to some, and to diverse diversely; neither have any Lawes of his Kingdome beene publisht on this
manner unto any people.
IV. And according to the difference which is between the Rationall word and the word of Prophecy, we attribute a twofold Kingdome unto God: Naturall, in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason,
and which is universall over all who acknowledge the Divine power, by reason of that rationall nature
which is common to all; and Propheticall, in which he rules also by the word of Prophecy, which is peculiar, because he hath not given positive Lawes to all men, but to his peculiar people, and some
certaine men elected by him.
V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a Right to rule, and to punish those who break his Lawes, from
his sole irresistable power. For all Right over others is either from nature, or from Contract. How the Right of governing springs from Contract, we have already shewed in the 6. Chapter. And the same
Right is derived from nature, in this very thing, that it is not by nature taken away. For when by nature all men had a Right over all things, every man had a Right of ruling over all as ancient as nature it
selfe; but the reason why this was abolisht among men, was no other but mutuall fear; as hath been
declared above in the second Chapter, the 3. art; reason namely dictating that they must foregoe that
Right for the preservation of mankinde, because the equality of men among themselves according to
their strength and naturall powers was necessarily accompanied with warre, and with warre joynes the
destruction of mankinde. Now if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with
joyned forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that Right
which nature had given him; The Right therefore of Dominion over all the rest, would have remained
with him, by reason of that excesse of power whereby he could have preserved both himselfe and
them. They therefore whose power cannot be resisted, and by consequence God Almighty, derives his
Right of Soveraignty from the Power it selfe. And as oft as God punisheth, or slayes a sinner, although he therefore punish him because he sinned, yet may we not say that he could not justly have punisht or
killed him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in punishing, may perhaps have regard
to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore follow, that the Right of afflicting, and killing, depends not on
divine Power, but on mens sins.
VI. That question made famous by the disputations of the Antients, why evill things befell the good, and
good things the evill, is the same with this of ours, by what Right God dispenseth good and evill things unto men. And with its difficulty, it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine
providence, but also of Philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psal. 73. v. 1, 2, 3. Truly
God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for me, my feet were almost gone,
my steps had well nigh slipt. And why? I was grieved at the wicked, I doe also see the ungodly in such
prosperity. And how bitterly did Job expostulate with God, that being just, he should yet be afflicted with so many calamities? God himselfe with open voyce resolved this difficulty in the case of Job, and hath
confirmed his Right by arguments drawn not from Jobs sinne, but from his own power. For Job and his
friends had argued so among themselves, that they would needs make him guilty, because he was
punisht; and he would reprove their accusation by arguments fetcht from his own innocence: But God
when he had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation, not by condemning him of injustice,
or any sin, but by declaring his own power, Job. 38. v. 4. Where wast thou (sayes he) when I laid the foundation of the earth, &c. And for his friends, God pronounces himself angry against them, Job. 42. v.
7. Because they had not spoken of him the thing that is right, like his servant Job. Agreeable to this is that speech of our Saviours in the mans case who was born blind, when, his Disciples asking him
whether he or his Parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he answered, John 9. v. 3. Neither hath
this man sinned, nor his Parents, but that the works of God should be manifest in him. For though it be said, Rom. 5:12. That death entred into the world by sinne, it followes not, but that God by his Right
might have made men subject to diseases, and death, although they had never sinned, even as he
hath made the other animalls mortall, and sickly, although they cannot sinne.
VII. Now if God have the Right of Soveraignty from his power, it is manifest, that the obligation of
yeelding him obedience lyes on men by reason of their weaknesse; 1 for that obligation which rises
from Contract, of which we have spoken in the second Chapter, can have no place here, where the
Right of Ruling (no Covenant passing between) rises only from nature. But there are two Species of
naturall obligation, one when liberty is taken away by corporall impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and all Creatures, doe obey the common Lawes of their Creation: The other
when it is taken away by hope, or fear, according to which the weaker despairing of his own power to
resist, cannot but yeeld to the stronger. From this last kinde of obligation, that is to say from fear, or
conscience of our own weaknesse (in respect of the divine power) it comes to passe, that we are
obliged to obey God in his naturall Kingdome; reason dictating to all, acknowledging the divine power
and providence, that there is no kicking against the pricks.
