Charmides by Plato. - HTML preview

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To be sure.

And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must And if we could find something which is at once greater see a colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour.

than itself, and greater than other great things, but not No.

greater than those things in comparison of which the oth-Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples ers are greater, then that thing would have the property of which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is being greater and also less than itself?

altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible—

That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.

inadmissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, num-Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of bers, and the like?

other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is rela-Very true.

tive to the half?

But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of That is true.

self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, this relation to And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not 21

“Charmides” – Plato

by others. And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who ence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there is noth-seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as ing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit some things only and not others; and whether in this class before the company that he could not answer my challenge of self-related things, if there be such a class, that science or determine the question at issue; and he made an unin-which is called wisdom or temperance is included. I alto-telligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the gether distrust my own power of determining these mat-argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then Critias, ters: I am not certain whether there is such a science of if you like, let us assume that there is this science of sci-science at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowl-ence; whether the assumption is right or wrong may here-edge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see after be investigated. Admitting the existence of it, will you whether such a science would or would not do us any good; tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self-good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you main-knowledge or wisdom: so we were saying?

tain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in for he who has this science or knowledge which knows it-the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in self will become like the knowledge which he has, in the the second place, the advantage, of such a science; and then same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowl-of temperance.

edge will know. In the same way he who has that knowl-Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a diffi-edge which is self-knowing, will know himself.

culty; and as one person when another yawns in his pres-I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, 22

“Charmides” – Plato

when he possesses that which has self-knowledge: but what justice, the probability is that he will only know that he necessity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether knows and what he does not know?