The chronological treatment of Jewish philosophy which we have followed makes it necessary at this point to take up a
Karaite work of the fourteenth century that is closely modelled upon the "Guide of the Perplexed." In doing this we
necessarily take a step backward as far as the philosophical development is concerned. For while it is true that the early
Rabbanite thinkers like Saadia, Bahya, Ibn Zaddik and others moved in the circle of ideas of the Mohammedan
Mutakallimun, that period had long since been passed. Judah Halevi criticized the Kalam, Ibn Daud is a thorough
Aristotelian, and Maimonides gave the Kalam in Jewish literature its deathblow. No Rabbanite after Maimonides would
think of going back to the old arguments made popular by the Mutakallimun—the theory of atoms, of substance and
accident in the Kalamistic sense of accident as a quality which needs continuous creation to exist any length of time, the
denial of law and natural causation, the arguments in favor of creation and the existence of God based upon creation,
the doctrine of the divine will as eternal or created, residing in a subject or existing without a subject, the world as due to
God's will or to his wisdom, the nature of right and wrong as determined by the character and purpose of the act or solely
by the arbitrary will of God—these and other topics, which formed the main ground of discussion between the
Muʿtazilites and the Ashariya, and were taken over by the Karaites and to a less extent by the early Rabbanites in the
tenth and eleventh centuries, had long lost their significance and their interest among the Rabbanite followers of
Maimonides. Aristotelianism, introduced by Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes among the Arabs, and Ibn Daud and
Maimonides among the Jews, dominated all speculative thought, and the old Kalam was obsolete and forgotten.
Gersonides no longer regards the Kalamistic point of view as a living issue. He ignores it entirely. His problems as we
have seen are those raised by the Averroistic system. In this respect then a reading of Aaron ben Elijah's "Ez Hayim"
(Tree of Life)[360] affects us like a breath from a foreign clime, like the odor of a thing long buried. And yet Aaron ben
Elijah was a contemporary of Levi ben Gerson. He was born about 1300, and died in 1369. He lived in Nicomedia, Cairo,
Constantinople. The reason for the antiquated appearance of his work lies in the fact that he was a Karaite, and the
Karaites never got beyond the Muʿtazilite point of view. Karaism was only a sect and never showed after the days of
Saadia anything like the life and enthusiastic activity of the great body of Rabbanite Judaism, which formed the great
majority of the Jewish people. The Karaites had their important men in Halaka as well as in religious philosophy and
Biblical exegesis. Solomon ben Yeroham, Joseph Ha-Maor (Al-Kirkisani), Joseph Al Basir (p. 48 ff.), Jeshua ben Judah
(p. 55 ff.), Yefet Ha-Levi, Judah Hadassi, Aaron ben Joseph—all these were prominent in Karaitic literature. But they
cannot be compared to the great men among the Rabbanites. There was no Maimonides among them. And Aaron ben
Elijah cherished the ambition of being to the Karaites what Maimonides was to the Rabbanites. Accordingly he undertook
to compose three works representing the three great divisions of Karaitic Judaism—a book of Laws, a work on Biblical
exegesis and a treatise on religious philosophy. The last was written first, having been composed in 1346. The "Sefer
Ha-Mizvot," on the religious commandments, was written in 1354, and his exegetical work, known as "Keter Torah" (The
Crown of the Law) was published in 1362. It is the first that interests us, the "Ez Hayim." As was said before, this book is
closely modelled upon the "More Nebukim," though the arrangement is different, being more logical than that of the
"Guide." Instead of beginning, as Maimonides does, with interpreting the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible,
which is followed by a treatment of the divine attributes, long before the existence of God has been proved or even the
fundamental principles laid down upon which are based the proofs of the existence of God, Aaron ben Elijah more
naturally begins with the basal doctrines of physics and metaphysics, which he then utilizes in discussing the existence
of God. As Maimonides brought to a focus all the speculation on philosophy and religion as it was handed down to him
by Arab and Jew, and gave it a harmonious and systematic form in his masterpiece; so did Aaron ben Elijah endeavor to
sum up all Karaitic discussion in his work, and in addition declare his attitude to Maimonides. The success with which he
carried out this plan is not equal. As a source of information on schools and opinions of Arabs and Karaites, the "Ez
Hayim" is of great importance and interest. But it cannot in the least compare with the "Guide" as a constructive work of
religious philosophy. It has not the same originality or any degree remotely approaching it. The greater part of the
Aristotelian material seems bodily taken from Maimonides, and so is the part dealing with the anthropomorphic
expressions in the Bible. There is a different point of view in his exposition of the Muʿtazilite physics, which he presents
in a more systematic and favorable light than Maimonides, defending it against the strictures of the latter. But everywhere
Aaron ben Elijah lacks the positiveness and commanding mastery of Maimonides. He is not clear what side of a question
to espouse. For the most part he places side by side the opposed points of view and only barely intimates his own
attitude or preference. Under these circumstances it will not be necessary for us to reproduce his ideas in extenso. It will
be sufficient if we indicate his relation to Maimonides in the problems common to both, adding a brief statement of those
topics which Aaron ben Elijah owes to his Karaite predecessors, and which Maimonides omits.
His general attitude on the relation of religion or revelation to reason and philosophy is somewhat inconsistent. For while
he endeavors to rationalize Jewish dogma and Scriptural teaching like Maimonides, and in doing so utilizes Aristotelian
terminology in matters physical, metaphysical, psychological, ethical and logical, he nevertheless in the beginning of his
work condemns philosophy as well as philosophers, meaning of course the Aristotelians.[361] He nowhere expressly
indicates the manner of reconciling this apparent contradiction. But it would seem as if he intended to distinguish
between the philosophical method and the actual teachings of the Aristotelians. Their method he approves, their results
he condemns. The Aristotelians taught the eternity of the world, the immutability of natural law, God's ignorance of
particulars and the absence of special Providence. These doctrines must be condemned. Maimonides too rejects these
extreme teachings while praising Aristotle and maintaining that philosophy was originally a possession of the Israelitish
people, which they lost in the exile. Aaron ben Elijah is not willing to follow the philosophers as far as Maimonides. He
admits positive attributes in God, which Maimonides rejects; he admits an absolute will in God and not merely a relative
like Maimonides; he extends God's providence to all individuals including irrational creatures, whereas Maimonides limits
special providence to the individuals of the human species, and so on. And so he condemns the philosophers, though he
cannot help using their method and even their fundamental doctrines, so far as they are purely theoretical and scientific.
He is willing to go the full length of the Aristotelians only in the unity and incorporeality of God, though here too he
vindicates sense perception to God, i. e., the knowledge of that which we get through our sense organs. He too like the
philosophers insists on the importance of the reason as the instrument of truth and knowledge. Abraham was the first, he
tells us, who proved the existence of God with his intellect. Then came the law of Moses, which strengthened the same
idea. The Gentiles hated and envied Israel for their superiority and their true opinions; hence they endeavored to refute
their ideas and establish others in their stead. This was the work of the ancient Greek philosophers, who are called
enemies in the Bible (Psalms 139, 21). At the time of the second Temple, seeing that the Jewish religion and its
teachings were true, they took advantage of the advent of Jesus to adopt his false teachings, thus showing their hatred
and envy of Israel. At the same time, however, they were obliged to borrow some views and methods of proof from Israel,
for religion as such is opposed to philosophy. Still the true nature of God was unknown to them. Then came the Arabs,
who imitated the Christians in adopting a belief different from Judaism, at the same time borrowing views from the Bible.
These are the Muʿtazila and the Ashariya. Later when on account of the exile differences arose among the Jews, there
were formed the two parties of the Karaites and the Rabbanites. The Karaites followed the Muʿtazila, and so did some of
the Rabbanites, because their views coincided with those of the Bible, from which they were borrowed. The views of the
philosophers as being opposed to the Bible they naturally rejected. Nevertheless some Rabbanites adopted the views of
the philosophers, though believing in the Bible. This is a mistake, for even the Christians rejected the views of the
philosophers.[362]
Here we see clearly the difference in general attitude between Aaron ben Elijah and Maimonides. The latter has no use
whatsoever for the Muʿtazila. He realizes the immeasurable superiority of the Aristotelians (this is the meaning of the
word philosophers in mediæval Jewish and Arabic literature). His task is therefore to harmonize the Bible with Aristotelian
doctrine wherever possible. Aaron ben Elijah is still, in the fourteenth century, a follower of the Kalam, and believes the
Muʿtazila are closer to Scripture than Aristotle. He is two centuries behind Maimonides philosophically, and yet he has
the truer insight because less debauched by Aristotelian learning.
As was said before, Aaron ben Elijah follows a more logical arrangement in the disposition of his work than Maimonides.
In reality it is the old arrangement of the Kalamistic works (cf. p. 24). The purpose of all Jewish investigators, he says, is
the same, namely, to prove the existence and nature of God, but there is a difference among them in the method of
proving God's existence. Some base their proofs on the assumption of the creation of the world, others on that of the
world's eternity. The Mutakallimun follow the former method, the philosophers, the latter. Their respective views of the
origin of the world are determined by their opinions concerning the principles of existence and the existent, that is, the
fundamental principles of physics and metaphysics. Accordingly Aaron ben Elijah finds it necessary to give a preliminary
account of the Kalamistic as well as the philosophic theories, as Maimonides did before him (p. 249 ff.). It is not
necessary for us to reproduce here his sketch of the philosophical views, as we know them sufficiently from our studies
of Ibn Daud and Maimonides. But it will be of value to refer to his account of the Kalamistic principles, though we have
already discussed them in the introduction (p. xxi) and in our study of Maimonides (p. 249 ff.). This is due principally to
the fact that Aaron ben Elijah endeavors to defend the Mutakallimun against Maimonides's charge that they were
influenced by preconceived notions and allowed their religious views to dictate to them their interpretation of nature,
instead of letting the latter speak for itself. Thus Maimonides specifically accuses them of having adopted the atomic
theory of the pre-Aristotelian philosophers not because they were really and independently convinced of its scientific
truth—how could that be since Aristotle proved it impossible?—but because on this theory they could prove the creation
of the world, which they must at all hazards maintain as a religious dogma fundamental in its nature, since upon it is
based the proof of the existence of God.
Aaron ben Elijah denies this charge, maintaining the philosophical honesty of the Mutakallimun. Epicurus too, he says,
believed in the atomic theory, though he regarded the world as eternal. Hence there is no necessary connection between
atoms and creation.[363] The atomic theory is defensible on its own merits, and the motives of the Mutakallimun in
adopting it are purely scientific, as follows: According to the Mutakallimun there are only body or substance and its
accidents or qualities. This is the constitution of material objects. There are, however, two kinds of qualities or attributes,
viz., "characters," and accidents. Characters are such attributes as are essential to body and without which it cannot
exist. Accidents may disappear, while body continues. Since, then, body may exist with or without accidents, there must
be a cause which is responsible for the attachment of accidents to body when they are so attached. This cause we call
"union." When a body is "united" with accidents it owes this to the existence of a certain something, a certain property, let
us say, in it which we have called "union." Hence when the body is "separated" from accidents, when it is without
accidents, it is because there is no "union." Further, every body possessed of magnitude or extension is divisible, hence
it must have "union" to hold its parts together. But this "union" is not essential to all existents; for we have seen that its
function is to unite accidents with body. And as accidents are separable while body may continue to exist without them,
"union" disappears together with the accidents. Bodies without "union" are therefore possible and real. But we have just
seen that all bodies possessing magnitude have "union." It follows therefore that if there are "union"-less bodies, they are
without magnitude, and hence atoms. This is the proof of the atomic theory and it has nothing to do with the matter of the
origin of the world.[364] As a matter of fact the Mutakallimun believe that the atoms were created ex nihilo. But the
creation of the world can be proved whichever view we adopt concerning the nature of the existent, whether it be the
atomic theory of the Mutakallimun or the principles of matter and form of the Aristotelians. The important principle at the
basis of this proof is the well-known Kalamistic one that if an object cannot do without an attribute originating in time, the
object itself has its origin in time. Now on either view of the constitution of the existent, body must have form or accidents
respectively, and as the latter are constantly changing, body or matter has its origin in time, hence the world is not
eternal.