VIII. Because the word of God ruling by nature onely, is supposed to be nothing else but right reason,
and the Laws of Kings can be known by their word only, its manifest that the Laws of God ruling by
nature alone, are onely the naturall Lawes; namely those which we have set down in the second and
third Chapters, and deduced from the dictates of reason, Humility, Equity, Justice, Mercy, and other Morall vertues befriending Peace, which pertain to the discharge of the duties of men one toward the other, and those which right reason shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and worship of the
Divine Majesty. We need not repeat what those Naturall Laws, or Morall vertues are; but we must see what honours, and what divine worship, that is to say, what sacred Lawes, the same naturall reason
doth dictate.
IX. Honour, to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of anothers Power joyned with goodnesse; and to honour a man, is the same with highly esteeming him, and so honour is not in the Party
honoured, but in the honourer. Now three Passions do necessarily follow honour thus placed in opinion; Love, which referres to goodnesse; hope, and feare, which regard Power. And from these arise all outward actions, wherewith the powerfull are appeased, and become Propitious, and which are
the effects, and therefore also the naturall signes of honour it selfe. But the word honour is transferred also to those outward effects of honour, in which sense, we are said to honour him, of whose power we testifie our selves, either in word, or deed, to have a very great respect; insomuch as honour is the
same with worship. Now WORSHIP is an outward act, the sign of inward honour; and whom we
endeavour by our homage to appease, if they be, angry or howsoever to make them favourable to us,
we are said to worship.
X. All signes of the mind are either words or deeds, and therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds. Now both the one and the other are referred to three kindes; whereof the first is Praise, or publique declaration of goodnesse; The second, a publique declaration of Present Power, which is to magnify, megalunein; The third, is a publique declaration of happinesse, or of Power, secure also for the future, which is called, makariomos. I say, that all kindes of honour may be discerned, not in words only, but in deeds too. But we then praise, and celebrate in words, when we doe it by way of
Proposition, or Dogmatically, that is to say by Attributes, or Titles, which may be termed praysing, and celebrating, categorically, and plainly, as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberall, strong, wise; And then, in deeds, when it is done by consequence, or by hypothesis, or supposition, as by Thanksgiving, which supposeth goodnesse; or by Obedience, which supposeth Power; or by Congratulation, which supposeth happinesse.
XI. Now whether we desire to praise a man in words, or deeds, we shall find some things which signify honour with all men, such as among attributes, are the generall words of vertues and powers, which cannot be taken in ill sense, As Good, Faire, Strong, Just, and the like; and among actions, Obedience, Thanksgiving, Prayers, and others of that kinde, by which an acknowledgement of vertue and power is ever understood: Others, which signify honour, but with some, and scorne with others, or else neither;
such as in Attributes, are those words which according to the diversity of opinions, are diversly referred to vertues or vices, to honest or dishonest things; As that a man slew his enemy, that he fled, that he is
a Philosopher, or an Orator, and the like, which with some are had in honour, with others in contempt.
In deeds, such as depend on the custome of the place, or prescriptions of civill Lawes, as in saluting to be bareheaded, to put off the shoes, to bend the body, to petition for any thing standing, prostrate,
kneeling, forms of ceremony, and the like. Now that worship which is alwayes, and by all men
accounted honourable, may be called Naturall; the other, which followes places, and customes,
Arbitrary.
XII. Furthermore, worship may be enjoyned, to wit by the command of him that is worshiped, and it may bee voluntary, namely such as seems good to the worshipper: If it be enjoyned, the actions expressing it, do not signify honour, as they signify actions, but as they are enjoyned: for they signify obedience immediately, obedience power; insomuch as worship enjoyned consists in obedience. Voluntary is honourable onely in the nature of the actions, which if they doe signify honour to the beholders, it is
worship, if not, it is Reproach. Again worship may be either publique or private. But publique, respecting each single worshipper, may not be voluntary; respecting the City it may. For seeing that
which is done voluntarily, depends on the will of the Doer, there would not one worship be given, but as
many worships as worshippers, except the will of all men were united by the command, of one. But
Private worship may be voluntary, if it be done secretly; for what is done openly is restrained, either by Lawes, or through modesty, which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary action.
