The Arctic Region Security Environment
The Arctic generally remains an area of cooperation, ranging from scientific, environmental, and economic collaboration under the auspices of the Arctic Council to military and coast guard cooperation to enhance maritime domain awareness and improve search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, exercise sovereignty, conduct bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and develop Arctic transportation.
Friction points, however, do exist. The most significant disagreements from the United States' perspective are the way that Canada and Russia regulate navigation in Arctic waters claimed under their jurisdiction. Canada claims all waters within the Canadian Arctic islands as historic internal waters, requiring Canada’s permission to transit, including the waters of the Northwest Passage (NWP), which the United States views as an international strait. Canada also claims authority, through regulations referred to as “NORDREGs,” to deny entry to the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond the outer Canadian Arctic islands of ships that do not report in advance to the Canadian Coast Guard.
Russia makes a similar historic internal water claim about three international straits along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Further, Russia's NSR regulations require permits for ships, including sovereign immune vessels, to transit the NSR, which includes all of the territorial sea and EEZ of Russia’s claimed Arctic waters. The United States has protested these excessive maritime claims as inconsistent with international law and does not recognize them. This will likely remain an issue on which the United States and a number of other nations will continue to disagree with Canada and Russia.
NATO created Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOPs) at the Wales Summit in 2014. EOPs are more involved in NATO decision-making by participating in earlier and higher-level political consultations. NATO's five EOPs are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden.
Diminishing sea ice will give rise to new economic opportunities in the region while simultaneously increasing concerns about human safety and protection of a unique ecosystem that many indigenous communities rely on for subsistence. In the near term, the increasing rate of coastal erosion similarly will threaten DoD’s Arctic coastal infrastructure. In the mid- to far-term, as ice recedes and resource extraction technology improves, competition for economic advantage and a desire to exert influence over an area of increasing geostrategic importance could lead to increased tension. These economic and security concerns may increase the risk of disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic nations over access to Arctic shipping lanes and natural resources.
Recent Russian strategy documents emphasize the importance of the Arctic region to Russia and its national economy. Primary sources of revenue for Russia are generated through the energy and transportation sectors located in the northwestern region of the country. More than 20 percent of Russia’s landmass lies above the Arctic Circle. Moscow has identified four main national interests in the Arctic: to use Russia’s Arctic region as a national strategic resource base to support the country’s socio-economic development; to preserve the region as a zone of peace and cooperation; to protect the environment; and to develop the NSR for transportation. Russian strategy documents also outline top priorities, which include: defense, continental shelf delimitation, and improving Arctic transportation and communication infrastructure.
Intensifying Russian cooperation with Arctic nations and international organizations, including the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, is one of Russia’s strategic priorities. Russia delivered a partial revised extended continental shelf (ECS) submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2015. In making its formal submission to the CLCS, Russia followed the appropriate procedure under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. As of this writing, the CLCS is reviewing the data and analysis submitted by Russia and will make recommendations on the outer limits of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic. This technical step is a part of the recognized process by which coastal States secure legal certainty in their sovereign rights and jurisdiction with respect to continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. It is important to note that Russia’s submission does not include any areas where the United States may in the future establish its extended continental shelf. Although the United States has not acceded to the LOSC, the United States respects this process, which has facilitated an orderly and rules-based approach to delineating the extent of the continental shelf for countries around the world.
Canada views itself as a maritime nation with unique responsibilities, opportunities, and benefits due to its extensive Arctic coastline and maritime territory. Canada maintains that the NWP, which consists of a series of routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian archipelago, has the status of historical internal waters, a view not shared by the United States, the European Union (EU), or other nations. Canada also claims authority to deny transit through the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone beyond its northern Arctic islands of ships that do not report in advance to the Canadian Coast Guard.
The Kingdom of Denmark is an Arctic nation by virtue of its historical ties to Greenland and the Faroe Islands and its current responsibilities for foreign affairs and defense on behalf of Greenland. The Kingdom of Denmark and Russia have overlapping ECS submissions to the CLCS, which has no authority to determine maritime boundaries; it is up to nations to resolve boundary disputes diplomatically. In 2013, the Ministry of Defense in Copenhagen established a Joint Arctic Command, which maintains a working-level liaison relationship with Thule Air Base, and the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in Greenland. Both entities maintain small permanent staffs to provide search and rescue service and patrols, marine environmental protection, and support to civilian authorities.
The Kingdom of Denmark has limited domain awareness and response capacity due to the vastness of the region and a comparative lack of assets, infrastructure, and investment. Although stating that regional maritime security is a priority, in 2016 the Danish government cautioned commercial shipping and cruise lines about the harsh operating conditions and limited SAR assets in the region, implying that Danish defense forces may not be available for emergency assistance.
In June 2016, the Kingdom of Denmark released its Arctic Strategy. Citing the need for improved domain awareness; improved command, control and communication; and more operational capacity, Denmark has budgeted approximately $18 million per year over the next decade for Arctic-specific defense investments. Funds will be used for an additional naval patrol vessel, an increase in Joint Arctic Command staff, and assets for domain awareness, including potential commercial satellite coverage and unmanned aircraft solutions.
Finland does not have a coastline on the Arctic Ocean; however, nearly one-third of its territory lies north of the Arctic Circle. All of Finland’s Baltic Sea ports require icebreaking services in the winter. Finland is a leader in icebreaking technology and ice-capable ship construction and in extreme cold weather operations. Finland is also an EOP with NATO.
Iceland views Arctic issues as vital to its national identity and foreign policy. It is important to note that the small island of Grimsey located 40 kilometers north of the main island is the basis for Iceland’s claim as an Arctic nation. The Arctic Circle passes through this five square kilometer island with fewer than 100 inhabitants. As a small nation with no military of its own, Iceland relies on NATO guarantees for territorial defense.
Norway views the Arctic as a top foreign and domestic policy priority. With one-third of its landmass, more than 10 percent of its population, and 80 percent of its territorial sea and EEZ lying above the Arctic Circle, Norway views Arctic development and stability as critical to both its security and its economy. Melting sea ice has increased the economic potential for the development of the Norwegian Arctic, including commercial shipping and oil and gas extraction. Norway emphasizes predictability and transparency as important for maintaining its “High North—low tension” policy.
Sweden does not have a coastline on the Arctic Ocean, but almost one-third of its territory lies north of the Arctic Circle. Some of Sweden’s ports in the Gulf of Bothnia require icebreaker service in the winter. Sweden’s Arctic Strategy identifies three main priorities: climate and the environment, with an emphasis on biodiversity protection; economic development in the Arctic and Barents Sea region; and the human dimension, which includes the preservation of Saami language and culture. Like Finland, Sweden is a NATO EOP.
Non-Arctic States, particularly those with robust maritime sectors, have sought to increase their influence in the region and safeguard their ability to access potential resources and transit routes. Arctic Council Observers include France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India. The EU released an Arctic Strategy in 2013, reiterating its commitment to playing a bigger role in facilitating research, promoting climate change policies, and fostering cooperation.
Source: https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf