COMPREHENSIVE FREEDOM
14.1. The goal of this chapter and the next is to evaluate the theories of two political philosophers who have tried to accommodate individuals’ freedom in the liberal democratic state, namely, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, with the observations made in the previous chapters in mind, dealing with Rawls’s position first.
14.2. With the observations of chapter 13 in mind, an analysis such as that of Rawls appears problematic. He seeks to find an answer to the question “How might political philosophy find a shared basis for settling such a fundamental question as that of the most appropriate family of institutions to secure democratic liberty and equality?”1 The result should, according to Rawls, be a conception of justice that “[…] should be, as far as possible, independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm. In formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. The religious doctrines that in previous centuries were the professed basis of society have gradually given way to principles of constitutional government that all citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse. Comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines likewise cannot be endorsed by citizens generally, and they also no longer can, if they ever could, serve as the professional basis of society”2.
Rawls’s own theory, however, seems to manifest precisely the elements that would qualify it as a comprehensive doctrine3, his own observations to the contrary notwithstanding4. This is clear from his starting point: “Since we start within the tradition of democratic thought, we also think of citizens as free and equal persons. The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons equal”5. Rawls speaks of ‘moral powers’ providing the basis of freedom6 and equality. This means that, with respect to freedom, the notion of ‘negative freedom’ in the straightforward sense presented in chapter 7, is apparently not at stake; after all, that notion does not involve any content whatsoever and is, accordingly, compatible with any view. It is even reconcilable with a totalitarian view, acknowledging its physical manifestation in nature while denying that it should be allowed in the political domain (which means that it is conceptually acknowledged at the political level; that it should not be allowed to citizens (and thus not allowed in that sense) is of course another matter). As for equality, Rawls obviously has something else in mind than basic equality, basic equality being devoid of any ‘moral’ meaning. His views in this regard were discussed in chapter 2; I will focus here on the issue of freedom.
14.3. Rawls states: “It is left to citizens individually – as part of liberty of conscience – to settle how they think the values of the political domain are related to other values in their comprehensive doctrine. For we always assume that citizens have two views, a comprehensive and a political view; and that their overall view can be divided into two parts, suitably related”7. It is clear that Rawls disadvantages those comprehensive views (i.e., worldviews) which leave no room for a separate domain for a political view, namely, those whose ambit encompasses the political view. The results such worldviews seek to realize are obviously incompatible with liberal democracy, so that they could be deemed undesirable for that reason, but that is another matter. (That does not mean that it is not an important matter, though; chapter 16 is devoted to the topic of integrating such views into a liberal democratic state.)
The idea of an overlapping consensus is an important part of Rawls’s intended solution to produce a stable democratic state while acknowledging the differences between comprehensive doctrines8: “When political liberalism speaks of a reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, it means that all of these doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, support a political conception of justice underwriting a constitutional democratic society whose principles, ideals, and standards satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Thus, all reasonable doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding political institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens, including liberty of conscience and the freedom of religion. On the other hand, comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a democratic society are not reasonable”9.
The rights Rawls mentions are those that are relevant for the present discussion. They were addressed in part 1 of this inquiry, where the issue of who may be deemed basically equal and thus the bearer of the rights afforded on the basis of formal equality was addressed. It was argued in chapter 12 that a neutral way to approach issues such as which beings should be considered equal or which worldviews should be tolerated is not forthcoming from a neutral stance. Rawls makes it appear as if he describes how such a stance would be possible in a pluralistic society10, but this is difficult to uphold if my analysis is correct.
To return to the topic of the overlapping consensus, when Rawls says: “An overlapping consensus […] is not merely a consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of selfor group interests. All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their affirmation”11, it is clear that not every comprehensive view is compatible with the overlapping consensus12. (Indeed, only reasonable comprehensive views are acceptable, an issue that will be revisited in section 14.4.) Those which do not acknowledge the political equality of men and women, for example, are excluded, for the position from which they start is such that they can never reach the political conception that Rawls considers crucial. His model of thought does not afford the room of disagreement mine does, which does not demand of any view that its contents should be compatible with the political reality but merely that the outward acts of citizens – whatever particular view they may hold – do not conflict with it.
Apart from that, even the very feasibility of such an enterprise may be questioned: “[…] the more things that people must believe in order to be included in [an overlapping] consensus, the more difficult it will be for a consensus actually to be achieved. In other words, if participation in the consensus requires affirmation not only of a particular set of principles of justice but also of certain metatheses about the status of those principles, then, other things equal, one would expect the consensus to include fewer people”13.
14.4. An additional problem is that Rawls maintains that “[…] the political conception of justice […] is itself a moral conception”14. The same problem that arose, mutatis mutandis, in chapter 2 is apparent here: Rawls does not make it clear what makes his perspective a ‘moral’ one, and in this case, the added problem is that such an inclusion seems to point to a comprehensive view, so that Rawls seems, as I said (vide note 3, supra), either to argue in a circle, or to defeat the very premise of his own account.
Rawls may be15 right when he observes that “[…] a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power. If we think of political society as a community united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is necessary for political community. In the society of the Middle Ages, more or less united in affirming the Catholic faith, the Inquisition was not an accident; its suppression of heresy was needed to preserve that shared religious belief. The same holds, I believe, for any reasonable comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrine, whether religious or nonreligious”16. Still, his position testifies to a comprehensive view, as comprehensive elements are smuggled in because of the way he approaches equality17.
