1. Causes of error, or how men come to give assent contrary to probability. Knowledge being to be
had only of visible and certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our
judgment giving assent to that which is not true.
But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability,
and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded how
men come to give their assents contrary to probability. For there is nothing more common than
contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another
only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes and firmly adheres to.
The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may all be reduced to these
four:
I. Want of proofs.
II. Want of ability to use them.
III. Want of will to see them.
IV. Wrong measures of probability.
2. First cause of error, want of proofs. First, By want of proofs, I do not mean only the want of those
proofs which are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want even of those proofs
which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs, who have not the convenience
or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any
proposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect the testimonies of others: and in
this state are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the
necessity of their mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living. These
men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their
understandings are but little instructed, when al their whole time and pains are laid out to still the
croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man who
drudges on all his life in a laborious trade, should be more knowing in the variety of things done in
the world than a packhorse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and
dirty road, only to market, should be skilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more
possible that he who wants leisure, books, and languages, and the opportunity of conversing with
variety of men, should be in a condition to collect those testimonies and observations which are in
being, and are necessary to make out many, nay most, of the propositions that, in the societies of
men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of assurance so great as the belief
of the points he would build on them is thought necessary. So that a great part of mankind are, by
the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs,
unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, and which are
necessary to establish those opinions: the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means
of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries.
3. Objection. "What shall become of those who want proofs?" Answered. What shall we say, then?
Are the greatest part of mankind, by the necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable
ignorance in those things which are of greatest importance to them? (for of those it is obvious to
inquire). Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them to
their happiness or misery? Are the current opinions, and licensed guides of every country sufficient
evidence and security to every man to venture his great concernments on; nay, his everlasting
happiness or misery? Or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which
teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor countryman be eternally
happy, for having the chance to be born in Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he
had the ill-luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some of these things, I
will not here examine: but this I am sure, that men must al ow one or other of these to be true, (let
them choose which they please,) or else grant that God has furnished men with faculties sufficient
to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their
ordinary vocations allow them the leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the
means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters of
religion. Were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none
so enslaved to the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to
this advantage of their knowledge.
4. People hindered from inquiry. Besides those whose improvements and informations are
straitened by the narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whose largeness of fortune would
plentifully enough supply books, and other requisites for clearing of doubts, and discovering of truth:
but they are cooped in close, by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those whose
interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These
are as far, nay further, from the liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than these poor and
wretched labourers we before spoke of: and however they may seem high and great, are confined
to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man, their
understandings. This is generally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken to
propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the
country; and must therefore swallow down opinions, as silly people do empiric's pills, without
knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and having nothing to do but believe that they
will do the cure: but in this are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to
refuse swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to choose the physician, to whose
conduct they would trust themselves.
5. Second cause of error, want of skill to use proofs. Secondly, Those who want skill to use those
evidences they have of probabilities; who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads; nor
weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circumstance its
due allowance; may be easily misled to assent to positions that are not probable. There are some
men of one, some but of two syl ogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance one step
further. These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie; cannot constantly
follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion. Now that there is such a difference between
men, in respect of their understandings, I think nobody, who has had any conversation with his
neighbours, will question: though he never was at Westminster-Hall or the Exchange on the one
hand, nor at Alms-houses or Bedlam on the other. Which great difference in men's intellectuals,
whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body particularly adapted to thinking; or in the
dullness or untractableness of those faculties for want of use; or, as some think, in the natural
differences of men's souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it matters not here to
examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings,
apprehensions, and reasonings, to so great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to
mankind, affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect than
between some men and some beasts. But how this comes about is a speculation, though of great
consequence, yet not necessary to our present purpose.
6. Third cause of error, want of will to use them. Thirdly, There are another sort of people that want
proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them: who though they
have riches and leisure enough and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for
them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages some men's
thoughts elsewhere: laziness and oscitancy in general, or a particular aversion for books, study, and
meditation, keep others from any serious thoughts at all; and some out of fear that an impartial
inquiry would not favour those opinions which best suit their prejudices, lives, and designs, content
themselves, without examination, to take upon trust what they find convenient and in fashion. Thus,
most men, even of those that might do otherwise, pass their lives without an acquaintance with,
much less a rational assent to, probabilities they are concerned to know, though they lie so much
within their view that, to be convinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. We know
some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news; and many men forbear to cast
up their accounts, or so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in
no very good posture. How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their
understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks they have
a low opinion of their souls, who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ
none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a
neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes, or a patched
coat, and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches
and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or their country tailor (I mean the common
opinion of those they have conversed with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how
unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no
rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is to
the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know.
But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen, That, however
they may think credit, respect, power, and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet
they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition, who surpass them in
knowledge. They who are blind will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he
is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding.
In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been shown of wrong assent, and how it comes
to pass that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the
reasons which are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have considered only such
probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraces the error.
7. Fourth cause of error, wrong measures of Probability. Fourthly, There remains yet the last sort,
who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the
conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either epechein, suspend their assent, or give it
to the less probable opinion. And to this danger are those exposed who have taken up wrong
measures of probability, which are:
I. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for
principles.
