1. Necessary to know their boundaries. It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity
ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want
rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far
as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in
matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our
reason upon.
From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries
between faith and reason: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great
disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved
how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour
to convince one another in matters of religion.
2. Faith and reason, what, as contradistinguished. I find every sect, as far as reason will help them,
make use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reason.
And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of
the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be
the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do.
Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or
probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such
ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz., by sensation or reflection.
Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of
reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of
communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation.
3. No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation. First, Then I say, that no man
inspired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had
not before from sensation or reflection. For, whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the
immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another,
either by words or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no
other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using them for signs, that they
excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words,
seen or heard, recall to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs
of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in
all other signs; which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all.
Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt up into the third heaven;
whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place,
is only this, That there are such things, "as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into
the heart of man to conceive." And supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a
species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be
such, nobody can deny,) which had six senses; and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs
by that sixth sense: he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas
imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the sound of
words, into a man who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth, of
seeing. For our simple ideas, then, which are the foundation, and sole matter of all our notions and
knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason; I mean our natural faculties; and can by no
means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation. I say, traditional revelation, in
distinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression which is made immediately
by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those
impressions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions
one to another.
4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions knowable also by reason, but not with the
same certainty that reason doth. Secondly, I say that the same truths may be discovered, and
conveyed down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas we
naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as
well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all
things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and
surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear
discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us
than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have that this
revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear
and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: v.g. if it were revealed
some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to
the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of that tradition, that it was revealed: but that would
never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my
own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact
knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their
original from revelation: and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of
the flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen
it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed
writ by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book as if he
had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the
assurance of his senses.
5. Even original revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason. In propositions,
then, whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our
ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident
deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to
gain our assent, and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could
settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of
anything, unless where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too our assurance can be no
greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under
that title, shake or overrule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in
a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For, since no evidence of our
faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive
knowledge, we can never receive for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct
knowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree, and the mind has so
evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the
same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine
revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly,
that we understand it right; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge,
whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no
proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to al such, if it be
contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and
foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and there would be left no
difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if
doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know give way to
what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of
the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith.
They cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince
us of anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be founded on the testimony of
God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth
of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength of the
certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the
proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection
hanging to it, viz., that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of
our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge
he has given us; render all our faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his
workmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light, less
conduct than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps
not so clear) evidence of anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own
reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a
proposition, whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.
6. Traditional revelation much less. Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it,
even in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself. But to all
those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive
the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed
down to them, reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive
them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word,
(called commonly divine faith), has to do with no propositions, but those which are supposed to be
divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith
can say that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be
found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or
all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing, or
not believing, that proposition, or book, to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but
matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can
never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for reason
ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable.
In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of
knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may, in
consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we
be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentience of reason, to quit it for the contrary
opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith: which can have no authority against the plain and
clear dictates of reason.
7. Things above reason are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith. But, Thirdly, There being
many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past,
present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all;
these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when
revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby
lost their first happy state: and that the dead shall rise, and live again: these and the like, being
beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to
do.
8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith; and must carry it against probable
conjectures of reason. But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his
own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters
wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has
been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason. Because the mind
not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability
that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is satisfied, comes from
one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its
being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if anything
shall be thought revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident
knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as
to a matter within its province. Since a man can never have so certain a knowledge that a
proposition which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely
revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered, as he has that the contrary
is true, and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it, without
examination, as a matter of faith.
9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.
First, Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions,
cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.
Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to
determine and judge, from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still,
that, in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth
only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing
violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reason; in
such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against
probability. For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true
or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine;
and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason, in that particular
matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination where reason
came short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay.
10. In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to. Thus far the
dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason; which is not injured
or disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal
fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of it.
This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge;
which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor
allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence
that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we
understand it, so clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason: and therefore Nothing that
is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to he
urged or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine
revelation, ought to overrule all our opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received
with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the landmarks of
knowledge: this shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for
which they were given us.
11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion
can be contradicted. If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries,
there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and
ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed.
For, to this crying up of faith in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those
absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been
principled with an opinion that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however
apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let
loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions,
and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their
follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid
thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should
most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures,
above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts
themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good man,
pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.