They dropped their incendiaries on each of three aiming-points in the centre of Cologne and then turned away, while the second wave began their attacks. Soon, there was an enormous conflagration, and the later aircraft had little difficulty in identifying the target. When the figures were correlated, it was found that 40 aircraft were missing (Churchill had been prepared for a loss of 100 and Harris 60), although a further 12 were so seriously damaged that they had to be written off and another 33 were categorised as seriously damaged. Even more encouraging was the fact that no less than 890 claimed to have hit the target, representing 540 tons of HE and 915 tons of incendiaries. Because of the enormous pall of smoke over the city, it was to be some days before the damage could be accurately assessed, but it was clear that Bomber Command had had a spectacular success.
The Press had a field-day: 'the greatest air operation ever planned and undoubtedly achieved the greatest single success in aerial warfare'. The normally sober headline of The Times proclaiming: 'OVER 1 000 BOMBERS RAID COLOGNE: Biggest Air Attack of the War. Of the many tributes which flowed into HQ Bomber Command, two meant more to Harris than any other. From Churchill: “I congratulate you and the whole of Bomber Command upon the remarkable feat of organisation which enabled you to dispatch over a thousand bombers to Cologne in a single night. The proof of the growing power of the British Bomber Force is also the herald of what Germany will receive, city by city, from now on”. Harris had shown what he could do if he had the aircraft.
On 13th June 1942, Harris told the Prime Minister that he intended to mount another 1 000-bomber operation during the June full moon and urged him to apply pressure to the Admiralty to release Coastal Command aircraft for it. Churchill in a minute of 15th June wrote to the First Sea Lord informing him of further 1 000 bomber raids and the necessity for Coastal Command to participate. The Admiralty offered 100 Hudson medium bombers, Harris had hoped for 250 aircraft, but, the Admiralty being adamant, he had again to draw heavily on training units for the next 1 000 Bomber Raid on 25th June 1942. This time the target was Bremen, and 1 006 aircraft took off.
Although considerable damage was caused to the town, especially to the Focke-Wulf factory, the results were disappointing. After the success of Cologne, Harris had hoped to make the 1 000 bomber raids the cornerstone of his campaign. On the evidence of the Cologne damage analysis, he believed that two to four successive raids of this size on a similar city would knock it out 'for any foreseeable duration of the war', and suggested that a list of 20-30 such towns be drawn up. Meanwhile, Harris relentlessly continued his battle to make Bomber Command the decisive weapon of the war, and bombarded Churchill with his views. Meanwhile, as the Bremen 1 000 Raid had only too amply demonstrated, the need to improve bombing accuracy was paramount. This was being tackled in two ways; by the formation of a specialist target marking force, and the introduction of new technical aids.
The idea of forming a special target marking force appears to have been first officially mooted in the Air Ministry in March 1942, when Group Captain Bufton, Deputy Director of Bomber Operations, suggested in a minute to Harris that he should designate six squadrons for this task, which could then concentrate on developing effective tactics. During the summer of 1942, Harris came round to Bufton's proposal. He was now convinced that the more effective the illumination the easier it would be to penetrate the industrial haze of the Ruhr, which was causing such problems at the time. He agreed to the need for a specialised role for expert crews and the use of flares or incendiaries in the vicinity of the target. In a letter dated 20th June he ordered four squadrons to be set aside for this purpose. Even more significant was the fact that at this very time the Germans began jamming the GEE direction finder. New technical aids were still under development, so for the rest of the year the newly formed Pathfinder Force was to be reliant on merely their own experience and natural ability to identify targets.
The two aiming devices on which Bomber Command was pinning its hopes for the future were OBOE and H2S. Meanwhile, the Pathfinder Force was cutting its teeth, and during the period August 1942 - January 1943 took part in 26 attacks. With the introduction of OBOE and H2S, there was every reason to presume that Bomber Command's offensive against Germany would really begin to bite in 1943. Especially with ever more huge four engined Lancaster heavy bombers coming off the production line, and the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) adding its weight to the fray. The Americans pinned their faith on the heavy armament of the B-17 four engined bombers and its Norden bombsight.
The end of 1942 saw Bomber Command in a much better position than it had been at the end of the previous year. OBOE had already been fitted to the Mosquito twin engined fast fighter bombers. The Pathfinders, too, were now obtaining proper Target Indicators (TI) and these were first used on Berlin on the night of 16/17 January. The effectiveness of the bombs themselves was also increasing, and by this time there was an 8 000lb High Capacity (HC) bomb in service, which was carried in modified Lancaster’s.