II. Received hypotheses.
III. Predominant passions or inclinations.
IV. Authority.
8. I. Doubtful propositions taken for principles. The first and firmest ground of probability is the
conformity anything has to our own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge which we have
embraced, and continue to look on as principles. These have so great an influence upon our
opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability; to that degree, that
what is inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be
allowed possible. The reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so
paramount to all other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses
are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anything contrary to these established rules. How much
the doctrine of innate principles, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has
contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict
another: but withal I take leave also to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he
admits for a principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself,
by its own evidence, or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so upon the authority of
others. For he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his
assent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any
opinion in itself not evidently true.
9. Instilled in childhood. There is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds
propositions (especially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurses, or those about them:
which being insinuated into their unwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by
degrees, are at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education,
beyond al possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon
their opinions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories,
not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to
reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned:
they look on them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God himself, to
be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to
appeal in all manner of controversies.
10. Of irresistible efficacy. This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once
established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find,
how clearly soever proved, that shall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart these internal oracles;
whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to such principles, go
down glibly, and are easily digested. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing
quite contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various religions of mankind, are
as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received
traditional principles. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their
senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these
sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in his
understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz., that he must believe as the church
(i.e., those of his communion) believes, or that the pope is infallible, and this he never so much as
heard questioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles: how is he
prepared easily to swallow, not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence of his
senses, the doctrine of transubstantiation? This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he
will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a
man of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a
foundation of reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly call arguments
drawn from their principles) against his senses? Let an enthusiast be principled that he or his
teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain
bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong
principles, are not, in things inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent
and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be
persuaded to examine even those very principles, which many never suffer themselves to do.
11. II. Received hypotheses. Next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould,
and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis. The difference between these and the
former, is, that they will admit of matter of fact, and agree with dissenters in that; but differ only in
assigning of reasons and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance
with their senses, with the former: they can endure to hearken to their information a little more
patiently; but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things; nor be prevailed on
by probabilities, which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same
manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable
thing for a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, to have his authority of forty
years, standing, wrought out of hard rock, Greek and Latin, with no small expense of time and
candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturned by an
upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess, that what he taught his
scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance
at a very dear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? And who ever,
by the most cogent arguments, will be prevailed with to disrobe himself at once of all his old
opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all this time been
labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest afresh of new notions? All the arguments
that can be used will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his
cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced the errors that
may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or right principles, but not rightly understood. There is
nothing more familiar than this. The instances of men contending for different opinions, which they
all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All that call
themselves Christians, allow the text that says, metanoeite, to carry in it the obligation to a very
weighty duty. But yet how very erroneous will one of their practices be, who, understanding nothing
but the French, take this rule with one translation to be, Repentez-vous, repent; or with the other,
Fatiez penitence, do penance.
12. III. Predominant passions. Probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run
the same fate. Let ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning, and
money on the other; it is easy to foresee which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud walls, resist
the strongest batteries: and though, perhaps, sometimes the force of a clear argument may make
some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm, and keep out the enemy, truth, that would
captivate or disturb them. Tell a man passionately in love that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses
of the falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words of hers shall invalidate all their
testimonies. Quod volumus, facile credimus; what suits our wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I
suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented: and though men cannot always
openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not
to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more
probable side; but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its inquiries, and not permit a full
and satisfactory examination, as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made.
Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent
probabilities:
13. Two means of evading probabilities: I. Supposed fallacy latent in the words employed. First,
That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy
latent in them: and the consequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them
incoherent. There are very few discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which most men may
not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose conviction they may
not, without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old reply,
Non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I will not yield.
14. Supposed unknown arguments for the contrary. Secondly, Manifest probabilities may be
evaded, and the assent withheld, upon this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may he said on
the contrary side. And therefore, though I be beaten, it is not necessary I should yield, not knowing
what forces there are in reserve behind. This is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide,
that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.
15. What probabilities naturally determine the assent. But yet there is some end of it; and a man
having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to
inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on both sides; may, in most cases,
come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some
proofs in matter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are so cogent and clear,
and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his assent. So that I think
we may conclude, that, in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet
there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as
considerable to be produced on the contrary side; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often
voluntary actions. But where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not
sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words (which sober and serious
consideration may discover) nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered, latent on the other side
(which also the nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man); there, I
think, a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which the greater
probability appears. Whether it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should
often fall into a method and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse; or that a
blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, should frequently
constitute the bodies of any species of animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody that
considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in his assent. Lastly,
when there can be no supposition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending
upon the testimony of witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the matter of fact
attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v.g. whether there was one thousand seven hundred
years ago such a man at Rome as Julius Caesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any
rational man's power to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows, and closes with such
probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think it is in man's power to suspend his assent; and
perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits with his
inclination or interest, and so stop from further search. But that a man should afford his assent to
that side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as
impossible as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time.
16. Where it is in our power to suspend our judgment. As knowledge is no more arbitrary than
perception; so, I think, assent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any
two ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of reason, I can no more
refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my
eyes to, and look on in daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot
deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once