CHAPTER TEN
GUDERIAN
The credit for the establishment of the German armoured forces and their subsequent unique place in the history of warfare must go principally to General Guderian more than to any other officer. His inter-war career had been directed to one specific aim; the creation of a mechanized army whose tactical concept was the blitzkrieg. Unlike his contemporaries in the British and French armies, Guderian appreciated that the tank, in co-operation with infantry, artillery and air power, would produce a combination of mobility and velocity, to surprise and defeat the enemy.
Guderian took tank tactics by the scruff of the-neck and thrashed out a new and revolutionary branch of tank warfare. He used his Panzers as strike weapons to thrust deep into his enemy's heart, moving as fast as possible and without stopping to consolidate. This role was given to the infantry following fast behind.
Heinz Guderian had been born in Kulm on the Vistula on 17th June 1888. His father was an army officer, but most of his close relations were professional men or landed gentry. His outstanding intelligence did not express itself in the conventional field of operational strategy; Guderian was always a rebel in his profession, his mind always attuned to the possibilities of innovation. He also possessed a single-minded determination and was a man of his times, rare in the military profession where most lag behind it.
The last two years of World War One had offered a number of clues to solving the principal problem which had beset both sides; the immobilisation of fixed defensive lines. The most obvious of these clues was the future potential of mechanisation, of mobilising both firepower (the tank) and troop movements (motorised infantry). The Germans had achieved little in this respect during the war, but the British successes were not forgotten in its aftermath. And Guderian studied them in detail.
Guderian had secured a place in the Reichswehr, and because of his interests was given a post in the Inspectorate of Transport Troops. He began to study the writings of British Army officers Fuller and Liddell Hart that expanded his ideas. It was not merely a tactical improvement he was aiming at, he began to realise, but a revolutionary development of awesome implications.
Practical experience was essential. Since Versailles had forbidden the Germans real tanks, Guderian constructed dummy ones, cars draped in sheet metal. It was not just the weapons which fascinated him; there was also the question of their insertion into the existing structure of the Army.
He became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry support could never achieve decisive importance. The exercises carried out with mock-ups had persuaded him that tanks would never be able to produce their full effects until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and cross-country performance. In such a formation of all arms, the tanks must play the primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armour. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions; what was needed were armoured divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to allow the tanks to fight with full effect.
This was easier said than done. Fortunately for Guderian he had a sympathetic superior at the Transport Department, and allowed to create a Motor Transport Battalion. The four companies, true to Guderian's all-arms theory, were composed of tanks, anti-tank weapons, motorcycles, and armoured reconnaissance vehicles. The greatest boon was a visit from the new Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, in 1933. Watching Guderian's units going through their paces, Hitler could see Lebensraum opening up before his eyes. “That's what I want! That's what I need”! He said excitedly. Guderian, as yet not privy to the Fűhrer's dreams, could only be grateful for such vindication. Hitler had won him over. At least for the time being.
Accordingly, Hitler's expansion of the truncated Reichswehr contained provision for three panzer divisions. All that remained for Guderian was to convince the Army High Command, with, if need be, Hitler's assistance, that they be used in a certain way. Through the first six years of the thousand-year Reich he published numerous articles to this effect, and a book, "Achtung! Panzer!' (Attention! Tanks!).
How should the panzer divisions be used? To Guderian the answer was clear. Their essential asset was their mobility; it must not be wasted in frontal assaults on prepared defensive positions. Such work, the pinning down of the enemy front, was for the less mobile infantry. The panzers should bypass what the enemy defends and must go for the flanks, and vulnerable spots. In the nineteenth century the flanks of a nation at war were no longer the flanks of its fighting armies; they were the supply lines and command channels which maintained those armies in existence as a collective force.
Introducing a new method into the military, and then to sustain it, is a particular achievement. There is always resistance to change from conservative thinkers to anything new, and this was emphatically so in the German army in the years before 1939. The older-established regiments were particularly reluctant to accept mechanisation. But their powerful opposition led ultimately to a compromise which was to produce a far more effective fighting unit. It prevented the dominance of the tank over all other arms and led to a closely knit fighting formation based on intimate co-operation between tanks, infantry, artillery and air power.
