There are similar issues in the ways that programs focus on certain rule-of-law aspects while not engaging other projects in often closely related areas. For example, projects focused on land title reform and detainee policy are both closely related to informal justice projects, but they are rarely coordinated on a programmatic level. here has been some discussion of trying to improve coordination between these types of projects, and ISAF has organized a series of conferences on rule-of-law issues, but these efforts have not really led to real coordination between projects. As a result, their disparate impacts remain limited, and, perhaps more significantly, the programs continue to ignore the ways in which most justice issues are related. his reflects the tendency of the international community-and not just in the rule-of-law sectorto isolate certain policy issues within silos and then create further divisions within each issue.
Finally, the counterinsurgency focus has created a reactive approach to justice issues. he military's tendency to emphasize activity in areas where there has been recent fighting makes sense for certain types of programs but not for dispute resolution projects. In a country with a highly suspect judicial system, far more can be done in stable areas where there is some hope of promoting cooperation between formal and informal leaders. In the most unstable areas, where groups such as USAID and USIP are being pressured to work, significant damage has often already been done to local institutions, and the political setting is simply not ready to focus on resolving small-scale disputes.
The enthusiasm for a national policy on informal justice reached its height in 2009. . . . By 2010, however, this had been de-prioritized. This left those in the Ministry of Justice and other Afghan bodies confused as to the international stance on informal justice.
The Funding and the Favoring of Those Not Best Equipped to Address Justice Needs
A particularly acute problem with the international community's work in many areas is that current funding mechanisms favor organizations that are in the poorest position to actually perform the work being funded. Smaller Afghan organizations, which often have the networks that are best positioned to do this type of work, are rarely given funds by the international military or by large donors. he military, due to its district-by-district approach to informal justice that lacks continuity and its poor relationships with Afghan NGOs, has not been able to bring in such local organizations to help the stabilization effort and, at a local level, is often actually unaware of the Afghan NGOs active in the area. In any case, this is a difficult hurdle to overcome, because associating with the international military in the least secure areas