In February 1942, the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau together with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen slipped out of Brest harbour on the French Atlantic coast. Under Hitler’s orders they were embarking on a daring attempt to escape to the safety of German home waters. In so doing the Germans would strike a humiliating blow at British air and sea power by impudently sailing their big capital ships in broad daylight through the English Channel right under the very noses of the British admiralty.
This remarkable achievement by the German navy would succeed where the Spanish Armada four centuries previously had failed and it would leave the British people stunned and infuriated. What was the reason for this audacious World War Two operation? Possibly, there were several factors which influenced Hitler to order the German fleet home. One reason was his concern about the intensification of British air raids on Brest Harbour. In 8 months the RAF had dropped 4 000 tons of bombs and it was becoming increasingly difficult to protect the ships from this aerial bombardment. There were also the numerous British commando raids on the Norwegian coastline that convinced Hitler that Norway was the most vulnerable region of his Atlantic Wall.
However, possibly the main reason was that he was particularly concerned about the effect the British arctic convoys were having on his war against Russia. These convoys were shipping crucial war supplies around the Norwegian coast to his Soviet enemy on the Eastern Front. The impatient Hitler was no longer prepared to tolerate three great ships bottled up in Brest; especially when the German Navy was at this time fighting a war on three fronts; namely, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Arctic. Hitler wanted to concentrate all his surface naval strength in the north, stating that any surface ship that was not in Norway was in the wrong place.
He pressurised his navy chiefs by ordering them to return the capital ships to home waters or they would be decommissioned; and their guns mounted as shore batteries. The Battle of the Atlantic which was now at its height since the Americans had come into the war was to be left to the U-boats alone. This proposal, one should imagine, placed the German navy commanders in a terrible dilemma. On the one hand there was the prospect of the RAF's destructive air power, and on the other the Führer was threatening that unless the ships were brought home he would dismantle them.
The prospect of scrapping the fleet horrified the German navy chiefs as it would present the British with a bloodless victory, and be a death sentence to the German Navy. Admiral Raeder was determined that this would not happen. Most German naval planners had also come to realise that they had few options other than to return their ships through the Channel. To take them by the northern route round Scotland, which had proved a grave for the Bismarck, would subject them to enemy air power operating from land plus the superior Anglo-American battle fleets. Hitler accepted that the chances of bringing the ships safely through the Channel were only fifty-fifty, but, as always, being prepared to gamble, he insisted that a breakthrough was the only viable alternative. However, he was adamant that the risk would only be feasible if absolute secrecy was maintained and providing the enemy was taken completely by surprise.
To the complete amazement of his navy commanders, he ordered the ships to be brought through the Dover Straits in broad daylight. A naval operation of this magnitude within sight of the English coast was without precedent and would be in utter defiance of the traditional use of capital ships.
However, Hitler’s proposal deserves closer examination; initially it must have appeared tempting for the Germans to sail through the Straits of Dover at night under the cover of darkness. But the disadvantage was that the ships would have to leave Brest in broad daylight, where they were sure to be sighted. If the Royal Navy were to be alarmed immediately, it would give them sufficient time to mass a battle fleet capable of annihilating the Germans. From this viewpoint, it was considered more favourable to go through the Straits in daylight aided by the protective cover of the Luftwaffe.
Hitler persuaded his naval commanders that it would be impossible for the British in the space of just a few hours to get together the forces necessary for an organised attack. He was certain that the British would consider it inconceivable for the Germans to attempt a break out through the Channel in daylight; in this assessment he was absolutely correct. British intelligence, being aware that a break-out was possible, based their interception plan on the assumption that the Germans would leave Brest in day time. This would allow them to approach the narrowest part of the Channel, that is, the Straits of Dover, which is only 21 miles wide, during darkness. RAF Coastal Command was therefore, ordered to establish dusk to dawn reconnaissance patrols along the Channel; the navy also ordered submarine patrols during daylight hours outside Brest Harbour.
