US Pacific Victory in World War Two by Bill Brady - HTML preview

CHAPTER TWELVE

CONCLUSION

The Japanese Government, Army, and Navy rulers who made Japan's national policy in the name of Emperor Hirohito were struggling to end this disastrous war with a negotiated peace. Hopefully, this would avoid Allied military occupation, and preserve Japan's historic imperial system. By the spring of 1945, Japan was clearly defeated: following failure to secure Russia's good offices for negotiations, their last chance for a conditional peace. Thus, the Japanese Minister of War, General Anami, stated that Japan must now fight on to the bitter end in defence of the home islands. Japan still had two million combat troops and 9 000 kamikaze aircraft. These forces could be expected to wreak tremendous casualties upon the invaders, who, in the end, would be compelled to negotiate peace.

American assessments of the situation were not vastly different from those of General Anami. Japan was certainly defeated militarily, besieged from the sea, and being pulverised by U.S. Navy carrier aircraft and U.S. Army Air Forces B-29 bombers that were flying from bases in the Marianas. At a meeting in the White House on 18th June 1945, U.S. Army Chief-of-Staff General George C. Marshall urged that Japan must be invaded in order to end the war. Therefore, President Harry S Truman approved the planned landings on Kyushu scheduled for 1st November 1945 (Operation 'Olympic'), and five months later against Honshu (Operation 'Coronet'). While Marshall supported invasion, he had serious reservations about potential American casualties, estimating that seventy thousand Americans would be killed or wounded in a two hundred thousand man operation against Kyushu. Japanese troops had amply demonstrated that they could and would fight desperately even when the outlook was hopeless.

The alternative for forcing Japan to surrender, short of invasion, was also discussed at the meeting. The representatives of the highly secret U.S. Manhattan Project, located in New Mexico, claimed that two atomic bombs would be available for operational employment by the end of July. The first of these revolutionary weapons would be the bomb named 'Little Boy', with an explosive Uranium-235 core- fissionable material that had been laboriously extracted. Atomic scientists were confident that an explosive charge would drive a plug of U-235 into the U-235 core, establishing a critical mass to create an explosion of gigantic dimensions. The scientists were less confident on the other type of bomb. This was the 'Fat Man', an implosion weapon which used plutonium (Pu239) housed in nuclear reactors. The implosion weapon principle would require testing in mid-July at a proving ground in New Mexico: and, if the principle worked, a 'Fat Man' would also be available at the end of July.

The U.S. Army Air Force had prepared everything required to drop the atomic bombs when they were ready. The 509th Composite Group had been activated in December 1944 under the command of Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., and included the 393rd Bombardment Squadron with the most advanced model long-range B-29 bombers; the only American aircraft with the capacity to carry the first atomic bombs. The group, after undergoing intensive training had in April/May 1945 moved to Tinian Island in the Marianas. Both in training and in familiarisation flights to Japa n, the 509th Group had been dropping orange-painted 10 000-pound T.N.T filled bombs, which were similar in ballistic characteristics to the 'Fat Man'. Only Colonel Tibbets and a few others in the group shared the atomic secret. The cities of Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto were nominated for the first atomic strikes. Nagasaki was later substituted for Kyoto when Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson forbade an attack against Kyoto because of its cultural antiquities.

American military leaders understood Japan's reluctance to surrender her ancient imperial system, and they also reasoned that the Emperor would be the only authority that could enforce the capitulation of Japan's military forces. The military leaders were therefore inclined to modify the Allied unconditional surrender terms to permit Japan to retain her Emperor. This view was not accepted at the Allied heads of state conference in Potsdam. Instead, the Potsdam proclamation published on 26th July 1945, called for the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, or else the acceptance of "prompt and utter destruction". On 28th July, Prime Minister Suzuki announced that his government would "treat the Potsdam Declaration with silent contempt". Suzuki, actually favoured peace and may well have used the wrong word, but his response unleashed violent reactions.

President Truman had had enough and events moved swiftly. He had learned of the world's first successful nuclear detonation on 16th July, 1945 and was now more determined than ever to bring the war to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. In Washington, General Carl A. Spaatz, on his way to take command of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, was told of the atomic strike plans. His orders were that the 509th Group would deliver its first 'special bomb' as soon after 3rd August as weather would permit a visual attack. The primary target was Hiroshima, with Kokura the secondary and Nagasaki the tertiary. Since visual bombing was mandatory, an advance B~29 weather observer aircraft