“Charmides” – Plato
But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a sci-that again we have just now been attributing to another ence of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, art.
or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, Very true.
then wisdom or temperance will not be of use.
How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, advantage?
however much we assume that wisdom is a science of sci-That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.
ences, and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing have this particular science of the good under her control, that I could have no sound notion about wisdom; I was and in this way will benefit us.
quite right in depreciating myself; for that which is admit-And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the ted to be the best of all things would never have seemed to effect of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of us useless, if I had been good for anything at an enquiry.
the other arts,—do they not each of them do their own But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to work? Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is discover what that is to which the imposer of names gave only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more nothing else?
admissions were made by us than could be fairly granted; That is obvious.
for we admitted that there was a science of science, although Then wisdom will not be the producer of health.
the argument said No, and protested against us; and we Certainly not.
admitted further, that this science knew the works of the The art of health is different.
other sciences (although this too was denied by the argu-Yes, different.
ment), because we wanted to show that the wise man had Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for knowledge of what he knew and did not know; also we 29
“Charmides” – Plato
nobly disregarded, and never even considered, the impos-yourself, and see whether you have this gift and can do sibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he without the charm; for if you can, I would rather advise does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to that which he does not know; than which nothing, as I reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding us so and temperate you are, the happier you will be.
easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still unable to dis-Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, cover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out whether I have or have not this gift of wisdom and temper-of its way to prove the inutility of that which we admitted ance; for how can I know whether I have a thing, of which only by a sort of supposition and fiction to be the true even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to discover the definition of temperance or wisdom: which result, as far as nature?—(not that I believe you.) And further, I am sure, I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I said. But Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am con-for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry—that you, hav-cerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until ing such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, you say that I have had enough.
should have no profit or good in life from your wisdom Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the have a proof of your temperance, that is, if you allow your-charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little self to be charmed by Socrates, and never desert him at all.
profit, from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is You may depend on my following and not deserting him, nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and said Charmides: if you who are my guardian command me, that I must be a bad enquirer, for wisdom or temperance I I should be very wrong not to obey you.
believe to be really a great good; and happy are you, And I do command you, he said.
Charmides, if you certainly possess it. Wherefore examine Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day.
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“Charmides” – Plato
You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?
We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.
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And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?
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Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; return to
and therefore you had better consider well.
But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when
violence is employed; and you, when you are determined
on anything, and in the mood of violence, are irresistible.
Do not you resist me then, he said.
I will not resist you, I replied.
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