With the Royal Navy's capital ships far distant at Scapa Flow, the Germans calculated that if surprise was achieved, they could expect opposition from only light surface forces. The main threat was expected to come from air attacks and mine fields. Another obstacle for the Germans was the British radar stations strung along the Channel coast. The Germans knew that the British were ahead of them in radar development. But they were not certain how far ahead, and made plans accordingly; the effect of which will be seen later. Taking all these factors into consideration, the Germans came to the decision that, rather than dismantle the great ships; they would risk fighting them through the English Channel in daylight. The operation was code-named; operation ‘Cerberus’ which Hitler claimed would be the greatest naval exploit of the war. This turned out to be an accurate prediction as the venture was later to be acknowledged by friend and foe alike as an ‘outstanding and daring combined operation by German naval and air forces’.
The planned schedule for the operation was;
In order to achieve this, it would be essential to maintain a cruising speed of 28 knots.
The British First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, was at this time 65 years old, and a sick man. He shared the view that if the Germans decided to break out through the Channel they would reach the Straits of Dover at night; to do otherwise, he stated “would be pushing audacity to the point of folly”. As the Germans had predicted Sir Dudley was not prepared to risk the capital ships based at Scapa Flow; instead, six Swordfish torpedo carrying planes were moved to Manston on the Kent coast. Nine motor torpedo boats were stationed at Ramsgate; in addition, the admiralty alerted six 20 year old destroyers at Harwich to be prepared to intercept the German ships if they came.
In hindsight, it may be easy to dismiss the behaviour of the First Sea Lord as ineffectual and puzzling. But bear in mind; this was the blackest period of the war for Britain. Rommel’s Afrika Corps had come to the aid of Italy in North Africa which had the effect of reversing all the previous year's British gains; and the catastrophe at Singapore was looming. Sir Dudley had still not recovered from the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse; British naval power from Singapore to Scapa Flow was stretched to the limit. Not unlike Jellicoe at Jutland in World War One, Sir Dudley Pound was ‘the man who could lose the war in an afternoon. This weighed heavily on him and he was emphatic that, “on no account were capital ships to be brought within range of enemy air attacks". His fear was perhaps justified, for instance, what if several British battleships, operating near the occupied coast of Europe were sunk, or put out of action by determined enemy air attacks; this would undoubtedly change the whole picture of the war, particularly in European waters. In any case, Sir Dudley refused to even contemplate that the Germans would be foolhardy enough to try and bring their ships through the Dover Straits in daylight. He was convinced they would not be exposed to the RAF who would surely sink them as had the Japanese to Repulse and Prince of Wales.
Strange as it may seem, it did not seem to occur to the admiralty that although the RAF did have a most formidable bomber force whose primary objective was to bomb targets at night from a very great height; they had not been trained for the precision attacks on fast moving ships steaming at 30 knots whilst taking evasive action. The only planes which really had much chance of damaging the big ships were torpedo carriers. The British had two types of these; the Swordfish and the Beaufort. The Swordfish had been used successfully against the Bismarck, but there were only six available at the channel coast and their inexperienced crews were undergoing training. The leader of this half squadron was Eugene Esmonde, who had distinguished himself in the Bismarck operation. He was ordered to prepare his crew for a night attack on the enemy ships in the event of a break-out from Brest.
These single-engine Swordfish biplanes were designed like World War One aircraft. They had a fabric fuselage, open cockpits, and carried a crew of three, consisting of a pilot, an observer and a rear gunner. Yet these old planes could absorb tremendous punishment; anti-aircraft shells passed through the fabric instead of exploding against it. At Taranto Harbour on November 1940; operating under cover of darkness, carrier based swordfish had crippled and put out of action the main Italian fleet. However, the ‘stringbags’ as they were nicknamed had a top speed of only ninety knots, which made them sitting ducks in daylight.
The other torpedo bomber, the Beauforts, which were possibly the most serious threat to the German ships were not placed on alert. None were moved towards Dover, and this decision would bear heavily on the outcome of the operation. These aircraft were much more effective and more capable to sink or disable the German ships. They could fly at twice the speed of the swordfish, and three squadrons were available. One stationed at Leuchers in Scotland preparing for operations against the Tirpitz; the others were based in the south of England near Portsmouth. Therefore, to contest the passage of the German fleet speeding up the Channel, the Royal Navy had assembled six Swordfish torpedo planes, nine MTB's and six 20 year old destroyers. It was a pathetic force to put against a mighty German battle squadron; protected by the greatest air umbrella any ships had ever had.
