1. The common names of substances stand for sorts. The common names of substances, as well
as other general terms, stand for sorts: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such
complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are
capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. I say do or
might agree: for though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it being
abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) might each agree in it, it is as much a
sort as if there were as many suns as there are stars. They want not their reasons who think there
are, and that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, to one who was placed
in a due distance: which, by the way, may show us how much the sorts, or, if you please, genera
and species of things (for those Latin terms signify to me no more than the English word sort)
depend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the real nature of things; since
it is not impossible but that, in propriety of speech, that might be a sun to one which is a star to
another.
2. The essence of each sort of substance is our abstract idea to which the name is annexed. The
measure and boundary of each sort or species, whereby it is constituted that particular sort, and
distinguished from others, is that we call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which
the name is annexed; so that everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort. This, though
it be all the essence of natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts,
yet I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal essence, to distinguish it from the real constitution of
substances, upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which,
therefore, as has been said, may be called the real essence: v.g. the nominal essence of gold is that
complex idea the word gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight,
malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that
body, on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend. How far these two are
different, though they are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover.
3. The nominal and real essence different. For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and
reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I and others annex the
name man, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called: yet nobody will say that
complex idea is the real essence and source of all those operations which are to be found in any
individual of that sort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex
idea, is something quite different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man, from
which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which his so
regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has, we should
have a quite other idea of his essence than what now is contained in our definition of that species,
be it what it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it is now, as
is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other contrivances within of the famous clock at
Strasburg, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand,
and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances.
4. Nothing essential to individuals. That essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts,
and that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears
from hence: that, take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them
under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes:
we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly shows their relation. It is necessary for
me to be as I am; God and nature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me.
An accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever or fall may take away my
reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither sense, nor understanding, no, nor life.
Other creatures of my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties than I
have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine. None
of these are essential to the one or the other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to
some sort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort,
something is found essential. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find that as soon
as he supposes or speaks of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea
signified by some general name, comes into his mind; and it is in reference to that that this or that
quality is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other
particular corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I
write on to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort man, and to have
the name man given it, then reason is essential to it; supposing reason to be a part of the complex
idea the name man stands for: as it is essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it
the name treatise, and rank it under that species. So that essential and not essential relate only to
our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which amounts to no more than this, That
whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract idea which
any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name; since
that abstract idea is the very essence of that species.
5. The only essences perceived by us in individual substances are those qualities which entitle them
to receive their names. Thus, if the idea of body with some people be bare extension or space, then
solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea to which they give the name body to be
solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to body. That therefore, and that alone, is considered
as essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for: without which
no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found
a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the
loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it nor receive direction from it, would any one question
whether it wanted anything essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing
wanted anything essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an essential or specific
difference or no, since we have no other measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas?
And to talk of specific differences in nature, without reference to general ideas in names, is to talk
unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature
between any two particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which is looked
upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such patterns and standards being quite laid
aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have al their qualities
equally essential; and everything in each individual will be essential to it; or, which is more, nothing
at all. For, though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?
yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be essential to the particular parcel
of matter I cut my pen with; without considering it under the name, iron, or as being of a certain
species. And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed to them, are the
boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but what is contained in those ideas.
6. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potential sorts. It is true, I have often
mentioned a real essence, distinct in substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their
nominal essence. By this real essence I mean, that real constitution of anything, which is the
foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the
nominal essence; that particular constitution which everything has within itself, without any relation
to anything without it. But essence, even in this sense, relates to a sort, and supposes a species.
For, being that real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of
things, properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals: v.g. supposing the nominal
essence of gold to be a body of such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the
real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities and their union
depend; and is also the foundation of its solubility in aqua regia and other properties, accompanying
that complex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition of a sort or general
abstract idea, which is considered as immutable; but there is no individual parcel of matter to which
any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it. That which is
essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it is of this or that sort: but take away the
consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing
necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real essences of substances, we only
suppose their being, without precisely knowing what they are; but that which annexes them still to
the species is the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and cause.
7. The nominal essence bounds the species for us. The next thing to be considered is, by which of
those essences it is that substances are determined into sorts or species; and that, it is evident, is
by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It
is impossible, therefore, that anything should determine the sorts of things, which we rank under
general names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for; which is that, as has been
shown, which we call nominal essence. Why do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an
animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort, but because it has
that nominal essence; or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea, that name is annexed to?
And I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those or
other names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for.
8. The nature of species, as formed by us. And that the species of things to us are nothing but the
ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us, and not according to
precise, distinct, real essences in them, is plain from hence:--That we find many of the individuals
that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one
species, have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions, as far different one from another
as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed
by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are often, by sad experience,
convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur,
antimony, or vitriol, which they have found in others. For, though they are bodies of the same
species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name, yet do they often, upon severe
ways of examination, betray qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation
and labour of very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into species, according to their
real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances
of the same species, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles.