Guderian, instrumental in creating this force, received acknowledgement of his efforts by being given command of the 19th Armoured Corps. It was a unique honour for a soldier who was the creator of a new concept, to be given the opportunity to put the method to the test. The blitzkrieg campaigns in Poland and France were to prove beyond doubt that Guderian the innovator, was also Guderian the brilliant tactical commander.
Poland, for the German Army, was the hors-oeuvre before the final reckoning with France. At dawn on 1st September 1939, the 19th Armoured Corps commanded by General Heinz Guderian at the spearhead of the German 3rd Army rumbled over the frontier into Poland. The era of the blitzkrieg had begun. Guderian, well forward with his leading troops, travelled in an armoured command vehicle. For a Corps commander to move and command so far forward was a unique innovation, but above all, Guderian was an innovator.
His new command consisted of the 3rd Panzer Division and the 2nd and 20th Motorised Infantry Divisions. As they crossed the frontier, the 3rd Panzer Division, had been given the task of advancing to and crossing the River Vistula. The 2nd Motorised Division was to break through and destroy the Polish frontier defences while the 20th Motorised Division was to secure the northern flank. The overall Corps task was to cut off and destroy the Polish troops in the Polish Corridor.
The main thrust was to be made by the 3rd Panzer Division and this was where, not surprisingly, Guderian placed himself. Being a forward tank commander had its dangers, and an initial setback robbed Guderian of his armoured command vehicle. The divisional artillery was firing short and he was forced into a ditch. But he quickly re-joined the 3rd Division, much to the surprise of the leading commander who had halted on the river bank. The commander was keen to take a rest and not attempt a crossing of the river until the following day. Guderian was not impressed by his approach and while admonishing him, a young officer, who had just returned from the other side of the river reported there was still a bridge intact and that the Polish defences were weak.
Guderian went forward to the river's edge, located the enemy position, and personally briefed a motor-cycle battalion to cross, followed quickly by tanks. The result was the capture of the Polish company defending the sector. The bridgehead was consolidated and the advance continued over the River Vistula. Guderian had always insisted that for success in the blitzkrieg the commander had to be well forward 'reading the battle' and be prepared to take calculated risks; he had done just that. By the night of 2nd September the Corps reconnaissance troops had reached the River Vistula, and the Motorized Infantry Division followed up quickly. The Polish Corridor had been breached.
The tactical success of Guderian's advance is shown in the relatively small expenditure of lives, some 150 killed and 700 wounded out of a force of about 50 000 men. Hitler, visiting the Corps after its successes, remarked that this was in great contrast to his own experience in World War One. Guderian had realised the vital fact that successful blitzkrieg tactics meant avoiding head on attacks by bypassing the enemy and quickly reaching the rear of his positions. Where a head-on attack was inevitable, reconnaissance elements would accurately locate the enemy, and the tanks and infantry supported by dive-bombers would then destroy the opposition so that the advance could continue rapidly.
Guderian's Corps was now ordered to join General von Kuchler's 3rd Army. This was not to his liking. He suggested to the Army Group Chief of Staff that he should be directed by Army Group Command, and work on the left of von Kuchler where the non-mechanized infantry would not slow down his tank advance. Guderian realized that a slow advance determined by infantry pace would allow the Poles to withdraw and establish another defensive line. A rapid Panzer advance would prevent this happening.