The Admiralty however, was content that the combined torpedo attacks by the MTB's and Swordfish would slow down and cripple the ships. This would be accomplished while they were within range of the Dover coastal batteries, which would deliver the coup-de-grace. In the event of them managing to slip through the straits, they were to be finished by the RAF and by the destroyers. It was not much of a plan, even for a night attack!
Now that the preparations of each side have been evaluated; it is interesting to assess the actual operation and outcome. On 11th February 1942, at 22 15 hours, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen weighed anchor and slipped quietly out of Brest. At this moment the Germans had their first taste of good fortune; the RAF Coastal Command aircraft on patrol outside Brest harbour experienced a radar breakdown during their departure and, therefore, was unaware that the German battle squadron had sailed. The British submarine on patrol outside the harbour had abandoned watch when light faded, as the admiralty was insistent that the Germans would leave during daylight. A similar mishap befell the other aircraft which was patrolling the outer entrances. This aircraft also returned to base for radar repairs, which turned out to be a blown fuse. Another aircraft was ordered to take over, but was unable to start due to a damp spark plug. By the time these air patrols were resumed the German squadron had left harbour and were already speeding at 27 knots through the English Channel. Worse still, and this was inexcusable, the RAF had failed to notify the admiralty that the Brest patrols had not taken place. This combination of bad luck and inefficiency would emerge as a pattern for the British.
A heavy mist now descended over the Channel causing the other British patrols to be cancelled earlier than usual. Had these patrols been maintained, their radar would certainly have identified the German ships steaming off the French coast. Therefore, before the British woke up to the fact that the big ships were out; the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen had won a 300 mile start. They were escorted by 6 destroyers, 10 torpedo boats, numerous E boats, and an air umbrella consisting of 300 day and night fighters. The German ships racing up the Channel were almost into the Dover Straits, the 21 mile wide maximum danger zone; at this point they would be clearly visible by telescope to observers on the cliffs of Dover. Here they would be confronted with weapons which might prove formidable or even decisive; the big Dover coastal guns.
Just how effective were these weapons? After Dunkirk, Churchill, fearing invasion had ordered heavy guns to be mounted on the Dover cliffs. Four 13 inch World War One guns from the old Iron Duke class of battleship were found in Nottingham covered in cobwebs and rusting. They were cleaned up and installed near Dover. These clumsy, slow-firing guns were actually quite useless. They were difficult to load, only capable of firing at five minute intervals, and after 80 rounds, the barrel wore out.
Shortly after 10 00 hours, two Spitfires on patrol over the Channel spotted German fighter planes and climbed to engage; they had unwittingly stumbled into the outer guard of the air umbrella protecting the German ships. Almost immediately, flak shells burst around them and they were attacked by a dozen Messerschmitt’s. As the Spitfires dodged the enemy fighters they sighted the big ships. The RAF orders were to maintain radio silence over the Channel and to report any sightings after returning to base. But when the Spitfire pilot realised that such a large number of ships sailing so close to the English coast must be the German battle squadron escaping from Brest; he decided this was the occasion to disobey orders, break radio silence, and report to base. At first the report was not taken seriously, nobody wanted to believe that the Germans would be making a getaway through the Channel in broad daylight. This was utterly inconceivable; the British admiralty was totally unprepared and their reaction was to be piecemeal and uncoordinated.
On this particular morning the British radar observers had something else to worry about; the previous night every radar set on the English coast had ceased to function. For the first time the Germans were operating their jamming stations in a big way and not a single British radar instrument was able to function. The ruse had succeeded, and the German squadron had been able to continue on its way undiscovered until the time of the Spitfire sighting. The controller on duty at Biggin Hill interpreted the Spitfire report accurately; at long last, the alarm was raised. The German ships had been at sea undetected for eleven hours. The controller then tried to alert headquarters only to discover the post office telephone lines were down. Eventually, the air officer in command, Air Vice-Marshall Trafford Leigh-Mallory was tracked down; he was in the process of reviewing Belgian air force units on parade and his staff officers refused to interrupt him. They were still unconvinced that it was the German fleet in the Channel, decided that it must be fishing boats and were not prepared to bother their commanding officer.