Operation ‘Chastise’, the Dams Raid of the night 16/17 May 1943, is undoubtedly, in terms of technical ingenuity, imaginative planning and courage, one of the greatest feats of RAF Bomber Command. Barnes Wallis, designer of the Wellington bomber and the man who made ‘Chastise’ technically possible, had been considering methods of attacking the dams since the outbreak of war. His ideas eventually generated sufficient interest for the Ministry of Aircraft Production to set up a special Air Attack on the Dams (AAD) Committee, which met three times during 1942. A number of tests were carried out by Wallis. Through these, Wallis developed his 'bouncing bomb' concept, but for a long time the Air Ministry were sceptical. Indeed, the Admiralty showed somewhat more enthusiasm for it as an anti-ship weapon.
Consequently, by the end of 1942, Wallis was working on two versions: ‘Highball’, which would be carried by a Mosquito for attacks against ships, and ‘Upkeep’, a larger version, which would be carried in a Lancaster for use against the dams.
Trials from a Wellington in Dorset at the beginning of 1943 proved the concept, and won the Air Ministry over. Harris was initially unenthusiastic: “This is tripe of the wildest description, there is not the smallest chance of its working”. Harris thought that this was another Admiralty diversion; he had only recently received the Casablanca Directive and was gearing himself up to launch his attacks on the Ruhr and other targets in Germany, in which the Lancaster was to be his cornerstone. Harris still poured scorn on the idea, something he later denied. Portal, who had lived with the idea of knocking out the dams since its inception, believed that the idea should be given a try, and three Lancaster’s were allocated for ‘Upkeep’ trials. By mid-March 1943, Harris had been told that the operation was to go ahead, and that twenty Lancaster’s would be modified to take ‘Upkeep’. Harris personally selected Wing Commander Guy Gibson to command 617 Squadron. Gibson epitomised all that was best in Bomber Command, having been awarded a DSO for his leadership and gallantry. The other highly trained and experienced pilots were all volunteers.
On 16th May 1943, nineteen Lancaster’s took off in three waves. The first, consisting of 9 aircraft led by Gibson himself, was to attack the Mohne Dam and then the Eder. Any aircraft with a bomb still on board after these two attacks would tackle the Sorpe. The second group, acting as a diversion for Gibson's group, would take a different route and go for the Sorpe. The third wave were to act as an airborne reserve. The outward and return routes would be flown at a height of 60 feet in order to avoid enemy radar. This was to cause three casualties on the outward trip. One of the second-wave aircraft had to return early when it hit the sea and lost its bomb, another hit a high tension cable and crashed. Another hit trees while trying to avoid flak. Three more were shot down by flak on the way out.
Gibson's wave breached the Mohne, losing one aircraft in the process, and then went on to attack the Eder which was successfully breached. Meanwhile, the second wave, had caused a small breach in the Sorpe Dam, which was later widened, but not decisively. Tragically, two aircraft were shot down on their way back, making a total of eight aircraft lost, only three members of the crews survived to become prisoners of war. As the aircraft returned, Harris and Wallis motored over to Scampton to greet them, and one of Harris's first actions was to telephone Churchill in Washington to inform him of the success of ‘Chastise’. The Dams Raid undoubtedly produced an enormous fillip not just for British morale, but to that of the Allies and the Occupied Countries. Among the many plaudits was one by Churchill, who used the success of the raid to reiterate the Allied bombing strategy when he addressed the US Congress on 19th May.
The Americans were clearly impressed, and it certainly helped the Combined Bomber Offensive plan to gain acceptance as official Allied policy, and a valuable morale booster to Bomber Command. It showed the skill and determination of which it was capable. It was these factors which made the raid so important, not so much the physical damage caused, which turned out not to be as substantial as first thought or hoped. Nevertheless, the lesson had once more been reinforced that the casualty rate was too high for Bomber Command to seriously contemplate.
The destruction of the major port and U Boat construction yard of Hamburg, was viewed by Harris as essential to reducing the industrial capacity of the enemy's war machine. Together with the effect on morale, success would play a very important part in shortening the war. Some 10 000 tons of bombs would be needed to complete the process. With the use of the dropping of aluminium strip foils successfully tested to jam radar defences, code named ‘WINDOW’, Harris planned Operation ‘Gomorrah’, as the offensive against Hamburg was called. Harris at his 09 00 hours conference gave the 'green light' for the night of 24/25 July 1943, and 791 Lancaster’s, Halifax’s, Stirling’s and Wellington’s took off for Hamburg. Each aircraft bound for Hamburg carried its own bundles of ‘WINDOW’ and the crews were instructed to drop them at one-minute intervals from the moment that they were within about 60 miles of the target. Their effect on the German defences was to prove devastating. The main force attacked the target with a mixture of H.E. and incendiaries. In the space of some fifty minutes, 728 aircraft dropped almost 2 400 tons of explosive on the target, with some 40 per cent getting within three miles of the aiming-point. Its effect on the ground was that of a firestorm, fanning the flames caused by the incendiaries, so that small fires quickly linked up. Such was the concentration of the attack, that the temperature quickly built up and fierce hot winds blew.