The 19th Corps was now reinforced by the addition of the 10th Panzer Division and given the formidable task of advancing to Brest-Litovsk by crossing the River Narev and then following the east bank of the River Bug. The crossing of the Narev at Visna by the 10th Panzer Division's' infantry went well. But on one of his visits to the forward edge of the battle area, Guderian discovered that they had made no attempt to seize the Polish defensive positions: They were across the river but they had not reached the concrete defence emplacements on the far bank. For the time being nothing was happening. Guderian, therefore crossed the river himself to see the Regimental commander. And found himself in the front line; there was no sign of the division's tanks, which were all still on the north bank of the river. Guderian ordered them across immediately. This intervention from a front line position was typical of Guderian
The tanks had by now started to cross by ferry and newly constructed bridges. The 3rd and 10th Panzer Divisions pressed on again, capturing the 18th Polish Division and its commander. By 14th September, the reconnaissance troops of the 10th Panzer Division had reached the line of fortified positions outside Brest-Litovsk.
Guderian, acting with flair and judgement, ordered the entire corps to move rapidly forward to Brest-Litovsk.
The advance to Brest-Litovsk had been a masterpiece of simplicity and tactical brilliance. After crossing the River Narev, the 20th Motorized Division advanced on the Corps' right flank, thereby engaging the Poles and giving the impression of a major thrust at this point. Meanwhile the tactics of deep penetration were put into effect by the 3rd and 10th Panzer Divisions. Guderian had given them the task of advancing on the left flank, bypassing opposition and thus outflanking the Poles and striking in depth towards Brest-Litovsk. This was textbook blitzkrieg: a feint designed to confuse the enemy and draw attention from the real attack.
Both Panzer divisions advanced rapidly: 20 to 30 miles a day, with their reconnaissance regiments well forward locating the Polish opposition. When contact was made, minor opposition was destroyed by quick attacks involving the close cooperation of panzers, infantry, artillery and air support. Stronger positions were simply bypassed. It is an impossible situation for the defenders to hold out when enemy forces are in their rear; the Poles were no exception. The Polish defenders facing the 20th Motorized Division and finding both Panzer divisions behind them, surrendered. Their communications gone, the Poles fell back towards Brest-Litovsk.
Guderian's strategic thrust in depth to Brest-Litovsk was a master stroke. It fulfilled all the dictates of the blitzkrieg mobility, velocity, and indirect approach. The link-up of Guderian's Corps with the Russians at Brest-Litovsk had enormous political significance. Guderian's reward was the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross: “It seemed to me to be primarily a vindication of my long struggle for the creation of the new armoured force”.
The campaign gave the German army the opportunity to evaluate the blitzkrieg. The results spoke for themselves. The Polish nation lay in ruins, an entire army of 750 000 men and its equipment lost. The German debit balance by comparison was insignificant, some 8 000 dead and 200 tanks lost. However, some refinements had to be introduced before Hitler could launch his mechanized forces on the next military task in compliance with his expansionist policy.
The German High Command, ordered by Hitler to take the offensive in the west, was intending to put into operation the outmoded Schlieffen plan of 1914, a thrust in the north of Belgium. This was a totally predictable line of approach. The Maginot Line naturally reduced the possibility of an attack in the south, and the French and British considered the Ardennes impassable to tanks. General von Manstein, Chief of Staff to von Rundstedt, could not accept this uninspired and desolate plan. After discussions' with Guderian, he submitted a plan to the High Command proposing a feint attack in the north, and a major tank thrust through the Ardennes towards Sedan, splitting the French defences in two.
Guderian gave von Manstein’s plan his full support, and emphasized the importance of using all the Panzer divisions for the major Ardennes thrust. But to get this plan accepted became a continuous struggle for Manstein and Guderian, and at a war game in Koblenz on 7th February the Chief of the Army General Staff, Colonel General Halder, declared that it was “senseless”. Because of his determined insistence on the plan, Manstein was relieved of his contact with Panzers and given command of an infantry corps. During a subsequent war game on 14th February the old Schlieffen plan was again discussed and decided upon as the best solution. Both Guderian and Manstein, declared emphatically that they had no confidence in the plan or the proposed employment of the armour by the High Command.