Besides, not to speak of the inconclusive character of the philosophical arguments in favor of eternity and the positive
arguments for creation (all or most of which we have already met in our previous studies, and need not therefore
reproduce Aaron ben Elijah's version of them), the philosophers themselves without knowing it are led to contradict
themselves in their very arguments from the assumption of eternity. The doctrine of creation follows as a consequence
from their own presuppositions. Thus on the basis of eternity of motion they prove that the heavenly spheres are
endowed with soul and intellect, and their motions are voluntary and due to conceptions which they endeavor to realize
(cf. p. 267). This makes the sphere a composite object, containing the elements, sphericity, soul, intellect. Everything
composite is a possible existent, because its existence depends upon the existence of its parts. What is a possible
existent may also not exist. Moreover, that which is possible must at some time become actual. Hence the sphere must at
some time have been non-existent, and it required an agent to bring it into being. We are thus led to contradict our
hypothesis of eternity from which we started.[365]
Creation is thus established, and this is the best way to prove the existence, unity and incorporeality of God. Maimonides
attempts to prove creation from the peculiarities of the heavenly motions, which cannot be well accounted for on the
theory of natural causes. Adopting the latter in the main, he makes an exception in the case of the spherical motions
because the philosophers cannot adequately explain them, and jumps to the conclusion that here the philosophical
appeal to mechanical causation breaks down and we are dealing with teleology, with intelligent design and purpose on
the part of an intelligent agent. This leads to belief in creation. But this argument of Maimonides is very weak and
inconclusive. Ignorance of causes in a special case, due to the limitations of our reason, proves nothing. Mechanical
causes may be the sole determinants of the heavenly motions even though the philosophers have not yet discovered
what they are (cf. above, p. 270 ff.).[366]
Nor is Maimonides to be imitated, who bases his proof of the existence of God on the theory of eternity. The Bible is
opposed to it. The Bible begins with creation as an indication that this is the basis of our knowledge of God's existence,
revelation and providence. This is the method Abraham followed and this is what he meant when he swore by the "most
high God, the creator of heaven and earth" (Gen. 14, 22). Abraham arrived at this belief through ratiocination and
endeavored to convince others. The same thing is evident in the words of Isaiah (40, 26), "Lift up your eyes on high and
see who created these." He was arguing with the people who believed in eternity, and proved to them the existence of
God by showing that the world is created. All these indications in the Bible show that the doctrine of creation is capable
of apodeictic proof.[367]
The reader will see that all this is directed against Maimonides, though he is not mentioned by name. Maimonides
claimed against the Mutakallimun that it is not safe to base the existence of God upon the theory of creation, because the
latter cannot be strictly demonstrated. And while he believed in it himself and gave reasons to show why it is more
plausible than eternity, he admitted that others might think differently; and hence based his proofs of God's existence on
the Aristotelian theory of eternity in order to be on the safe side. It is never too late to prove God's existence if the world
is created. We must be sure of his existence, no matter what the fate of our cosmological theories might be. This did not
appeal to the Karaite and Mutakallim, Aaron ben Elijah. His idea is that we must never for a moment doubt the creation of
the world. To follow the procedure of Maimonides would have the tendency of making people believe that the world may
be eternal after all, as happened in fact in the case of Gersonides. Aaron ben Elijah will not leave a way open to such a
heresy.
In the doctrine of attributes Aaron ben Elijah likewise maintains the views of the Muʿtazilite Karaites against the
philosophers, and especially against Maimonides. The general problem is sufficiently familiar to us by this time, and we
need only present the salient points in the controversy. The question is whether there are any positive attributes which
may be applied to God as actually denoting his essence—hence positive essential attributes. Maimonides denied it, the
Karaites affirmed it. The arguments for Maimonides's denial we saw before (p. 262 f.). And his conclusion is that the only
attributes that may be applied to God are the negative, and those positive ones which do not denote any definite thing
corresponding to them in God's essence, but are derived from the effects of God's unitary and simple being on the life of
man and nature. He is the author of these effects, and we characterize him in the way in which we would characterize a
human being who would do similar things; but this must not be done.