It may be objected that, while the fact that I have not distinguished between ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ (vide the introduction, note 21) may not have given rise to problems up to now (the analysis in section 2.5 would not have been different if I had differentiated between them), the awareness of the need for such a distinction is necessary here. After all, Rawls himself does distinguish between them18, while only reasonable comprehensive doctrines, affirmed by reasonable persons, are considered acceptable19, and, indeed, the idea of an overlapping consensus is only possible on the basis of such doctrines20. I will not deal here with the convoluted nature of Rawls’s conception of ‘rationality’ (cf. sections 2.3 and 2.4) as it is rather ‘reasonableness’ that is inquired here. I do acknowledge, then, that a distinction such as Rawls’s can be made, but it does not follow from this that I have failed to include in my account an essential element; that remains to be seen.
Rawls says: “Reasonable persons, we say, are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others. By contrast, people are unreasonable in the same basic aspect when they plan to engage in cooperative schemes but are unwilling to honor, or even to propose, except as a necessary public pretense, any general principle or standards for specifying fair terms of cooperation. They are ready to violate such terms as suits their interests when circumstances allow”21. Since only reasonable comprehensive doctrines are acceptable, it is clear that acknowledging the distinction between ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ does not affect my analysis of Rawls’s theory.
14.5. Rawls’s observations seem to result in an impasse. His position appears to invade people’s convictions, or at least not leave room for those which do not include the essential premises in his theory, demanding that they share a mind-set in order to realize a stable society, while the alternative, which is described by Rawls in the form of what he calls a modus vivendi, meaning that parties will adhere to agreements as long as this will be profitable, ceasing to do so once the circumstances should change22, seems unacceptable.
A similar, and similarly problematic, stance is evidenced by Scanlon, who says: “Any society, no matter how homogeneous, will include people who disagree about how to live and about what they want their society to be like […]. Given that there must be disagreements, and that those who disagree must somehow live together, is it not better, if possible, to have these disagreements contained within a framework of mutual respect? The alternative, it seems, is to be always in conflict, even at the deepest level, with a large number of one’s fellow citizens”23. First of all, the notion of ‘respect’ may be said to be difficult to uphold if not in the rudimentary sense that one acknowledges the power of the person or group of people with whom one is confronted (cf. chapter 6, note 59), so that an appeal to mutual respect would add nothing relevant here (if one resents someone or a group of people but at the same time acknowledges (respects) his or their power, one will not harm him or them since one is unable to do so)24.
Second, mutual respect is not something that can simply be stipulated, just as no one can be brought to believe something simply because one ought to do so. In a liberal democratic state, the outward acts can be regulated – to accord with the ignore principle – and apart from that, debates or other means to convince those who harbor a resentment (if these are deemed fruitful) can be used to change their viewpoint, but if a government should take indeed take a stance and restrain more actions than what could reasonably be ignored, it would not be difficult to accuse it of being verificationist25, and thus of exceeding the limits of its authority. Third, conflicts are likely to remain in some domains, e.g. between employers and employees, at least with regard to the details that can be considered the outcomes of zero-sum games (notably, employees’ salaries, which constitute costs for employers26), which apply to all economic systems save for an extreme case such as communism. (Admittedly, though, cases such as those just mentioned may perhaps not be characterized as those to which Scanlon refers by ‘the deepest level’.)
14.6. A mere modus vivendi in the guise presented by Rawls may seem insufficient to realize a stable society. Still, the results presented in chapter 6 appear to provide a basis to counter such an objection. As I argued in section 6.7, absent basic equality (specified by basic rationality) there will be no guarantee for those presently in charge that they will fall victim to their own failure to secure rights for all those who are able to claim rights. This, basic equality, is precisely what serves as the element to realize the stable society to which one aspires, without having to demand of those who agree with its inclusion in a political solution that they should acknowledge anything more than precisely this basic equality. They do not have to acknowledge any more ‘fundamental’ sort of equality, and may continue to consider, for example, women inferior to men, or black people inferior to white people.
Whether such inequalities can consistently be defended is a matter of scientific, religious or ‘moral’ inquiry27. Including elements from one or more of such domains in a political solution to matters of conflict amounts to nothing less than the advocacy of a comprehensive view, and if this is not acknowledged – by considering equalities other than basic equality as constitutive for a political view without at the same time granting that this makes it a comprehensive view – a misleading or indoctrinating view is proffered28. According to Rawls, in such a situation, i.e., a situation characterized by a modus vivendi, “[…] we do not have stability for the right reasons, that is, as secured by a firm allegiance to a democratic society’s political (moral) ideals and values”29. How one assesses such an observation depends on how ‘democracy’ is evaluated. The relevance of this last remark will become apparent in chapter 16.
Rawls attempts to realize a political theory without using a comprehensive doctrine as its basis. Yet the conclusion that the crucial elements that constitute that theory themselves manifest a comprehensive doctrine appears inevitable. More specifically, Rawls’s outlook is a ‘moral’ one. What adds to this predicament is the fact that such an outlook can, indeed must, be forgone: citizens’ equality and freedom must be acknowledged, as Rawls argues, but on the basis of a different, less ambitious, theory than his, which leaves citizens relatively much freedom. That such an alternative to Rawls’s approach is necessary follows from what was argued in chapters 11, 12 and 13. A criticism similar to the one provided in the case of Rawls can be leveled against Habermas’s position, whose stance vis-à-vis religious outlooks differs from Rawls’s, but whose demands from citizens are similar.