The final decision was forced on the High Command by an apparently insignificant event. A courier, flying at night with vital papers containing references to the Schlieffen plan, was brought down on Belgian soil and it was impossible to know if he had destroyed his papers. This, coupled with Hitler's personal liking for the more daring Manstein plan, decided the course of, action. A feint attack was to be made by moving against Holland and Belgium in the north, giving the impression that the Schlieffen plan was being pursued. But the decisive blow was to come in the Ardennes, delivered by the Panzer Corps that were positioned in depth. The remainder of the army together with Schmidt's 39th Panzer Corps and Hoeppner's 16th Panzer Corps moved against Holland, Belgium and the Maginot Line. The Panzer Corps comprising Hoth's 15th, Reinhardt's 41st and Guderian's 19th were to strike at the supposedly impassable tank country of the Ardennes.
Guderian's Corps, consisting of three Panzer Divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 10th, was given the difficult task of crossing the Meuse at Sedan. The High Command had given no further instructions if the crossing proved a success. Guderian himself had no doubts, he had told Hitler “unless I receive orders to the contrary I intend the next day to continue my advance westwards. The Supreme leadership must decide whether my objective is Paris or Amiens. In my opinion the correct course is to drive past Amiens to the English Channel”.
The defending Anglo-French forces could muster some 4 000 armoured vehicles against the 2 800 of the German Army, so the numerical odds were on the Anglo-French side. But in quality there was not much to choose between the two armies. The Char B was the best French tank mounting a 47mm gun and their Somua, a faster tank, also carried a 47mm gun. The armour of the French tanks was normally thicker than the German, but the British light tanks were vulnerable. British infantry tanks with 70mm of armour were proof against the German anti-tank guns, and their 2- pounder gun could penetrate any German armour. The Germans mustered 627 of the good Mark III and IV Panzers, but 1 478 of their tanks were the earlier and less efficient Mark I and II’s. But the critical fact was deployment. Whereas the Anglo-French armoured forces were scattered throughout the battle area, the German Panzers were concentrated and commanded as an entity.
At 05 30 hours on 10th May, 1940 Guderian's force struck out across the Luxembourg frontier. The General was well forward with the 1st Panzer Division and the advanced guard had soon passed over the Belgian frontier and made contact with the airborne forces that had been dropped in the rear of the forward battle area. But extensive road demolitions were encountered, and they could not advance as deep as their commander wanted. On the following day the path was cleared and the 1st Panzer Division pressed forward again. .
The north bank of the Meuse was quickly taken and Sedan fell. The Meuse crossing, the more difficult second phase, began with the prearranged air attack. The French positions were pounded by wave after wave of Stuka"s, Guderian's mobile artillery. The attacks were concentrated on Huntziqer's French Second Army. The French artillery were offered superb targets as the German forces massed for the main river crossing but the opportunity could not be taken. The Stuka"s had severed all communications, and prevented the much needed defensive fire. Guderian records the French artillery was almost paralysed by the increasing threat of attack by Stuka"s and bombers.
After six hours of continuous battering, panic developed and the French Commander was staggered to see his troops retreating past his headquarters. Guderian now decided to push his infantry across the river in rubber boats to deceive the French into thinking the front had broken. The ploy worked. General Georges telephoned his group commanders and ordered them to destroy their guns and retreat; and widespread panic broke out behind the French divisions still trying to hold the front.
Guderian now launched the Panzers of the 1st Division in a concentrated thrust against the widely dispersed French armour and quickly finalized the victory. His skilled tactical handling had produced a refinement of blitzkrieg tactics, a preliminary pounding by Stuka"s and artillery, an infantry assault and a rapid Panzer exploitation.
On 15th May, von Kleist ordered a halt to all further advances, Guderian reacted violently to this and demanded the order should be rescinded. After a heated discussion, von Kleist agreed that the 19th Corps could advance for a further 24 hours. On 16th May, a French order was captured which indicated that the defence was having difficulty in holding the line. Guderian instantly appreciated its significance and read the order out to his troops. They had been advancing continuously for seven days, but realizing that complete victory was within their grasp they surged forward again. Once more the Supreme Command ordered a halt on 17th May. General von Kleist arrived and remonstrated with Guderian for disobeying orders. It was clear to Guderian that there was a total lack of understanding of blitzkrieg tactics at Supreme Headquarters, and threatened to resign.
