I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition.
What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and mak-Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question—
ing are not the same?
Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen No more, he replied, than making or working are the make or do something?
same; thus much I have learned from Hesiod, who says I do.
that ‘work is no disgrace.’ Now do you imagine that if he And do they make or do their own business only, or that had meant by working and doing such things as you were of others also?
describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace They make or do that of others also.
in them—for example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for selling pickles, or sitting for hire in a house of ill-fame?
themselves or their own business only?
That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but I conceive him Why not? he said.
to have distinguished making from doing and work; and, No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a dif-while admitting that the making anything might sometimes ficulty on his who proposes as a definition of temperance, become a disgrace, when the employment was not 14
“Charmides” – Plato
honourable, to have thought that work was never any dis-good, is temperate?
grace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called Yes, he said; and you, friend, would agree.
works; and such makings he called workings, and doings; No matter whether I should or not; just now, not what I and he must be supposed to have called such things only think, but what you are saying, is the point at issue.
man’s proper business, and what is hurtful, not his busi-Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, ness: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, and not good, is not temperate; and that he is temperate may be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his who does good, and not evil: for temperance I define in own work.
plain words to be the doing of good actions.
O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, And you may be very likely right in what you are saying; than I pretty well knew that you would call that which is but I am curious to know whether you imagine that tem-proper to a man, and that which is his own, good; and that perate men are ignorant of their own temperance?
the makings (Greek) of the good you would call doings I do not think so, he said.
(Greek), for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen which Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objec-might be temperate in doing another’s work, as well as in tion to your giving names any signification which you doing their own?
please, if you will only tell me what you mean by them.
I was, he replied; but what is your drift?
Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good which you would use, of good actions, is temperance?
to himself and good to another also?
I do, he said.