At 11 05 hours the Squadron Leader at Biggin Hill insisted that the Beaufort squadrons should be alerted, but he had no authority to do so. He did, however, telephone Esmonde at Manston, who did put his six Swordfish on readiness and requested fighter protection. This was the first decisive step taken by the British armed forces to intercept the German battle squadron as they entered the narrowest part of the Channel, and it was taken by a relatively junior officer. Leigh-Mallory, eventually came to the phone, extremely upset at being disturbed by a mere Squadron Leader. He was extremely rank conscious, but after being given the information he decided that it must be the German ships in the Channel and gave the orders to execute the operational plan. There was in fact a British battle plan code named ‘Operation Fuller’, but the intelligence officer in charge of the operation had locked the plans in a safe and gone on leave and no one could find the key. An hour had now lapsed since the Spitfire's urgent report.
At 12 15 hours, exactly according to their timetable, the Germans arrived at the narrowest part of the Channel; between Dover and the French coast, where they were required to reduce speed and negotiate a mine field. They were at their most vulnerable and feared that the British would be waiting to sink them with massive air and sea attacks and coastal gun barrages. The British, however, had still not recovered from their initial surprise; when they eventually did, the big guns of the coastal batteries opened up. This was after the German ships were through the straits and almost out of range. The German crews saw flashes from the cliffs and several splashes in the sea. Although the shells fell short and uneven, it meant that there was no longer any doubt that they had been detected. Smoke shells were ordered to be fired from the escorting E Boats to shield the big ships. The gunfire from the English shore soon ceased when the German coastal batteries in France opened up in reply; no hits were reported.
As the German ships reached the Belgian coastline, the British launched the MTB's who raced out towards them at a top speed of 27 knots. The German ships were now cruising at their maximum speed of 30 knots and the protecting screen of E Boats could make 35 knots. The MTB's were outperformed and lighter-armed than the E Boats as they came under a tremendous concentration of fire from sea and air. They were forced to fire their torpedoes from maximum range which gave the German ships plenty of time to manoeuvre
The first battle of the straits had been lost. In the meantime Esmonde awaited orders to launch an attack with his Swordfish that were trained for night operations. To send these slow-moving planes in daylight against the ferocious flak and heavy fighter escorts was certain death. The indecisive senior officers at the admiralty let Esmonde decide whether to attack or not, no one was prepared to give him a direct order on a suicide mission. Esmonde, being a dedicated regular officer, and obviously a very brave individual, felt he had no other choice but to attack. He realised that as the German ships were moving so fast he would need to make an immediate decision. Having a top speed of only 90 knots, if they did not take off at once they would lose the enemy ships. He was told there would be plenty of air cover from the spitfires with whom they would rendezvous once airborne. All six planes lumbered into the air. Without hesitation, the Swordfish crews flew courageously, going to their doom in a futile operation; few would survive this mission. Four minutes after the arranged rendezvous time with the escorting Spitfires the Swordfish were still orbiting over the coast of Kent. Only ten Spitfires had arrived, Esmonde decided that it was now or never. The rest of the escort fighters would catch them up; they never did due to administrative bungling and eighteen young men in six slow, old aircraft went on their way. If any mission could be described as suicidal, this certainly was one.
Three of the Swordfish actually managed to get through the German fighter screen and massive flak barrage to drop their torpedoes on target that were all evaded by the Germans. One after another they were blown to pieces and massacred. There were only five survivors; Esmonde was not one of them. He was later awarded the posthumous VC. As the last of the six torpedo planes blew up and splashed into the sea, the German fighters gave a victory roll over the ships before resuming their patrol. It was 12 45 hours and the German ships were heading up the coast of Holland into the North Sea. While Esmonde's Swordfish were giving the Germans their first real taste of opposition and being shot to pieces, through a combination of inefficient ground work and bad weather the rest of the RAF fighters either took off too late or got lost in the mist.