XIII. Now that we may know what the scope and end of worshipping others is, we must consider the cause why men delight in worship: And we must grant what we have shewed elsewhere, that Joy
consists in this, that a man contemplate vertue, strength, science, beauty, friends, or any Power
whatsoever, as being, or as though it were his own; and it is nothing else but a Glory, or Triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured, that is to say, lov'd and fear'd, that is to say, having the services and
assistances of men in readinesse. Now because men beleeve him to be powerfull whom they see
honoured (that is to say) esteemed powerfull by others, it falls out that honour is increased by worship;
and by the opinion of power, true power is acquired. His end therefore who either commands, or suffers
himself to be worshipt, is, that by this means he may acquire as many as he can, either through love, or
fear, to be obedient unto him.
XIV. But that we may understand what manner of Worship of God naturall reason doth assigne us, let us begin from his Attributes: where, first it is manifest, that existence is to be allowed him; for there can be no will to honour him, who, we think, hath no being. Next, those Philosophers who said, that God
was the World, or the worlds Soul, (that is to say, a part of it) spake unworthily of God, for they attribute
nothing to him, but wholly deny his being. For by the word God we understand the Worlds cause; but in
saying that the World is God, they say, that it hath no cause, that is as much, as there is no God. In like manner, they who maintain the world not to be created, but eternall; because there can be no cause of
an eternall thing, In denying the world to have a Cause, they deny also that there is a God. They also have a wretched apprehension of God, who imputing idlenesse to him, doe take from him the
Government of the world, and of mankind. For say they should acknowledge him omnipotent, yet if he
minde not these inferiour things, that same thred-bare Sentence will take place with them, Quod supra
nos, nihil ad nos; What is above us, doth not concern us. And seeing there is nothing for which they
should either love, or fear him, truly he will be to them as though he were not at all. Moreover in
Attributes which signifie Greatnesse, or Power, those which signifie some finite, or limited thing, are not signes at all of an honouring mind. For we honour not God worthily if we ascribe lesse Power, or
greatnesse to him than possibly we can; but every finite thing is lesse than we can, for most easily we may alwayes assigne and attribute more to a finite thing; No shape therefore must be assigned to God,
for all shape is finite; nor must he be said to be conceived, or comprehended by imagination, or any other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is finite: And although this word Infinite signifie a conception of the mind, yet it followes not, that we have any conception of an infinite thing: For when we say that a thing is infinite, we signifie nothing really, but the impotency in our owne mind, as if we should say we know not whether, or where it is limited: Neither speak they honourably enough of God,
who say we have an Idea of him in our mind; for an Idea is our conception, but conception we have
none, except of a finite thing: Nor they, who say that he hath Parts, or that he is some certaine intire thing; which are also attributes of finite things: Nor that he is in any place; for nothing can be said to be in a place, but what hath bounds and limits of its greatnesse on all sides: Nor that he is moved, or is at rest; for either of them suppose a being in some place: Nor that there are more Gods; because not more infinites. Farthermore concerning attributes of happinesse, those are unworthy of God which
signify sorrow (unlesse they be taken not for any Passion, but by a Metonomy for the effect) such as
Repentance, Anger, Pity: Or Want, as Appetite, Hope, Concupiscence, and that love which is also called lust, for they are signes of Poverty, since it cannot be understood, that a man should desire, hope, and wish for ought, but what he wants and stands in need of. Or any Passive faculty; for suffering belongs to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we therefore attribute a
will to God, it is not to be conceived like unto ours, which is called a rationall desire; for if God desires, he wants, which for any man to say, is a contumelie; but we must suppose some resemblance which
we cannot conceive. In like manner when wee attribute sight and other acts of the senses to him, or knowledge, or understanding, which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the minde raised from outward objects pressing the Organes, wee must not think that any such thing befalls the Deity; for it is
a signe of power depending upon some other, which is not the most blessed thing. He therefore who
would not ascribe any other titles to God, than what reason commands, must use such as are either
Negative, as infinite, eternall, incomprehensible, &c. or superlative, as most good, most great, most powerfull, &c. or Indefinite, as good, just, strong, Creatour, King, and the like; in such sense, as not desiring to declare what he is (which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our
phantasie), but to confesse our own admiration, and obedience, which is the property of humility, and
of a minde yeelding all the honour it possibly can doe. For Reason dictates one name alone, which
doth signify the nature of God (i.e.) Existent, or simply, that he is; and one in order to, and in relation to us, namely God, under which is contained both King, and Lord, and Father.
