An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke - HTML preview

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Chapter XXVI

Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations

1. Whence the ideas of cause and effect got. In the notice that our senses take of the constant

vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances,

begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of

some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect. That which produces

any simple or complex idea we denote by the general name, cause, and that which is produced,

effect. Thus, finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple idea that

was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat we call the

simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So also,

finding that the substance, wood, which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called, by the

application of fire, is turned into another substance, called ashes; i.e., another complex idea,

consisting of a collection of simple ideas, quite different from that complex idea which we call wood;

we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes, as effect. So that whatever is

considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple idea, or collection of

simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the

relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.

2. Creation, generation, making, alteration. Having thus, from what our senses are able to discover

in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect, viz., that a cause is

that which makes any other thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode, begin to be; and an effect

is that which had its beginning from some other thing; the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish

the several originals of things into two sorts:--

First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a

new particle of matter doth begin to exist, in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we

call creation.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exist; but that very

thing, so constituted of pre-existing particles, which, considered all together, make up such a

collection of simple ideas, had not any existence before, as this man, this egg, rose, or cherry, etc.

And this, when referred to a substance, produced in the ordinary course of nature by internal

principle, but set on work by, and received from, some external agent, or cause, and working by

insensible ways which we perceive not, we call generation. When the cause is extrinsical, and the

effect produced by a sensible separation, or juxta-position of discernible parts, we call it making;

and such are all artificial things. When any simple idea is produced, which was not in that subject

before, we call it alteration. Thus a man is generated, a picture made; and either of them altered,

when any new sensible quality or simple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there

before: and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are effects; and those things

which operated to the existence, causes. In which, and all other cases, we may observe, that the

notion of cause and effect has its rise from ideas received by sensation or reflection; and that this

relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the idea of cause and

effect, it suffices to consider any simple idea or substance, as beginning to exist, by the operation of

some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

3. Relations of time. Time and place are also the foundations of very large relations; and all finite

beings at least are concerned in them. But having already shown in another place how we get those

ideas, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things received from time

are only relations. Thus, when any one says that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-

five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more

but this, That the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her

government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all words, answering, How Long?

Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066; which means this, That, taking

the duration from our Saviour's time till now for one entire great length of time, it shows at what

distance this invasion was from the two extremes; and so do all words of time answering to the

question, When, which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer

duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

4. Some ideas of time supposed positive and found to be relative. There are yet, besides those,

other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas, which yet will, when

considered, be found to be relative; such as are, young, old, etc., which include and intimate the

relation anything has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus,

having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when

we say a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain

to; and when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that

which men do not usually exceed. And so it is but comparing the particular age or duration of this or

that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort

of animals: which is plain in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young

at twenty years, and very young at seven years old: but yet a horse we call old at twenty, and a dog

at seven years, because in each of these we compare their age to different ideas of duration, which

are settled in our minds as belonging to these several sorts of animals, in the ordinary course of

nature. But the sun and stars, though they have outlasted several generations of men, we call not

old, because we do not know what period God hath set to that sort of beings. This term belonging

properly to those things which we can observe in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay,

to come to an end in a certain period of time; and so have in our minds, as it were, a standard to

which we can compare the several parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto,

call them young or old; which we cannot, therefore, do to a ruby or a diamond, things whose usual

periods we know not.

5. Relations of place and extension. The relation also that things have to one another in their places

and distances is very obvious to observe; as above, below, a mile distant from Charing-cross, in

England, and in London. But as in duration, so in extension and bulk, there are some ideas that are

relative which we signify by names that are thought positive; as great and little are truly relations.

For here also, having, by observation, settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several

species of things from those we have been most accustomed to, we make them as it were the

standards, whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, such a one as is

bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a little horse, such a one as comes

not up to the size of that idea which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses; and that will

be a great horse to a Welchman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the

different breed of their countries, taken several-sized ideas to which they compare, and in relation to

which they denominate their great and their little.

6. Absolute terms often stand for relations. So likewise weak and strong are but relative

denominations of power, compared to some ideas we have at that time of greater or less power.

Thus, when we say a weak man, we mean one that has not so much strength or power to move as

usually men have, or usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his strength to the idea we

have of the usual strength of men, or men of such a size. The like when we say the creatures are all

weak things; weak there is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion there is in the power of

God and the creatures. And so abundance of words, in ordinary speech, stand only for relations

(and perhaps the greatest part) which at first sight seem to have no such signification: v.g. the ship

has necessary stores. Necessary and stores are both relative words; one having a relation to the

accomplishing the voyage intended, and the other to future use. All which relations, how they are

confined to, and terminate in ideas derived from sensation or reflection, is too obvious to need any

explication.