Aaron ben Elijah insists that there are positive essential attributes, which are the following five: Omnipotent, Omniscient,
Acting with Will, Living, Existent. He agrees with Maimonides that these essential attributes must be understood in a
manner not to interfere with God's simplicity and unity, but is satisfied that this can be done. For we must not conceive of
them as additions to God's essence, nor as so many distinct elements composing God's essence, but as representing
the multiplicity of powers issuing from him without detriment to his unity. We call them essential attributes, meaning that
they are the essence of God, but not that they are different from each other and each makes up part of God's essence.
We do not know God's essence, and these terms are simply transferred from our human experience, and do not indicate
that God's activity can be compared to ours in any sense.
The five attributes above named are all identical with God's simple essence. "Living" denotes ability to perceive, hence is
identical with "Omniscient." "Acting with will" likewise denotes just and proper action, which in turn involves true insight.
Hence identity of will and knowledge. "Omnipotent" also in the case of an intellectual being denotes the act of the
intellect par excellence, which is knowledge. And surely God's existence is not distinct from his essence, else his
existence would be caused, and he would not be the necessary existent all agree him to be. It follows then that God is
one, and his essence is nevertheless all these five attributes.
There are all the reasons in the world why we should apply attributes to God. The same reason as we have for applying
names to anything else exists for giving names to God. In fact it would be correct to say that we should have more names
for God than for anything else, since in other things we can avoid naming them by pointing to them, as they can be
perceived by the senses. Not so God. We are forced to use words in talking about him. God has given himself names in
the Bible, hence we may do the same.
Maimonides and his school endeavor to obviate the criticisms of the philosophers, who are opposed to all attributes, by
excluding all but negative terms. But this does not help the matter in the least. A negative attribute is in reality no different
from a positive, and in the end leads to a positive. Thus if we say "not mineral," "not plant," we clearly say "animal." The
advocates of negative attributes answer this criticism by saying that they understand pure negation without any positive
implications, just as when we say a stone is "not seeing," we do not imply that it is blind. But this cannot be, for when
they say God is "not ignorant," they do not mean that he is not "knowing" either, for they insist that he is power and
knowledge and life, and so on. This being the case, it is much more proper to use positive attributes, seeing that the
Prophets do so. When they say that the Prophets meant only to exclude the negative; that by saying, "Able," "Knowing,"
they meant to exclude "weak" "ignorant," they ipso facto admit that by excluding the latter we posit the former.
The arguments against positive essential attributes we can easily answer. By saying that certain attributes are essential
we do not claim to know God's essence. All we know is God's existence, which we learn from his effects, and according
to these same effects we characterize God's existence by means of attributes of which also we know only the existence,
not the essence. For we do not mean to indicate that these terms denote the same thing in God as they denote in us.
They are homonyms, since in God they denote essence, whereas in us they are accidents. The plurality of attributes
does not argue plurality in God, for one essence may perform a great many acts, and hence we may characterize the
essence in accordance with those acts. The error of composition arises only if we suppose that the various acts point to
various elements in their author. Of the various kinds of terms those only are applicable to God which denote pure
essence or substance like knowledge, power; and those denoting activity like creating, doing, and so on.[368]
In reference to the will of God Aaron ben Elijah refuses to agree with the peculiar view of the Mutakallimun; but unlike
Maimonides, who can afford to ignore their discussions entirely and dismiss their fanciful notion with a word ("Guide," I.
75, proof 3), Aaron ben Elijah takes up the discussion seriously. The Mutakallimun (or the Ashariya, according to Aaron
ben Elijah) were in dread of anything that might lend some semblance to eternity of the world. Hence they argued, If the
will of God is identical with his essence like the other essential attributes, it follows that as his essence is eternal and
unchangeable so is his will. And if we grant this, then the objects of his will too must be eternal and unchangeable, and
we have the much abhorred doctrine of the eternity of the world. To avoid this objectionable conclusion they conceived
of God's voluntary acts as due to an external will. But this external will also offered difficulties. It cannot be a power or
quality residing in God as its subject, for God is not a material substance bearing accidents. It cannot be a quality
inherent in another subject, for then it would not be God's will at all; it would be the will of this other being, and God's
acts would be determined by someone else. They were thus forced to assume a subject-less will newly created with
every act of God. This notion Aaron ben Elijah rejects on the ground that a subject-less will is an impossibility. An
accident must have a subject, and will implies life as its subject. Besides, th