1. Number the simplest and most universal idea. Amongst all the ideas we have, as there is none
suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of unity, or one: it has
no shadow of variety or composition in it: every object our senses are employed about; every idea in
our understandings; every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the
most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most universal
idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts; everything that either
doth exist, or can be imagined.
2. Its modes made by addition. By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions
together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus, by adding one to one, we have
the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a
dozen; and so of a score, or a million, or any other number.
3. Each mode distinct. The simple modes of number are of all other the most distinct; every the least
variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different from that which
approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote; two being as distinct from one, as two hundred; and
the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of
a mite. This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not so easy, nor perhaps possible for us to
distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to
find a difference between the white of this paper and that of the next degree to it: or can form distinct
ideas of every the least excess in extension?
4. Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise. The clearness and distinctness of each
mode of number from all others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think that
demonstrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extension, yet they are
more general in their use, and more determinate in their application. Because the ideas of numbers
are more precise and distinguishable than in extension; where every equality and excess are not so
easy to be observed or measured; because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined
smallness beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the
least excess cannot be discovered; which is clear otherwise in number, where, as has been said, 91
is as distinguishable from go as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90. But it is
not so in extension, where, whatsoever is more than just a foot or an inch, is not distinguishable
from the standard of a foot or an inch; and in lines which appear of an equal length, one may be
longer than the other by innumerable parts: nor can any one assign an angle, which shall be the
next biggest to a right one.
5. Names necessary to numbers. By the repeating, as has been said, the idea of an unit, and joining
it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever
can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any
number, and gave a name to it, may count, or have ideas, for several collections of units,
distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers, and a
memory to retain that series, with their several names: all numeration being but still the adding of
one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new or distinct
name or sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distinguish it from every smaller
or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with
his tale, taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression; and so again, by
subtracting an unit from each collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the ideas of
numbers within the compass of his language, or for which he hath names, though not perhaps of
more. For, the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of
units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but more or less, names or
marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For,
without such names or marks, we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially
where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together, without a
name or mark to distinguish that precise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in
confusion.
6. Another reason for the necessity of names to numbers. This I think to be the reason why some
Americans I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough,) could not,
as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had any distinct idea of that number, though they could
reckon very well to 20. Because their language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few
necessaries of a needy, simple life, unacquainted either with trade or mathematics, had no words in
it to stand for 1000; so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers, they would
show the hairs of their head, to express a great multitude, which they could not number; which
inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for
numbers above 5; any number beyond that they made out by showing their fingers, and the fingers
of others who were present. And I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a
great deal further than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them
by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them, by millions of millions of millions, etc., it is hard
to go beyond eighteen, or at most, four and twenty, decimal progressions, without confusion. But to
show how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having useful ideas of numbers,
let us see all these following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number: v. g.
Nonillions Octillions Septillions Sextillions Quintrillions
857324 162486 345896 437918 423147
Quartrillions Trillions Billions Millions Units
248106 235421 261734 368149 623137
The ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating of millions, of
millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the
denomination of the second six figures). In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing
notions of this number. But whether, by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination,
these, and perhaps a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly,
and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to
be considered. This I mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering, without
pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.
7. Why children number not earlier. Thus children, either for want of names to mark the several
progressions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones,
and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to
reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steadily, till a good while
after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas: and one may often observe them
discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before
they can tell twenty. And some, through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several
combinations of numbers, with their names, annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of
so long a train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their
lifetime to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For he that will count
twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before, with the distinct
name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap
is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no further. So that to reckon right,
it is required, (1) That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one from another
only by the addition or subtraction of one unit: (2) That it retain in memory the names or marks of the
several combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in
that exact order that the numbers follow one another. In either of which, if it trips, the whole business
of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the
ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.
8. Number measures all measureables. This further is observable in number, that it is that which the
mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable, which principally are
expansion and duration; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing
but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of Eternity and Immensity, but the repeated
additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity of number; in
which we can come to no end of addition? For such an inexhaustible stock, number (of all other our
ideas) most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one sum
as great a number as he pleases, this multitude, how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of
adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number; where still there
remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endless addition or addibility (if
any one like the word better) of numbers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the
clearest and most distinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.