1. Ideas considered in reference to their archetypes. Besides what we have already mentioned
concerning ideas, other considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are
taken, or which they may be supposed to represent; and thus, I think, they may come under a three-
fold distinction, and are:--
First, either real or fantastical;
Secondly, adequate or inadequate;
Thirdly, true or false.
First, by real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the
real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical, I call such as
have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are
tacitly referred, as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned,
we shall find that,
2. Simple ideas are all real appearances of things. First, Our simple ideas are all real, all agree to
the reality of things: not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist;
the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. But, though
whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and
coldness, pain, etc., being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to
produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that
are really in things themselves. For, these several appearances being designed to be the mark
whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve
us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects,
or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves: the reality lying in that steady
correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to
those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly
produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree
to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make
them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly
confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it
has received.
3. Complex ideas are voluntary combinations. Though the mind be wholly passive in respect of its
simple ideas; yet, I think, we may say it is not so in respect of its complex ideas. For those being
combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name, it is plain that the
mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass
that one man's idea of gold, or justice, is different from another's, but because he has put in, or left
out of his, some simple idea which the other has not? The question then is, Which of these are real,
and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what
not? And to this I say that,
4. Mixed modes and relations, made of consistent ideas, are real. Secondly, Mixed modes and
relations, having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more
required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a
possibility of existing conformable to them. These ideas themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ
from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them
inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them,
by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is
not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them,
that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea
which common use calls liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than
reality of ideas. For a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be
done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist.
But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to
be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of these, having the name courage given
to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea; but the other, whilst it has not a common
received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made
with no reference to anything but itself.
5. Complex ideas of substances are real, when they agree with the existence of things. Thirdly, Our
complex ideas of substances, being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and
intended to be representations of substances as they really are, are no further real than as they are
such combinations of simple ideas as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the
contrary, those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really
never united, never were found together in any substance: v.g. a rational creature, consisting of a
horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the centaurs are described: or, a body
yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed, but lighter than common water: or an uniform,
unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion
joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not
know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances, being made conformable to no pattern
existing that we know; and consisting of such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed us
united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex
ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.