The Passing of Morocco by Frederick F. Moore - HTML preview

CHAPTER XVI
 THE BRITISH IN MOROCCO

NOT very many of the European residents of Morocco are fond of the French invaders. Even, in many instances, Frenchmen hate them. They condemn consistently the disorders that the armies of France—the Spanish are not very active—have brought to Morocco; and still more they lament the influx of other Europeans, generally, as they point out, of the worst sort; dishonest speculators, adventurers and ‘dive’ keepers, unfortunately the usual vanguard of Western civilisation. Frenchmen of the old days are wont to sentimentalise about the ‘Moghreb defiled’; Germans have no love for the soldiers of France; Englishmen resent the subordinate position, which for three years they have been required to take.

In Eastern countries where Europeans are few, there is always intense rivalry and much bitter feeling between the races. In Morocco the great jealousy, until the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, was between the British and the French. For many years the agents of France and those of England, consuls as well as diplomatists, merchants, and even simple residents, had struggled against each other for trade, for social prestige, and for greater influence with the Sultan and the Moorish government. When the British Minister would go to Fez, the Frenchman was always prompt on his heels; nor did the former—though perhaps with more show of modesty—ever allow the Minister of France to get to his credit an extra visit or a larger present.

The intimacy between Kaid Maclean and the Sultan grievously annoyed the French, and they accused the Kaid of exploiting Abdul Aziz. On the other hand, though the Kaid was in the employ of the Sultan, he was engaged also to act as agent of the British government at the Maghzen. In loans and contracts the conflict was generally more between the Germans and the French; and on these occasions scandals of rival bribery and of diplomatic influence being brought to bear in the interests of the rival bankers or contractors, as the case might be, were always rife. British Ministers do not often aid the subjects of the King in gathering private contracts, and British interest in Morocco has always been primarily political. British trade with Morocco, actual or potential, was never of any considerable importance—except to the British traders in the towns of the coast, to whom the rivalry of course extended, growing often more acute.

In 1904 all this was changed by a stroke of the pen. England and France came to an understanding, the one waiving claims in Egypt, the other withdrawing politically from Morocco. The following year the German Emperor, who had not been consulted, volunteered an objection to the French scheme for policing certain coast cities and border towns and organising a Morocco State Bank. Intimidating the French—though Great Britain ‘agreed to support them in any attitude they should take,’ which meant, I am convinced, even to the extent of war with Germany—the Kaiser brought about a conference of the Powers, which came to be known by the name of the Spanish town at which it was held. The Algeciras Conference, after deliberating for months, finally in compromise decreed that France should be accompanied by Spain in her scheme, which was definitely limited.

The accord between France and England was a blow to British residents in Morocco. As long as they had been in the land they had held, in the fear and the regard of the Moors, the paramount position, and now that position was handed over to their foremost rivals. They felt that they as Englishmen could not consistently change their attitude at the dictation of their Government at home—nor did they change except for the worse.

Their jealousy has now turned to enmity, which is often intense. In the smaller towns French and British consular agents are not on speaking terms and avoid each other in the streets. Englishmen are friendly with the Germans, upholding the anti-French policy of the German Government and decrying the ‘weakness’ of their own, all the while sympathising with the unfortunate Moor and his disintegrating empire. To the large towns new consuls have been sent out, generally from both France and England, and new Ministers have gone to Tangier, and this makes things easier in diplomatic circles, where the French policy is supported consistently. Otherwise the same old merchants and residents are there, both French and English, with the same old hates.

How the Englishman rails against his Government! How he storms at the English Press! How he writes, in passionate language, in his Moghreb al Aksa, the little weekly English paper! I have in mind a thin, wiry little man, past middle age, who wears a helmet and dresses in a brown suit of tweeds. Having plenty of leisure he puts in much of his time writing for London papers; but they will have none of his spirited essays. So he prints them in the Moghreb. They are headed, ‘How Long Will England Close Her Eyes?’ ‘How Long Will the English Press Refuse to Print the Truth?’ ‘How Long Will the Patient Moor Refrain from Massacre?’—and such like. I suggested to him one evening as we sat with several other Europeans at a table at a new French café (it was not thoroughly consistent for the little man to patronise the place) that in all Morocco there were hardly enough Europeans to make a massacre, as massacres go in the East; were there fifty bonâ-fide Britishers in the land?

