different interests. But if men pursued the publick interest naturally,
and with a hearty affection, they would never have dreamed of
restraining each other by these rules; and if they pursued their own
interest, without any precaution, they would run headlong into every
kind of injustice and violence. These rules, therefore, are artificial,
and seek their end in an oblique and indirect manner; nor is the
interest, which gives rise to them, of a kind that coued be pursued by
the natural and inartificial passions of men.
To make this more evident, consider, that though the rules of justice
are established merely by interest, their connexion with interest is
somewhat singular, and is different from what may be observed on other
occasions. A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public
interest; and were it to stand alone, without being followed by other
acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to society.
When a man of
merit, of a beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser,
or a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public
is a real sufferer. Nor is every single act of justice, considered
apart, more conducive to private interest, than to public; and it is
easily conceived how a man may impoverish himself by a signal instance
of integrity, and have reason to wish, that with regard to that single
act, the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the universe.
But however single acts of justice may be contrary, either to public or
private interest, it is certain, that the whole plan or scheme is
highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support
of society, and the well-being of every individual. It is impossible
to separate the good from the ill. Property must be stable, and must be
fixed by general rules. Though in one instance the public be a sufferer,
this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the
rule, and by the peace and order, which it establishes in society. And
even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on ballancing
the account; since, without justice society must immediately dissolve,
and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which
is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be
supposed in society. When therefore men have had experience enough
to observe, that whatever may be the consequence of any single act of
justice, performed by a single person, yet the whole system of actions,
concurred in by the whole society, is infinitely advantageous to the
whole, and to every part; it is not long before justice and property
take place. Every member of society is sen sible of this interest: Every
one expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he
has taken of squaring his actions by it, on condition that others will
do the same. No more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform
an act of justice, who has the first opportunity. This becomes an
example to others. And thus justice establishes itself by a kind of
convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, supposed to
be common to all, and where every single act is performed in expectation
that others are to perform the like. Without such a convention, no one
would ever have dreamed, that there was such a virtue as justice, or
have been induced to conform his actions to it. Taking any single act,
my justice may be pernicious in every respect; and it is only upon
the supposition that others are to imitate my example, that I can be
induced to embrace that virtue; since nothing but this combination can
render justice advantageous, or afford me any motives to conform my self
to its rules.
We come now to the second question we proposed, viz. Why we annex the
idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice.
This question
will not detain us long after the principles, which we have already
established, All we can say of it at present will be dispatched in a few
words: And for farther satisfaction, the reader must wait till we come
to the third part of this book. The natural obligation to justice, viz,
interest, has been fully explained; but as to the moral obligation, or
the sentiment of right and wrong, it will first be requisite to examine
the natural virtues, before we can give a full and satisfactory account
of it. After men have found by experience, that their selfishness and
confined generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate
them for society; and at the same time have observed, that society is
necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions, they are naturally
induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may
render their commerce more safe and commodious. To the imposition then,
and observance of these rules, both in general, and in every particular
instance, they are at first induced only by a regard to interest; and
this motive, on the first formation of society, is sufficiently strong
and forcible. But when society has become numerous, and has encreased to
a tribe or nation, this interest is more remote; nor do men so readily
perceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these
rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society. But though in our own
actions we may frequently lose sight of that interest, which we have in
maintaining order, and may follow a lesser and more present interest,
we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive, either mediately or
immediately, from the injustice of others; as not being in that case
either blinded by passion, or byassed by any contrary temptation.
Nay when the injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our
interest, it still displeases us; because we consider it as prejudicial
to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person
guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; and as every
thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey,
is called Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner,
is denominated Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good
and evil follows upon justice and injustice. And though this sense,
in the present case, be derived only from contemplating the actions
of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The
general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose; while
at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments
they entertain of us. Thus self-interest is the original motive to the
establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the
source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.
Though this progress of the sentiments be natural, and even necessary,
it is certain, that it is here forwarded by the artifice of politicians,
who, in order to govern men more easily, and preserve peace in human
society, have endeavoured to produce an esteem for justice, and an
abhorrence of injustice. This, no doubt, must have its effect; but
nothing can be more evident, than that the matter has been carryed too
far by certain writers on morals, who seem to have employed their
utmost efforts to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind.
Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those
sentiments, which she suggests to us, and may even on some occasions,
produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action; but
it is impossible it should be the sole cause of the distinction we
make betwixt vice and virtue. For if nature did not aid us in this
particular, it would be in vain for politicians to talk of honourable or
dishonourable, praiseworthy or blameable. These words would be perfectly
unintelligible, and would no more have any idea annexed to them, than
if they were of a tongue perfectly unknown to us. The utmost politicians
can perform, is, to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original
bounds; but still nature must furnish the materials, and give us some
notion of moral distinctions.
As publick praise and blame encrease our esteem for justice; so private
education and instruction contribute to the same effect.