That is properly the essence to us, which determines every particular to this or that classis; or, which
is the same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but that abstract idea to
which that name is annexed; and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular
things, as to their general denominations?
9. Not the real essence, or texture of parts, which we know not. Nor indeed can we rank and sort
things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences;
because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction
of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them; which, however
made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true
internal constitution from which those qualities flow, than, as I said, a countryman's idea is from the
inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and
motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged
understanding. Though the familiar use of things about us take off our wonder, yet it cures not our
ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we
presently find we know not their make; and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in
them. It is evident the internal constitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us: for to
go no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that
texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead and antimony fusible, wood and stones not?
What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come
short of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences of plants or animals, every one
knows. The workmanship of the all-wise and powerful God in the great fabric of the universe, and
every part thereof, further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and
intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the
most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and
dispose them into certain classes under names, by their real essences, that are so far from our
discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as soon sort things by their colours, and he that has
lost his smell as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal constitutions
which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences, that
are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in those species called cassiowary and
querechinchio; and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of those species,
without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the
countries where those animals are to be found.
10. Not the substantial form, which we know less. Those, therefore, who have been taught that the
several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial forms, and that it was those
forms which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera, were led yet
further out of the way by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after "substantial forms";
wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or confused conception
in general.
11. That the nominal essence is that only whereby we distinguish species of substances, further
evident, from our ideas of finite spirits and of God. That our ranking and distinguishing natural
substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real
essences to be found in the things themselves, is further evident from our ideas of spirits. For the
mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits,
it hath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all those operations it finds in itself to a
sort of beings; without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of GOD
is but attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in
ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them than would be in their absence;
attributing, I say, those simple ideas to Him in an unlimited degree. Thus, having got from reflecting
on ourselves the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure--each of which we find it better
to have than to want; and the more we have of each the better--joining all these together, with
infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely
wise and happy being. And though we are told that there are different species of angels; yet we
know not how to frame distinct specific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of
more species than one of spirits is impossible; but because having no more simple ideas (nor being
able to frame more) applicable to such beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from
the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our
bodies; we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several species of spirits, one from
another, but by attributing those operations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or
lower degree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except only of GOD, to whom we
attribute both duration and all those other ideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation: nor,
as I humbly conceive, do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put any difference, by any
number of simple ideas which we have of one and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the
particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, etc., being ideas derived from the
operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits, with the difference only of
degrees; to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame as well as we can an
idea of the First Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, in the real excellency of his
nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest
seraph, is from the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what
our narrow understandings can conceive of Him.
12. Of finite spirits there are probably numberless species, in a continuous series or gradation. It is
not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many species of spirits, as
much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas,
as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know
and observe in them. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us, than
there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence: that in all the visible
corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps,
and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are
fishes that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region: and there are some birds that are
inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh so like in taste that the
scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts
that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic
together; seals live at land and sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog; not to
mention what is confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes that seem to
have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men: and the animal and vegetable
kingdoms are so nearly joined, that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other,
there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them: and so on, till we come to the
lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we shall find everywhere that the several species
are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite
power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent
harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the
species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite
perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have
reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are
beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of GOD than
we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all
those distinct species, for the reasons above said, we have no clear distinct ideas.
13. The nominal essence that of the species, as conceived by us, proved from water and ice. But to
return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one whether ice and water were
two distinct species of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot
be denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right. But if an Englishman bred in
Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the
water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, not knowing any peculiar
name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask whether this would be a new species to him,
different from water? And I think it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new species,
no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and
warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a
workman. And if this be so, it is plain that our distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas,
with distinct names annexed to them. It is true every substance that exists has its peculiar
constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking
of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under several titles) is done by us according
to the ideas that we have of them: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we
may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to
be done by their real internal constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into
species, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be
liable to great mistakes.
14. Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real essences. To distinguish substantial
beings into species, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise essences or
forms of things, whereby all the individuals existing are, by nature distinguished into species, these
things are necessary:--
15. A crude supposition. First, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always designs
them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which are to be the models of all things
to be produced. This, in that crude sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication,
before it can fully be assented to.
16. Monstrous births. Secondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that
essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births, that in divers
sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.
17. Are monsters really a distinct species? Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call
monsters be really a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the word species; since it
is certain that everything that exists has its particular constitution. And yet we find that some of these
monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to result from, and
accompany, the essence of that species from whence, they derive their originals, and to which, by
their descent, they seem to belong.
18. Men can have no ideas of real essences. Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we
distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e., we ought to
have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, the supposed real essences of
things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species.
19. Our nominal essences of substances not perfect collections of the properties that flow from their
real essences. Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having framed perfect
complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should
thereby distinguish them into species. But neither c