And when I am anxious to have a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would Cratylus.
only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your to the argument?
own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear.
CRATYLUS: If you please.
SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient say-HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that ing, that ‘hard is the knowledge of the good.’ And the our friend Cratylus has been arguing about names; he knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I says that they are natural and not conventional; not a had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma 3
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course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete edu-that and give another, the new name is as correct as cation in grammar and language—these are his own the old—we frequently change the names of our slaves, words—and then I should have been at once able to and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for answer your question about the correctness of names.
there is no name given to anything by nature; all is But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma convention and habit of the users;—such is my view.
course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and of Cratylus, or of any one else.
Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: he is only making fun of you;—he means to say that let us see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it?
looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of HERMOGENES: That is my notion.
knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.
SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself HERMOGENES: Yes.
that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which you SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;—sup-give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change pose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you 4
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mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?
me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a HERMOGENES: Certainly.
man by me and a horse by the world:—that is your meaning?
SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?
HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view.
HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole.
SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?
SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true.
SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?
SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part HERMOGENES: To be sure.
smaller than a name?
SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest.
and a false proposition says that which is not?
SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposi-HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?
tion?
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HERMOGENES: Yes.
thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?
SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say.
HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correct-HERMOGENES: Yes.
ness of names other than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries there SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?
are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several HERMOGENES: Yes.
Hellenic tribes from one another.
SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the names may be true and false?
things differ as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man HERMOGENES: So we must infer.
is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say one affirms to be the name?
that things have a permanent essence of their own?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all.
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SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that there was no such thing as a bad man?
that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?
HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many HERMOGENES: Impossible.
of them.
SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?
are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if HERMOGENES: Not many.
what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.
SOCRATES: Still you have found them?
HERMOGENES: He cannot.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would at the same moment and always; for neither on his view that be your view?
can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all.
HERMOGENES: It would.
HERMOGENES: There cannot.
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SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we relative to individuals, and all things do not equally please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut belong to all at the same moment and always, they must with the proper instrument only, and according to the be supposed to have their own proper and permanent natural process of cutting; and the natural process is essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are in-no use at all.
dependent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.
HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way.
HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.
SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the instrument the natural instrument.
things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?
HERMOGENES: True.
HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?
things.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?
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HERMOGENES: True.
SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?
SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be HERMOGENES: Precisely.
he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instru-SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer ment? Any other mode of speaking will result in error that names ought to be given according to a natural and failure.
process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you.
success.
SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in HERMOGENES: I agree.
giving names men speak.
SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to HERMOGENES: That is true.
be cut with something?
SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a HERMOGENES: Yes.
relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?
SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced HERMOGENES: True.
has to be woven or pierced with something?
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HERMOGENES: Certainly.
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, ‘What sort of instrument named with something?
is a shuttle?’ And you answer, ‘A weaving instrument.’
HERMOGENES: True.
HERMOGENES: Well.
SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?
SOCRATES: And I ask again, ‘What do we do when we weave?’—The answer is, that we separate or disengage HERMOGENES: An awl.
the warp from the woof.
SOCRATES: And with which we weave?
HERMOGENES: Very true.
HERMOGENES: A shuttle.
SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?
SOCRATES: And with which we name?
HERMOGENES: To be sure.
HERMOGENES: A name.
SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar ques-SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
tion about names: will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?
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HERMOGENES: I cannot say.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose and distinguish things according to their natures?
work will he be using well?
HERMOGENES: Certainly we do.
HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter.
SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of dis-only?
tinguishing the threads of the web.
HERMOGENES: Only the skilled.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the work will he be using well?
weaver?
HERMOGENES: That of the smith.
HERMOGENES: Assuredly.
SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?
SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—
and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use HERMOGENES: The skilled only.
the name well—and well means like a teacher?
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SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose HERMOGENES: The skilled only.
work will he be using?
SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled.
give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the rarest.
names which we use?
HERMOGENES: True.
HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.
SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names?
SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of them?
the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.
is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, HERMOGENES: Certainly.
uses the work of the legislator?
SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in HERMOGENES: I agree.
making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?
made the other?
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HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine.
example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses?
SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
HERMOGENES: I think so.
SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses?
SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, HERMOGENES: True.
woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of form which the maker produces in each case.
instruments in general.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator when a man has discovered the instrument which is also to know how to put the true natural name of each naturally adapted to each work, he must express this thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for namer in any true sense? And we must remember that 13
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different legislators will not use the same syllables. For weaver who is to use them?
neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but Socrates.
the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker?
or in a foreign country;—there is no difference.
Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work HERMOGENES: Very true.
is being well done or not?
SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or HERMOGENES: Certainly.
barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form SOCRATES: And who is he?
of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter.
HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre.
HERMOGENES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?
SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the HERMOGENES: The pilot.
proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the leg-14
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islator in his work, and will know whether the work is rudder, and the pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the to be well made.
user be the man?
HERMOGENES: True.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask ques-names, and the dialectician must be his director if the tions?
names are to be rightly given?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
HERMOGENES: That is true.
SOCRATES: And how to answer them?
SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you HERMOGENES: Yes.
fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, you would call a dialectician?
but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name.
things in letters and syllables.
SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find 15
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a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment, SOCRATES: Then reflect.
and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?
natural fitness of names.
SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show.
those who know, and you must pay them well both in Was I not telling you just now (but you have forgot-money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, of whom ten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into over the matter, a step has been gained; for we have your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has not every man knows how to give a thing a name.
learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.
HERMOGENES: Very good.
HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras and his truth (‘Truth’ was SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or cor-the title of the book of Protagoras; compare Theaet.), I rectness of names? That, if you care to know, is the were to attach any value to what he and his book af-next question.
firm!
HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know.
SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.
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HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about SOCRATES: Well, and about this river—to know that he names, and what does he say?
ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly says,
in the places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he
‘The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:’
not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis supposed to call things by their right and natural names; is than the name Cymindis—do you deem that a light do you not think so?
matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? (Compare Il. ‘The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if of the sportive Myrina.’) And there are many other ob-they call them at all. But to what are you referring?
servations of the same kind in Homer and other poets.
Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?
Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector’s son, are more within the range of human facul-
‘Whom,’ as he says, ‘the Gods call Xanthus, and men ties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means call Scamander.’
by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to which HERMOGENES: I remember.
I refer? (Il.)
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HERMOGENES: I do.
the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think women.
the more correct ofthe names given to Hector’s son—
Astyanax or Scamandrius?
HERMOGENES: That may be inferred.
HERMOGENES: I do not know.
SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Tro-jans to be wiser than their wives?
SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give HERMOGENES: To be sure.
correct names?
SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course.
a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?
SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, HERMOGENES: Clearly.
taken as a class, the wiser?
SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us con-HERMOGENES: I should say, the men.
sider:—does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,
SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Tro-jan men called him Astyanax (king of the city); but if
‘For he alone defended their city and long walls’?
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This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of rules, and owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may the saviour king of the city which his father was sav-think that I am talking nonsense; and indeed I believe ing, as Homer observes.
that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of HERMOGENES: I see.
Homer about the correctness of names.
SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see my-HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and self; and do you?
I believe you to be on the right track.
HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I.
SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speak-SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself ing only of the ordinary course of nature, when an ani-also give Hector his name?
mal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary births;—if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then HERMOGENES: What of that?
I should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly same may be said of trees and other things. Do you the same as the name of Astyanax—both are Hellenic; agree with me?
and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree.
man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he 19
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SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and value which the legislator intended—so well did he know see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same how to give the letters names.
principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not HERMOGENES: I believe you are right.
the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a make any difference so long as the essence of the thing king will often be the son of a king, the good son or the remains in possession of the name and appears in it.
noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear differ-SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my mean-ent to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize ing by the names of letters, which you know are not the them, although they are the same, just as any one of us same as the letters themselves with the exception of the would not recognize the same drugs under different dis-four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of the guises of colour and smell, although to the physician, rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other who regards the power of them, they are the same, and letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the etymologist is not put out by the addition or trans-the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter position or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by beta—the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere and does not prevent the whole name from having the with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of 20
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Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the is tau, and yet they have the same meaning. And how course of nature, and are prodigies? for example, when little in common with the letters of their names has a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the meaning is to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to the same. And there are many other names which just which he belongs, just as in the case which was before mean ‘king.’ Again, there are several names for a gen-supposed of a horse foaling a calf.
eral, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and oth-HERMOGENES: Quite true.
ers which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father others which might be cited, differing in their syllables should be called irreligious?
and letters, but