For as parents
easily observe, that a man is the more useful, both to himself and
others, the greater degree of probity and honour he is endowed with;
and that those principles have greater force, when custom and education
assist interest and reflection: For these reasons they are induced to
inculcate on their children, from their earliest infancy, the principles
of probity, and teach them to regard the observance of those rules,
by which society is maintained, as worthy and honourable, and their
violation as base and infamous. By this means the sentiments of honour
may take root in their tender minds, and acquire such firmness and
solidity, that they may fall little short of those principles, which are
the most essential to our natures, and the most deeply radicated in our
internal constitution.
What farther contributes to encrease their solidity, is the interest
of our reputation, after the opinion, that a merit or demerit attends
justice or injustice, is once firmly established among mankind. There is
nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing
on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to
the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard
to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind,
must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be
induced to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of
probity and honour.
I shall make only one observation before I leave this subject, viz, that
though I assert, that in the state of nature, or that imaginary state,
which preceded society, there be neither justice nor injustice, yet
I assert not, that it was allowable, in such a state, to violate the
property of others. I only maintain, that there was no such thing
as property; and consequently coued be no such thing as justice or
injustice. I shall have occasion to make a similar reflection with
regard to promises, when I come to treat of them; and I hope this
reflection, when duly weighed, will suffice to remove all odium from the
foregoing opinions, with regard to justice and injustice.
SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY
Though the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of
possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human
society, it can never serve to any purpose, while it remains in such
general terms. Some method must be shewn, by which we may distinguish
what particular goods are to be assigned to each particular person,
while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and
enjoyment. Our next business, then, must be to discover the reasons
which modify this general rule, and fit it to the common use and
practice of the world.
It is obvious, that those reasons are not derived from any utility or
advantage, which either the particular person or the public may reap
from his enjoyment of any particular goods, beyond what would result
from the possession of them by any other person. Twere better, no doubt,
that every one were possessed of what is most suitable to him, and
proper for his use: But besides, that this relation of fitness may be
common to several at once, it is liable to so many controversies, and
men are so partial and passionate in judging of these controversies,
that such a loose and uncertain rule would be absolutely incompatible
with the peace of human society. The convention concerning the stability
of possession is entered into, in order to cut off all occasions of
discord and contention; and this end would never be attained, were
we allowed to apply this rule differently in every particular case,
according to every particular utility, which might be discovered in such
an application. Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or
unfitness of objects to particular persons, but conducts herself by more
extensive views. Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally
well received by her, and obtains with the same facility a decision in
his favours, even for what is entirely useless to him.
It follows therefore, that the general rule, that possession must be
stable, is not applied by particular judgments, but by other general
rules, which must extend to the whole society, and be inflexible
either by spite or favour. To illustrate this, I propose the following
instance. I first consider men in their savage and solitary condition;
and suppose, that being sensible of the misery of that state, and
foreseeing the advantages that would result from society, they seek each
other's company, and make an offer of mutual protection and assistance.
I also suppose, that they are endowed with such sagacity as immediately
to perceive, that the chief impediment to this project of society and
partnership lies in the avidity and selfishness of their natural temper;
to remedy which, they enter into a convention for the stability of
possession, and for mutual restraint and forbearance. I am sensible,
that this method of proceeding is not altogether natural; but besides
that I here only suppose those reflections to be formed at once, which
in fact arise insensibly and by degrees; besides this, I say, it is very
possible, that several persons, being by different accidents separated
from the societies, to which they formerly belonged, may be obliged to
form a new society among themselves; in which case they are entirely in
the situation above-mentioned.
It is evident, then, that their first difficulty, in this situation,
after the general convention for the establishment of society, and for
the constancy of possession, is, how to separate their possessions,
and assign to each his particular portion, which he must for the future
inalterably enjoy. This difficulty will not detain them long; but it
must immediately occur to them, as the most natural expedient, that
every one continue to enjoy what he is at present master of, and
that property or constant possession be conjoined to the immediate
possession. Such is the effect of custom, that it not only reconciles
us to any thing we have long enjoyed, but even gives us an affection for
it, and makes us prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable,
but are less known to us. What has long lain under our eye, and has
often been employed to our advantage, that we are always the most
unwilling to part with; but can easily live without possessions,
which we never have enjoyed, and are not accustomed to.
It is evident,
therefore, that men would easily acquiesce in this expedient, that every
one continue to enjoy what he is at present possessed of; and this is
the reason, why they would so naturally agree in preferring it.
[Footnote 15. No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of causes present themselves
for the same phaenomenon, to determine which is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise
argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be
guided by a kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy,
and a comparison of familiar instances. Thus, in the present
case, there are, no doubt, motives of public interest for
most of the rules, which determine property; but still I
suspect, that these rules are principally fixed by the
imagination, or the more frivolous properties of our thought
and conception. I shall continue to explain these causes,
leaving it to the reader's choice, whether he will prefer
those derived from publick utility, or those derived from
the imagination. We shall begin with the right of the
present possessor.