Colonel General von Rundstedt, alarmed at the disagreement between his senior officers, told Guderian to assume command again, obey the order to halt but carry out a reconnaissance in force. In effect this gave Guderian the scope he needed. Nevertheless it was not until 19th May that his corps received orders to attack in strength. Ironically they were now crossing the old Somme battlefields of World War One but the blitzkrieg was in complete contrast to 1914-18 methods and this time victory was virtually secure.
The old city of Amiens now lay before Guderian's forces, and with his customary style he wanted to participate in the attack. By midday the city had fallen. During the night the infantry battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division pushed through Novelles and was to become the first German unit to reach the Channel coast.
Prisoners and equipment were now falling into the hands of the advancing Panzer Corps with monotonous regularity. In Amiens, a British artillery battery lined up on the barrack square and equipped only with training ammunition was captured complete. But the momentum of the advance was slowing, and the next day was spent in waiting for orders. Guderian was impatient. Orders were eventually received on 21st May to continue the advance and capture the channel ports, but with only two divisions, the 10th Panzer Division had been detached and placed in reserve. If it had been possible to deploy the three divisions, Guderian's plan would have been to make for Dunkirk. But two divisions reduced his flexibility, and the less ambitious objective of Boulogne was chosen.
The Panzers had outstripped their air cover by the afternoon of the next day, and fierce fighting was in progress on the outskirts of Boulogne. It was to be another four days before the town eventually fell. The German demand for surrender to Brigadier Nicholson, the town commander, was returned with the reply: “No. It is the British Army's duty to fight as well as it is the German's”. It was decided to return the 10th Panzer Division to Guderian together with the SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. Instantly he changed his tactical plan. The 1st Panzer Division struck out for Dunkirk and the 10th Panzer encircled Calais.
Guderian's brilliant tactical handling of the three divisions had brought absolute victory within sight. Then an unpredictable order from Hitler demanded a halt to the advance. Dunkirk and Calais were to be left to the Luftwaffe. The General wrote: “We were utterly speechless. But since we were not informed of the reasons for this order, it was difficult to argue against it”. Guderian told his Panzers to hold the line of the canal they had reached and make maximum use of the time for rest. Under Sepp Dietrich the Leibstandarte Division disobeyed orders and occupied the far bank of the canal. But Guderian supported the move which had been made for sound tactical reasons. And he moved in the 2nd Panzer Division in support.
The 10th Panzer Division were poised ready to capture Calais; Guderian asked the Divisional Commander if he wanted the town left to the Luftwaffe. They jointly agreed that this was not necessary and the division attacked contrary to orders. In the afternoon, the British surrendered: “We took 20 000 prisoners including between 3 000 and 4 000 British, the remainder being French, Belgian and Dutch of whom the majority had not wanted to go on fighting and whom the English had therefore locked up in cellars”.
On the afternoon of 26th May, Hitler at last gave the order for the advance on Dunkirk to continue. What triumphs the 19 Corps would have achieved if they had been allowed to take Dunkirk when it was first a possibility is open to speculation. Certainly the delay prevented the overwhelming victory that was within Guderian's grasp.
The British attack on the German extended flank at Arras was precisely what Hitler had feared might happen; this influenced him to issue the notorious "halt order" before Dunkirk. An order that has been the subject of debate almost since it was issued and interpreted in many ways. Some claim that Hitler wished to spare the British the humiliation of total surrender, in the hope that this would make them more amenable to a peace settlement.
Others argue that he wished to give Göring, the commander of the Luftwaffe a share of the glory, by allowing him to finish off the trapped British troops. However, perhaps the most credible explanation is that Hitler did not want to commit his panzer forces in the swampy terrain around Dunkirk. He needed to conserve, re-group, and re-fit them for the next phase of the campaign in France. Whatever the reason, it meant that the chance of reaching Dunkirk before the British was missed and the Germans were unable to complete their overall objective; which was the total destruction of all the Allied armies.