The six old destroyers from Harwich now launched their attack; they were also slower than the German ships and had to risk going through a minefield to intercept them. Meanwhile, the torpedo carrying Beauforts, the RAF's most important ship-busting aircraft were finally ordered to fly to Manston. Delayed by ground staff incompetence; some of the Beauforts were armed with bombs and not torpedo's. The distance from their base in Portsmouth to Manston where Esmonde's Swordfish were based is 120 miles; if they had left at the same time as Esmonde took off they could, by flying at twice his speed, have joined him to deliver a coordinated attack. Inexplicably, rather than let those armed with torpedoes take off and join Esmonde it was decided to hold back the entire squadron until they were all ready. The Beauforts from Leuchers in Scotland arrived over Manston and circled for over an hour awaiting orders which Manston ground staff were frantically signalling on the wrong frequency. No one had told Manston that these aircraft had recently had their radio frequencies changed. It was only when they were forced to land and re-fuel that this botch-up was discovered. In addition to this; several of the Beauforts landed at Manston expecting to be armed with torpedoes, only to find that none were available. No one had checked how many were in store.
When they eventually set off, it was with orders to attack a German merchant convoy. No one had told them of their real mission, and in the utter chaos, the Beauforts' Spitfire escorts flew off in another direction looking for them. At 15 45 hours a few of the Beauforts found the German ships, but due to the lack of fighter protection and the concentration of flak; dropped their torpedoes at maximum range, missed the target and returned to base. While the torpedo-carrying Beauforts were struggling against the continuing ground muddle, Bomber Command finally came to life. 675 aircraft took off, most of which had been on bombing raids over Germany the previous night. The majority of the aircraft could not find any target and did not really know what they were looking for. At one stage a squadron of Hudsons was told to follow the Beauforts out to the German ships. The Beauforts, however had been told that they were to follow the Hudsons to the target; the result was that every time the Hudsons formed behind the Beauforts, the Beauforts would fall back behind the Hudsons. This ring-a-ring of rose’s ridiculous situation continued for half an hour before the Wing Commander of the Beauforts became totally exasperated and decided he had enough and led his aircraft out to sea.
The British destroyers by this time had worked their way through the minefield, but never got within striking distance of the German ships. In many instances they were attacked indiscriminately by both British and German aircraft. They did, however, press forward to try and launch their torpedoes from a range of two miles. All missed and the destroyers, though severely damaged managed to limp back to port.
The German ships succeeded in avoiding the bombs and shells by skilful manoeuvring. Mines, however, proved to be a greater danger; at 14 31 hours, the leading ship, Scharnhorst hit her first mine off the Dutch coast and was lifted bodily out of the water. Electric installations failed, the rudder no longer functioned and the gyro-compass was out of action. The Scharnhorst was left rolling helplessly in the North Sea swell; a sitting target for the vengeance of the British. The Scharnhorst crew worked feverishly to repair the damage whilst the Luftwaffe and escorting vessels prepared to hold off the enemy who never came. The ships engineer’s surpassed themselves and in just over half an hour got the ship going again. The Scharnhorst, however, hit a second mine in the evening as she approached German waters. With 1 000 tons of water in her hull, and almost out of control, she nevertheless reached port due to the coolness and excellent seamanship of her captain. Later that same evening, Gneisenau struck a mine, but also managed to reach port.
What were the result and the reaction to this operation? The German losses were 17 Luftwaffe planes, 2 torpedo boats damaged by bombs, two dead and several German sailors wounded. All Germany rejoiced over the feat which was hailed as a mighty blow against an enemy who had ruled the waves for centuries. At 01 00 hours in London the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound conceded that the German ships must have reached the safety of home waters. He phoned Churchill to make one of the worst reports a British admiral has ever had to make to a British prime minister. Typically, Churchill growled "why" and slammed the phone down. The RAF officers blamed the disaster upon the fact that very few pilots really knew what they were looking for due to the ridiculous lack of information. One totally frustrated Beaufort Squadron
Leader declared, "I was sent looking for a convoy, why was I not told about the bloody great battleships”? He continued; "The reasons the German ships got through is not that the plan to stop them was badly executed or that it miscarried; the real trouble is that there was no plan at all. We relied far too much on hasty improvisation".