It is a quality, which I have already observed in human
nature, that when two objects appear in a close relation to
each other, the mind is apt to ascribe to them any additional relation, in order to compleat the union; and
this inclination is so strong, as often to make us run into
errors (such as that of the conjunction of thought and
matter) if we find that they can serve to that purpose. Many
of our impressions are incapable of place or local position;
and yet those very impressions we suppose to have a local
conjunction with the impressions of sight and touch, merely
because they are conjoined by causation, and are already
united in the imagination. Since, therefore, we can feign a
new relation, and even an absurd one, in order to compleat
any union, it will easily be imagined, that if there be any
relations, which depend on the mind, it will readily conjoin
them to any preceding relation, and unite, by a new bond,
such objects as have already an union in the fancy.
Thus for
instance, we never fail, in our arrangement of bodies, to
place those which are resembling in contiguity to each
other, or at least in correspondent points of view; because
we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity
to that of resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to
that of qualities. And this is easily accounted for from the
known properties of human nature. When the mind is determined to join certain objects, but undetermined in its
choice of the particular objects, It naturally turns its eye
to such as are related together. They are already united in
the mind: They present themselves at the same time to the
conception; and instead of requiring any new reason for
their conjunction, it would require a very powerful reason
to make us over-look this natural affinity. This we shall
have occasion to explain more fully afterwards, when we come
to treat of beauty. In the mean time, we may content
ourselves with observing, that the same love of order and
uniformity, which arranges the books in a library, and the
chairs in a parlour, contribute to the formation of society,
and to the well-being of mankind, by modifying the general
rule concerning the stability of possession. And as property
forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, it is
natural to found it on some preceding relation; and as
property Is nothing but a constant possession, secured by
the laws of society, it is natural to add it to the present
possession, which is a relation that resembles it.
For this
also has its influence. If it be natural to conjoin all
sorts of relations, it is more so, to conjoin such relations
as are resembling, and are related together.]
But we may observe, that though the rule of the assignment of property
to the present possessor be natural, and by that means useful, yet its
utility extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor would any
thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which
restitution would be excluded, and every injustice would be authorized
and rewarded. We must, therefore, seek for some other circumstance, that
may give rise to property after society is once established; and of
this kind, I find four most considerable, viz.
Occupation, Prescription,
Accession, and Succession. We shall briefly examine each of these,
beginning with Occupation.
The possession of all external goods is changeable and uncertain; which
is one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of
society, and is the reason why, by universal agreement, express or
tacite, men restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice
and equity. The misery of the condition, which precedes this restraint,
is the cause why we submit to that remedy as quickly as possible; and
this affords us an easy reason, why we annex the idea of property to the
first possession, or to occupation. Men are unwilling to leave property
in suspense, even for the shortest time, or open the least door to
violence and disorder. To which we may add, that the first possession
always engages the attention most; and did we neglect it, there would be
no colour of reason for assigning property to any succeeding possession.
[Footnote 16. Some philosophers account for the right of
occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his
own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it
gives him the property of the whole: But, 1. There are
several kinds of occupation, where we cannot be said to join
our labour to the object we acquire: As when we possess a
meadow by grazing our cattle upon it. 2. This accounts for
the matter by means of accession; which is taking a needless
circuit. 3. We cannot be said to join our labour to any
thing but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only
make an alteration on it by our labour. This forms a
relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the
property, according to the preceding principles.]
There remains nothing, but to determine exactly, what is meant by
possession; and this is not so easy as may at first sight be imagined.
We are said to be in possession of any thing, not only when we
immediately touch it, but also when we are so situated with respect
to it, as to have it in our power to use it; and may move, alter,
or destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage. This
relation, then, is a species of cause and effect; and as property is
nothing but a stable possession, derived from the rules of justice, or
the conventions of men, it is to be considered as the same species of
relation. But here we may observe, that as the power of using any object
becomes more or less certain, according as the interruptions we may meet
with are more or less probable; and as this probability may increase
by insensible degrees; it is in many cases impossible to determine when
possession begins or ends; nor is there any certain standard, by which
we can decide such controversies. A wild boar, that falls into our
snares, is deemed to be in our possession, if it be impossible for him
to escape. But what do we mean by impossible? How do we separate this
impossibility from an improbability? And how distinguish that exactly
from a probability? Mark the precise limits of the one and the other,
and shew the standard, by which we may decide all disputes that may
arise, and, as we find by experience, frequently do arise upon this
subject.
[Footnote 17. If we seek a solution of these difficulties in
reason and public interest, we never shall find satisfaction; and If we look for it in the imagination, it
is evident, that the qualities, which operate upon that
faculty, run so insensibly and gradually into each other,
that it is impossible to give them any precise bounds or
termination. The difficulties on this head must encrease,
when we consider, that our judgment alters very sensibly,
according to the subject, and that the same power and
proximity will be deemed possession in one case, which is
not esteemed such in another. A person, who has hunted a
hare to the last degree of weariness, would look upon it as
an injustice for another to rush in before him, and seize
his prey. But the same person advancing to pluck an apple,
that hangs within his reach, has no reason to complain, if
another, more alert, passes him, and takes possession. What
is the reason of this difference, but that immobility, not