1. Something unreasonable in most men. There is scarce any one that does not observe something
that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of
other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted
enough to espy in another, and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn; though he be
guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives,
and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.
2. Not wholly from self-love. This proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great
hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the overweening of self-flattery, are frequently
guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the
obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear
as daylight.
3. Not from education. This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice,
and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shows
distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause,
and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little
further, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show
whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.
4. A degree of madness found in most men. I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as
madness, when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really
madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions,
argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil
conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion, but in the steady
calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful
imputation on the greatest part of mankind, is, that, inquiring a little by the bye into the nature of
madness (Bk. ii. ch. xi. SS 13), I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the
very same cause we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time when I
thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a
weakness to which all men are so liable, if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind, the
greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in
its prevention and cure.
5. From a wrong connexion of ideas. Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and
connexion one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold
them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides
this, there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom. Ideas that in themselves
are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them;
they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but
its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang,
always inseparable, show themselves together.
6. This connexion made by custom. This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind
makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be very
different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, etc. Custom settles habits of
thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body: all
which seems to be but trains of motions in the animal spirits, which, once set a going, continue in
the same steps they have used to; which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the
motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas
seem to be produced in our minds; or, if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one
another in an habitual train, when once they are put into their track, as well as it does to explain
such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune will find that, let it but once begin in his head,
the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding, without any
care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the
tune he has begun, though his unattentive thoughts be elsewhere a wandering. Whether the natural
cause of these ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers be the motion of his animal
spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears to be so: but this may
help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas.
7. Some antipathies an effect of it. That there are such associations of them made by custom, in the
minds of most men, I think nobody will question, who has well considered himself or others; and to
this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men,
which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural; and are therefore
called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connexion of two ideas, which
either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards
kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I say most of the
antipathies, I do not say all; for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution,
and are born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to
be from unheeded, though perhaps early, impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which would have
been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person
surfeiting with honey no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries sickness and
qualms to his stomach, and he cannot bear the very idea of it; other ideas of dislike, and sickness,
and vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed; but he knows from whence to date this
weakness, and can tel how he got this indisposition. Had this happened to him by an over-dose of
honey when a child, all the same effects would have followed; but the cause would have been
mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.
8. Influence of association to be watched educating young children. I mention this, not out of any
great necessity there is in this present argument to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired
antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, viz., that those who have children, or the
charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent
the undue connexion of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible of
lasting impressions; and though those relating to the health of the body are by discreet people
minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the
mind, and terminate in the understanding or passions, have been much less heeded than the thing
deserves: nay, those relating purely to the understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men
wholly overlooked.
9. Wrong connexion of ideas a great cause of errors. This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in
themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to
set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves,
that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.
10. An instance. The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light:
yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together,
possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shall ever
afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear
the one than the other.
11. Another instance. A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that
action over and over, and by ruminating on them strongly, or much, in his mind, so cements those
two ideas together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and
displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as
much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent
occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.
12. A third instance. A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend die in such
a room: though these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the idea of the place
occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with
it: he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.
13. Why time cures some disorders in the mind, which reason cannot cure. When this combination
is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects
of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and
circumstances. And here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though
in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those
who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child that was the daily delight of its
mother's eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her
all the torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case, and you were as good
preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses, the pain of his joints
tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss, from the
idea of the child returning to her memory, all representations, though ever so reasonable, are in
vain; and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved, spend their
lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.
14. Another instance of the effect of the association of ideas. A friend of mine knew one perfectly
cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation. The gentleman who was thus recovered,
with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest
obligation he could have received; but, whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could
never bear the sight of the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he
suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.
15. More instances. Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they
were corrected for, so join those ideas together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are
never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a
torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives.
There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels,
which, though ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some
accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive; and who is there that hath
not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person not
otherwise superior to him, but because, having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the idea
of authority and distance goes along with that of the person, and he that has been thus subjected, is
not able to separate them.
16. A curious instance. Instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere, that if I add one more, it is
only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who, having learnt to dance, and that
to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The idea of
this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his
dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk
was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or some such other trunk had its
due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical
circumstances, a little beyond precise nature, I answer for myself that I had it some years since from
a very sober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I report it; and I dare say there are very
few inquisitive persons who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples, of this
nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.
17. Influence of association on intellectual habits. Intellectual habits and defects this way contracted,
are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the ideas of being and matter be
strongly joined, either by education or much thought; whilst these are stil combined in the mind,
what notions, what reasonings, will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very
childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be
liable to about the Deity? Let the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these
two constantly together possess the mind; and then one body in two places at once, shall
unexamined be swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined infallible
person dictates and demands assent without inquiry.
18. Observable in the opposition between different sects of philosophy and of religion. Some such
wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition
between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their
followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest,
though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so
universal a perverseness, as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood:
some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, i.e., to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore
there must be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood of
what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of
sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking
of: some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by education, custom, and the
constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and
they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea, and they operate
as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to
nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the errors in the world; or, if
it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders
men from seeing and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight
constantly united; if the eye sees these things riveted which are loose, where will you begin to rectify
the mistakes that follow in two ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to
substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This,
whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud
themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error; and the
confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath to them
made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false
consequences.
19. Conclusion. Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and extent of our IDEAS, with
several other considerations about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments, or materials of
our knowledge, the method I at first proposed to myself would now require that I should immediately
proceed to show, what use the understanding makes of them, and what KNOWLEDGE we have by
them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I
should have to do: but, upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connexion between
ideas and WORDS, and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation one to
another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which al consists in
propositions, without considering, first, the nature, use, and signification of Language; which,
therefore, must be the business of the next Book.