Nearly 700 fighters and bombers had been flung into the battle without success because they were too late and completely uncoordinated. Thirteen young fleet air arm pilots had been sent uselessly to their deaths; twenty seven young sailors had been killed and eighteen wounded. The fury unleashed by the military commanders was not isolated; it sent an electric tremor of outrage through the country. The nation was ashamed and affronted; British minds went back to Sir Francis Drake and the Spanish Armada; in effect, it spelled the end of the Royal Navy legend, which decreed: ‘in wartime no hostile warships would be permitted to neither approach so close to the English coast nor pass through what was proudly called the English Channel’.
In the entire British press a storm of indignation arose; how could this have happened right under their very noses? British public opinion was furious at the success of the channel dash. The war cabinet was violently attacked, causing a crisis of confidence in Churchill’s wartime cabinet. The Times, for example, thundered; “the German navy has succeeded where the Spanish Armada of 1588 failed”. It continued, "nothing more mortifying to the pride of our sea power has ever happened in home waters”.
National and provincial newspapers joined with the Times in voicing indignation that this humiliating disaster had been allowed to happen. The news chronicle stated "though individual courage and steadfast devotion to duty was evident, those primarily responsible for the war's greatest blunder must be brought to book". The newspaper attacked Churchill’s war time cabinet by stating: "the incident is symptomatic of a general feeling that something is wrong with Britain’s war effort; the tired and incompetent people occupying high office should be removed".
Conversely, while British newspapers roared their disapproval, the Germans were ecstatic with their victory. Especially the reference to the Spanish Armada; Hitler had been proved right. Faced with the same allegation of ‘bungling in high office’ which forced him out of office in World War One; Churchill took the unprecedented step, during war time that is, of ordering a military tribunal to be set up to investigate the break-out. The findings however, of this report were shrouded in secrecy and not even the members of parliament were allowed to see it. Churchill as defiant and truculent as ever, scowled at questions in the house by saying "our affairs are not conducted entirely by simpletons and dunderheads, as the comic papers try to depict".
Despite this attempt at reassuring the nation, there was much evidence of reports concerning the Channel Dash of going missing and officers being shunted to lesser posts. Three days later on 15th February, the British army surrendered at Singapore in one of the most ignominious fiascos of modern military history.
The Channel Dash plus Singapore made black February of 1942 the lowest point of the entire war for Great Britain. Churchill, now 67 years old was under severe pressure to throw in his hand. However, the pugnacious war time leader was not prepared to surrender high office. In retrospect, perhaps it is understandable that Churchill should cover up the disaster. The British public were already despondent enough about defeats from Dunkirk to Singapore. There was no point in dismaying them further by revealing the full facts of the military and bureaucratic inefficiency which allowed the German warships to sail unscathed past the cliffs of Dover. The unpalatable truth which Churchill dared not reveal to the angry and disturbed British public was that some of his service chiefs had proved themselves to be tragically incompetent. It makes one wonder what might have been the outcome if Hitler had gone ahead with his plans to invade Britain.
The break-out of the ships was a supreme example of meticulous German planning and efficiency; defeating the hasty last minute improvisations of the British, however, there were compensating advantages for the British. The major one being that the threat from Brest to the Atlantic convoys had been eliminated and no further attempt would be made to throw German capital ships into the battle of the Atlantic. Churchill stated after the war "viewed in the aftermath and in the overall context, the episode was of great benefit to us". One man who agreed with him was Grand Admiral Raeder, who during interrogation at the war's end, commented “it was a tactical success but a strategic defeat”.
These points merit closer analysis; why was the Channel Dash not a total defeat for Britain? Perhaps the answer to this question is that although the German ships achieved startling success in escaping through the Channel, their careers as fighting ships soon ended. A fortnight after arriving back in Germany, Allied bombers had their revenge by finishing off the Gneisenau. The damage caused by the mine struck whilst escaping up the Channel had made it necessary for her to enter the dry dock at Kiel for repairs. The RAF too