Fifty or a million, he replied vehemently, they had been sold by the Government at home. What an absurd thing to do, to hold the high hand in Morocco and pass it over to the French for relinquishing some paper claim on Egypt! But what could be expected from a man like the Earl of Lansdowne, himself half French? It was no use pointing out that the British Government on this occasion had sacrificed a few British subjects for what appeared to be the good of the many; that British exports to Morocco had never amounted to more than two millions a year; that the potential value of the country is not promising; that the French are treaty-bound to keep the open door; that the cost to France in money, to say nothing of blood, may never be repaid with revenues or even with trade.

That the French will ever withdraw from Morocco is exceedingly doubtful, and this is a sore grievance to British residents, who long hoped that one day England might control the country. Only a European war, or the serious danger of one that would defeat France, would cause her now to take leave. It is the custom of European Governments, when invading conquerable territory coveted by others, to protest the temporary character of their ‘mission’; and if other proof were needed of the intentions of France the very constant repetitions of the French Government that it will adhere to the Act of Algeciras would tend to rouse suspicion.

But there is reason for the French, indeed necessity for them, to control Morocco. Europe is too near Morocco for the country to be left to anarchy and ignorance and their consequences. Some European Power or Powers must represent Europe there, while the establishment of one other than France would be a constant menace to Algeria and would throw upon France the obligation of devoting to the expense of her colony a greater outlay than it would cost to conquer the Moorish Empire. France must remain in Morocco; and the French—those soldiers and diplomatists whom I have seen and talked with, at any rate—welcome the opportunity that the Shawia tribes have given them, and make the most of it. The assurances of the French Government are of course only diplomatic. Assurances of a temporary occupation were vouchsafed when Tunis was invaded. Nor is it only France that follows this diplomacy.

It is for the reason that events threaten to make permanent a certain French occupation that a few Britishers would like to create a difference between France and Great Britain, to annul the Anglo-French agreement. For, should France be stopped—as she is likely to be without British support—it will mean that no country shall regulate Morocco and that another situation like that of the Turk in Europe will be established, to run on an untold term of years. This is what these partisans would like to bring about, because their hostility to the French, beginning in trade and political rivalry, has become now one of sentimental sympathy with the Moors.

The case for Morocco is put by the Sultan Mulai Hafid himself in an appeal to the Powers of Europe presented to their Ministers at Tangier in February (1908). The argument has the Eastern fault of waiving rather than undermining the case for France, as, in one instance, where it speaks of peace with Europeans in provinces and cities where there are no foreign troops, a peace that obtains in the interior because the few European residents have left, and in the coast towns because of the lesson of Casablanca. In a ‘free rendering’ of the Arabic original, the correspondent of the Morning Post, R. L. N. Johnson, an authority on Morocco and the author of several literary books pertaining to the country, interprets this picturesque document as follows:—

‘In the name of the Most Merciful God, save from whom is neither device nor might. (Here follow the royal seal, the name of the Foreign Minister addressed, and the customary salutations.)

‘On behalf of the people of Morocco, one and all, many of whom are actual sufferers from what has befallen their dwellings, their brethren, and their families, I lay before you my plaint.

‘What has been done to them is an offence against Treaties and common justice. He who demands his right has no pretext for needless, inhuman violence and brutality, nor is such action compatible with dealings between the nations. Nor is there wrong to any (Power) in our nation deposing its Monarch on reasonable grounds. He has proved his incapacity, he has neglected every interest of the State, and he has followed a line of conduct which would not be tolerated by the believers of any faith. I call your attention to the terrible calamity which has afflicted the people of Morocco, relying upon your well-known frank recognition of the truth. Thus you can hardly keep silence on what has happened and is happening in this country. From time immemorial your folk have lived among us, for trade and other purposes, without any object of filching our land, exactly as they would live in other friendly countries, and in the manner laid down in the Madrid Convention, which was framed upon a knowledge of the conditions of life in Morocco.

‘It may be you have heard rumours of a declaration of war (Jehad). That declaration was made solely with the object of calming the exasperation of my people at the wholly unjust invasion of their land and the occupation of their soil. These invaders are to-day preventing our people from carrying on their everyday affairs according to our time-honoured customs. I was desirous of appointing Governors in Shawia who should be responsible to myself for the preservation of order, but obstacles [the French army—F.M.] were placed in my way, and to avoid a conflict which would have led to terrible bloodshed I abstained. My one desire is to restore tranquillity among my people, so as to bring back general welfare.