Night fighter crews and German controllers were totally confused; only twelve bombers were posted as missing. It was an auspicious beginning. The following day, the US Eighth Air Force joined in the battle, with 234 B-17 Fortresses being sent to the area, 68 of which attacked Hamburg specifically. That night, however, instead of going back to Hamburg, Harris launched a `maximum effort' on Essen, using ‘OBOE’ and ‘WINDOW’. It was the most destructive raid on Essen to date; fires were still burning two days later, and heavy damage was done to the Krupp's works. Aircraft losses, were comparatively light for Essen, with only 26 aircraft being shot down. During the day, the Americans paid another visit to Hamburg with 54 Fortresses attacking and 2 only being lost. The following night, a second major attack was launched against Hamburg. This time 787 bombers took off, and the effect was much more concentrated than the previous effort. ‘WINDOW’ again proved effective, but the Germans, now adopted a new system with the controllers concentrating on giving a running commentary on the height and position of the bomber stream rather than trying to acquire individual targets for the night fighters. Nevertheless, only 17 bombers were lost. Once again the firestorm raged.
The city was devastated by the raids, and it seemed that Bomber Command was now finally capable of inflicting decisive damage, with a significantly lower loss rate than hitherto. Hamburg had been selected as a target because it was the second most important city in Germany, also because, being near the coast it was easy to find. Whether the same results could be achieved against targets deeper into Germany remained to be seen.
On 3rd November 1943, Harris sent a minute to Churchill with some details of what had been achieved so far. He listed 19 towns and cities in Germany, which he claimed were 'virtually destroyed' and these included Hamburg, Cologne, Essen and the majority of the Ruhr towns. Under 'seriously damaged' were a further 19 population centres, including Munich, Nuremberg and Berlin, while a further 9 were considered 'damaged'. He said; “we can only claim what can be seen in the photographs. What actually occurs is much more than can be seen in any photograph”. As for future plans, he listed target areas in order of priority, with Berlin at the top. “I await promised USAAF help in this the greatest of air battles. But I would not propose to wait forever, or for long if opportunity serves. In conclusion, he wrote: “I feel certain that Germany must collapse before this programme which is more than half completed already. We must get the USAAF to wade in in greater force. If they will only get going according to plan and avoid such disastrous diversions as Ploesti. We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. It will cost between us 400-500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war”.
On 2/3 December Berlin was visited yet again, but there was a sharp rise in aircraft lost, with 40 out of 458 posted as missing. Nevertheless, in spite of these frustrations, Harris remained optimistic. On 7th December he wrote a formal letter to Churchill. He began by asserting that during the first ten months of 1943 Bomber Command had destroyed 25 per cent of the acreage of the 38 principal towns attacked, and believed that the enemy would 'capitulate'. So long as he was able to maintain the same tempo of attack, he calculated that this would be achieved by 1st April 1944. Based on a forecast loss rate of 5 per cent and the planned production of 212 Lancaster’s per month: stating “the Lancaster force alone should be sufficient for the devastation in which surrender is inevitable. This, however, is a reasonable expectation only if the assumptions made are actually fulfilled”; emphasising that Lancaster production must be increased over the next four months. Finally, he stressed that: “Time is an essential factor and if we are to fulfil our task by the 1st April 1944, or indeed at all, any delay in taking all measures possible to ensure the delivery of sufficient aircraft suitably equipped for their difficult task and adequately protected against the ever-increasing defences of the enemy is likely to prove fatal”. Harris clearly believed that Bomber Command, given the necessary tools, could finish the war on its own.
The Air Ministry had become increasingly concerned over the need to reduce German fighter strength and there was nothing to indicate that Harris had this in mind. It was pointed out that Harris's 38 principal cities contained only 11 per cent of the German population. He was reminded that the US Air Force's priorities were the wearing down of German fighter strength and the destruction of the German ball bearing industry as a prerequisite to ‘OVERLORD’ (code word for invasion of France), and that “as far as is practicable your efforts should be coordinated with and complementary to those of the US Air Force”. Harris was told, “Your night bombers would make the greatest contribution by completely destroying those vital industries which can be reached by day only at heavy cost; examples are Schweinfurt, Leipzig and centres of twin-engined aircraft”. He also believed that Hitler “could control German morale, but feared precision day attacks on vital industries”. In other words, Harris was being told that he must alter his complete policy. The suggestion of Schweinfurt as a target had already been put to Harris on 17th December. Harris had replied on the 23rd, and used much the same arguments as he had in 1942, pointing out that “the claims as to the actual percentage of Germany's ball-bearing supply manufactured in Schweinfurt have always been exaggerated and have been progressively reduced, even by their author”. He was quite certain that the Germans would have now dispersed this particular industry. He went on to say: “you must excuse me if I have become cynical with regard to the continual diversions of the bomber effort from its legitimate effort in which, as we all know, has inflicted the most grievous and intolerable damage to Germany. If Schweinfurt were a vital target, the US Air Force should be invited to carry out another attack on it, and if they can set the place alight in daylight, then we may have some reasonable chance of hitting it in the dark on the same night”.