XV. Concerning the Outward actions wherewith God is to be worshipped (as also concerning his Titles) its a most generall command of Reason, that they be signes of a mind yeelding honour; under which
are contained in the first place, Prayers;
Qui fingit sacros auro, vel marmore vultus,
Non facit ille Deos, qui rogat, ille facit.
For Prayers are the signes of hope, and hope is an acknowledgement of the divine Power, or
goodnesse.
In the second place, Thanksgiving; which is a signe of the same affection, but that prayers goe before the benefit, and thanks follow it.
In the third, Guifts, that is to say oblations and sacrifices, for these are thanksgivings.
In the fourth, not to sweare by any other. For a mans Oath is an Imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knowes whether he doe, or not, and can punish him if he doe, though he be
never so powerfull; which only belongs to God: for if there were any man from whom his subjects
malice could not lye hid, and whom no humane power could resist, plighted faith would suffice without
swearing, which, broken, might be punisht by that Man; and for this very reason there would be no
need of an Oath.
In the fifth place, To speak warily of God; for that is a sign of fear, and feare is an acknowledgement of Power. It followes from this precept: That we may not take the name of God in vain, or use it rashly; for either are inconsiderate. That wee must not swear where there is no need; for that is in vain; but need there is none, unlesse it be between Cities to avoyd or take away contention by force, which
necessarily must arise, where there is no faith kept in promises, or in a City, for the better certainty of
Judicature. Also, That we must not dispute of the Divine nature: For it is supposed that all things in the
naturall Kingdom of God are enquired into by reason only, that is to say, out of the Principles of naturall Science; but we are so far off by these to attain to the knowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot
so much as reach to the full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies, or of any other
Creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the
divine Majesty, according to the small measure of our conceptions. It followes also (which belongs to
the Right of Gods Kingdome) that their speech is inconsiderate, and rash, who say, That this, or that,
doth not stand with divine justice; for even men count it an affront that their children should dispute their Right, or measure their justice otherwise than by the rule of their Commands.
In the sixth, Whatsoever is offered up in Prayers, thanksgivings, and sacrifices, must in its kind be the
best, and most betokening honour; namely, Prayers must not be rash, or light, or vulgar, but beautifull, and well composed. For though it were absurd in the Heathen to worship God in an image, yet was it
not against reason to use Poetry, and Musick, in their Churches.
Also Oblations must be clean, and Presents sumptuous, and such as are significative either of
submission, or gratitude, or commemorative of benefits received; for all these proceed from a desire of
honouring.
In the seventh, That God must be worshipt not privately onely, but openly, and publiquely in the sight of
all men; because that worship is so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour, and esteem
in others (as hath been declared before in the 13. art.). Unlesse others therefore see it, that which is
most pleasing in our worship, vanisheth.
In the last place, That we use our best endeavour to keep the Lawes of Nature. For the undervaluing of
our Masters command, exceeds all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, Obedience is more
acceptable than all other sacrifices. And these are principally the naturall Lawes concerning the
worship of God, those I mean which Reason dictates to every Man; but to whole Cities, every one
whereof is one Person, the same naturall Reason farther commands an uniformity of publique worship.
For the actions done by particular Persons, according to their private Reasons, are not the Cities
actions, and therefore not the Cities worship; but what is done by the City, is understood to be done by
the command of him, or them who have the Soveraignty, wherefore also together with the consent of
all the subjects, that is to say, Uniformly.
XVI. The naturall Lawes set down in the foregoing Article concerning the divine worship, only command
the giving of naturall signes of honour; but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes, the
one naturall, the other done upon agreement, or by expresse, or tacite composition. Now because in every language, the use of words, and names, come by appointment, it may also by appointment be altered; for that which depends on, and derives its force from the will of men, can by the will of the
same men agreeing be changed again, or abolisht. Such names therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken away; now what can be done by the
appointment of men, that the City may doe; The City therefore by Right (that is to say, they who have
the power of the whole City) shall judge what names or appellations are more, what lesse honourable for God, that is to say, what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of God, and his
operations. Now actions doe signify not by mens appointment, but naturally, even as the effects are
signes of their causes; whereof some are alwayes signes of Scorn to them before whom they are
committed, as those, whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered, and whatsoever men are
ashamed to doe before those whom they respect; Others are alwayes signes of honour, as to draw