Meanwhile, the Belgian army finally surrendered on 28th May, which left the British flank wide open and effectively sealed the fate of the BEF in France. With their head now in a noose, they had no choice other than to evacuate to England; by 4th June, three hundred and thirty eight thousand British and French troops escaped in "the miracle of Dunkirk". There was much rejoicing in Britain about the rescue operation and the media hyped this into a major victory; thus prompting Churchill to announce that "wars are not won by evacuations”.
To this day, the phrase 'the Dunkirk spirit' has passed into the English language. It epitomises some of the primary virtues which the British like to claim for themselves. But just how close is the relationship of the Dunkirk spirit to the Dunkirk facts? Of course, there was courage and faith in abundance before, during and immediately after the incredible operation which saved the bulk of the British army from death or capture, and preserved the nucleus of the British Army for future campaigns. No one would wish to deny that. But in reality, a long, close and hard look at this single event which, it may be cogently argued, shaped the course of the war.
Had the full truth been known at the time, the nation's exultation at its deliverance would have been greatly dimmed. And the Dunkirk spirit, which helped to sustain the British people through five more hard years of war was to a considerable extent based on a myth. A necessary myth, which was eagerly embraced by a nation under the spell of Churchill's oratory. For while the soldiers, or most of them, displayed fortitude, there was deception, conflict and contradictory orders at the political and high command level. It may be argued, that in war, it is sometimes necessary to deceive allies, as well as enemies on the morality of actions taken by desperate men as catastrophe loomed ever nearer.
Two days after the fall of Dunkirk the new and larger Panzer Gruppe Guderian was formed. The first objective for Panzer Gruppe Guderian was southwards to the Plateau de Langres. French opposition was strong. They adopted the tactics of defending the woods and towns strongly, leaving the open spaces for the Panzers to progress freely. The River Aisne was well defended, and it was some time before a sizeable bridgehead could be established. After fierce fighting, the crossing of the river was successfully completed, and the Panzers exploited forward to Chalons.
At this point, Guderian experienced difficulty with the High Command: “From now on the Panzer Group received contradictory orders, some ordering a swing towards the east, others a continuation of the advance southwards”. Somehow, Guderian directed his victorious force on the most advantageous route. On 15th June Langres fell, and the Commander arrived in the town at midday. He was already considering the next move. No instructions had been received from the Army High Command, and Guderian sent back a liaison officer suggesting an advance to the Swiss frontier. By 17th June the 29th Motorized Infantry Division had reached the border, Guderian was personally forward in the battle taking instant and accurate decisions. He signalled Supreme Headquarters indicating that he had reached the Swiss border at Pontarlier, to which HQ signalled back “Your signal based on error. Assume you mean Pontailler sur Saone'. The reply was curt: 'No error. Am at Pontarlier on Swiss border”.
The French Army in Alsace Lorraine was now trapped. Since crossing the Aisne
Panzer Gruppe Guderian had captured 250 000 prisoners. On 22nd June the French Government agreed to an armistice. For Guderian the campaign in the west was over. His reward was promotion to Colonel General, and the oak leaves for his Knight's Cross. The achievements of the campaign were summed up in Guderian's farewell message to his soldiers: “The victorious advance from Aisne to the Swiss border and the Vosges will go down in history as an example of a breakthrough by mobile troops. I thank you for what you have done, it has been the finest fulfilment to my labours and struggles of more than a decade's duration”.
Now it was to be the turn of Russia!
Hitler's assertion that continued British resistance made elimination of Russia a strategic imperative was mere gloss, designed to quiet his generals, perhaps even to quiet himself. Göring and Raeder urged that the defeat of Britain would leave Germany in a stronger position vis-á-vis the Soviet Union, and made far greater strategic sen