‘As to the army now occupying the Casablanca district on the pretext of pacifying it and protecting foreigners, this is my duty towards the whole of Morocco—that is to say, to protect both Moslems and Europeans in their lives and property. I ask nothing better than to follow the path of justice, that these troops may evacuate that land and leave it to its lawful owners. They have but to depart and no further trouble need be feared. But assuredly so long as they remain peace is impossible. You have watched this going on for six months. Have you also watched the conditions of the other provinces and cities where no other intervention has taken place? Are not the people, yours and mine, living in peace and harmony? Absolutely nothing has occurred to hurt any person or place, nor, thank God, has any European been molested, despite all that our brethren have suffered. The wiser among the French nation recognise this, without being able to remedy the mischief done. As to those of lesser understanding who declare us to be anti-European, they speak falsely and without a shadow of reason. Our acts speak for themselves, and disprove the lies which have been thrown broadcast over the world. The wise know this, and that the authors of such calumnies are monsters rather than human.

‘As for the dethronement of Mulai Abdul Aziz, this was not only the will of the nation, but was done by the decision of the lawful court of Ulema, who judged him. Surely there is no crime in deposing a Sultan on the just ground that he is unfit to govern. It was done not long ago in Turkey. It has happened among the other Powers.

‘I now ask you to give me a faithful answer, and I will abide by the truth. On what principle of international law can there be armed intervention between a nation and the monarch it has deposed? I wait for your reply in the firm belief that, on careful review of the situation, your answer cannot fail to reflect a bright lustre upon your judgment and justice.

‘In peace. This 24th Haeja, 1325.’

Europeans in Morocco are mostly sympathisers with Mulai Hafid; and their hopes for the success of his Holy War lead them often—no doubt unconsciously—to exaggerate the difficulties of the French and to enlarge upon the numbers of the tribesmen opposing them. Though Hafid declared that his purpose in proclaiming the Jehad was only to unite the tribes in support of him, he has been drawn by this proclamation into war with the French. The forces that have been recruited by his deception have either pressed him or have taken upon themselves to combat the French invasion; and their opposition would seem to make it impossible for the French to recognise Hafid as Sultan. For this would be tantamount to a defeat of the French in the minds of the ignorant Moors. On the other hand Hafid’s position is now exceedingly difficult; for him it is either to fight or to surrender to his brother.

In leaving Morocco it would be picturesque to say with Pierre Loti: ‘Farewell, dark Moghreb, Empire of the Moors, mayst thou remain yet many years immured, impenetrable to the things that are new! Turn thy back upon Europe! Let thy sleep be the sleep of centuries, and so continue thine ancient dream! May Allah preserve to the Sultan his unsubdued territories and his waste places carpeted with flowers, there to do battle as did the Paladins in the old times, there to gather in his rebel heads! May Allah preserve to the Arab race its mystic dreams, its immutability scornful of all things, and its grey rags; may He preserve to the Moorish ruins their shrouds of whitewash, and to the mosques inviolable mystery!’

But for my part there is no sentimental feeling for Morocco. That a government is old is no reason, for me, that it should be maintained. Because the Moors have always ridden horses, I see no reason why they should not ride in carriages or even in trains. In fact, I sympathise with the unfortunate beasts of burden and with the suffering Moors themselves. I was not affected, like the great French writer, more by the beauty and the romance of the country than by the horror and distress; and, instead of his fair sentiment, I say: Let in the French! For the Moghreb I should like to see a little less of crime, a little less of base corruption, a little less of ignorance and needless suffering, a little less of cruelty, a little less of bestial vice. The French can do some little for Morocco, and no other Power can go in. I say, Let in the French!

MAP OF
 MOROCCO

Yet a last word, to the French: You boast your knowledge of Mohammedans; do you know that the Moors dread you for what they have heard from their fathers you did in the early days in Algeria? Nor have your methods about Casablanca reassured them. You have slain wantonly, even under General Drude. General d’Amade has penetrated the country time after time and accomplished ‘enormous slaughter.’ But for what purpose? This is all unnecessary. It would seem that your object has been to provoke further hostility, that you may have excuse to continue your occupation and to extend it. This is undoubtedly good politics; but rather unfair to the ignorant Moors, don’t you think? And is it good for your soldiers, Algerians or Europeans, to use them in this fashion?

THE END.