Harris maintained that the main effect of 'de-housing' was the devastation of economic life. He also bridled at being reminded that his efforts should be complementary to those of the US Air Force, when Bomber Command had dropped ten times the bomb-load of the latter on Germany during 1943. And, in any event, the American effort had been mainly against fringe targets. The Air Ministry reiterated on 14th January 1944, stating that Harris was to attack “as far as practicable, those industrial centres associated with German fighter production and ball-bearing industries”. Although it was appreciated that there were tactical difficulties involved, it was believed that the task was not beyond the present operational capabilities of Bomber Command with the navigational aids now available. Armaments manufacturing centres, were specified as priority targets. Berlin not mentioned, Harris had been brought to heel. Nevertheless, during the first part of January 1944, attacks on Berlin were continued, despite the appalling weather. On the night of the 1/2 January, 421 Lancaster’s were sent against Berlin and 28 failed to return. The following night 383 Lancaster’s, Halifax bombers and Mosquitoes attacked and a further 27 were shot down.
The weather prevented any further major operations until the night of the 14th when 498 bombers attacked, losing 38 in the process. A third attack on Berlin, the largest yet, was mounted on 20/21 January, with 769 aircraft taking off, and 35 being shot down. Harris had no intention of complying with instructions, resulting in a more specific Air Ministry directive issued on 28th January. It reiterated the priority of attacks on the fighter aircraft and ball-bearing industries to be given top priority. Bomber Command and the US Air Force were to attack Berlin only when weather and tactical conditions were unsuitable for priority attacks. Harris, therefore, was being allowed very little leeway. Weather during the first part of February 1944, prevented any operations. The US Air Force, which at last had received the P-51 Mustang single engined long range fighter, now began daylight attacks on Berlin.
Harris next selected a target which had been little visited, but which was important both politically and economically. This was Nuremberg. Much has been written about this raid: suffice it to say that it was the worst night of the war for Bomber Command with 96 aircraft out of 795 being posted missing. Apart from the fact that Harris took a gamble on the weather, most of the losses were caused by a new tactic developed by the Germans. This had been first noticed during the Stuttgart attack on 15/16 March, when German night fighters had been divided into two forces. While one harried the bomber stream, the other was held back to deploy over the target. Once identified, they took advantage of the fact that the bomber formations were at their most concentrated during this phase of the operation. Nuremberg confirmed that the only answer to this was to divide the bomber force, and on 1st April Harris laid down that from now on the main force would attack at least two targets each time it operated. Otherwise, it was clearly a night that Harris wished to forget. As for the crews themselves, when they heard of the total casualty list, there was perhaps more relief at having survived than any despondency over the missing. Harris had failed in his attempt to bring Germany to her knees by 1st April 1944. In all, during the five months from November to March, he had dispatched 28 903 sorties by night, from which 1 128 aircraft had failed to return, and another 2 034 had been damaged. Yet, he had no time to bewail his failure or mourn his losses, for the Allies were about to embark on another phase of the war, the planning of which had been increasingly drawing his attention during the past few months.
As early as 26th April 1943, a directive had been issued to General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), ordering him to draw up plans whose object would be 'to defeat the German fighting forces in north-west Europe'. It would be some time before the British and American air staffs were drawn into the planning, mainly because they were too engrossed in the prosecution of bombing Germany into oblivion. Then, in August 1943, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was appointed Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). He advocated that the strategic air forces should also be brought in to give direct support to ‘OVERLORD’. The strategic air forces should switch 50 per cent of their effort to support the invasion during and after the landings. General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the Supreme Commander, and Harris and Eaker placed under his command. Harris accepted the commitment to "OVERLORD" and expressed himself 'most ready' to discuss the matter with the AEAF Commanders. He did, however, request confirmation that the overall aim of bombing Germany still held good, and that in order to prevent 'the whole of the German fighter force being transferred to the invasion beaches, the bomber offensive must be maintained. Tactical bombing during the landings and beyond was only feasible if the weather was right. Harris then discussed the problems of bombing accurately by night, outlining the limitations of his technical aids, the problems over weather, the fact that the Pathfinder Force could not mark more than two targets in one night and that if used more than two nights in a row its efficiency would be impaired.
He warned that any cessation of attacks against Germany would lead to a resurgence of German strength and morale. In conclusion, he wrote: “It is thus clear that the best and indeed the only efficient support which Bomber Com