I have inquired what role formal equality and freedom serve in a liberal democratic state. With respect to the first issue, the foundation of formal equality – which has been characterized in the abstract as ‘prescriptive equality’ – has been the focus of attention, to which end the notion of ‘basic equality’ was introduced. It has been my primary goal in the first part of this study to clarify on what basis one may claim a right to be treated formally equally with others, meaning that one should have the same rights that follow from political and legal equality as those others.
I have first, in chapters 2 to 5, examined various alternatives to base such a claim on a ‘moral’ appeal. Rawls attempts to realize such a theory by using rationality as the decisive criterion, but, first, does not take a sufficiently radical stance with regard to the veil of ignorance to warrant the status of rationality as a ‘moral’ criterion, and, second, fails to clarify why rationality is such a criterion at all. Dworkin’s approach faces some equally challenging problems. In his case, the difficulty consists in the fact that an appeal to an ‘intrinsic value’ is made without indicating how and why these notions would serve as foundational values. Kateb does provide such an account. The problem here is that ‘human dignity’, the crucial starting point in his theory, appears to apply to all human beings, regardless of any special qualities they might exhibit, leaving the notion void. In Kant’s philosophy, this problem is absent, as he does specify such a criterion, but, apart from the fact that this cannot, given his general philosophical outlook, strictly speaking be demonstrated, the general difficulty that plagues every such defense remains, namely, that the link between any quality and ‘dignity’, human or not, seems impossible to find. That some presume that it can be found may be explained from confusion between, on the one hand, something valuable – which may in some cases be expressed through a price – and, on the other, a value or ‘dignity’.
In contradistinction to what these thinkers argue, I have stressed, in chapter 6, the importance of rationality, but not as a ‘moral’ characteristic. It has, rather, the (usual) meaning of a faculty by means of which one seeks to obtain the most desirable outcome in the long term. I have not based my account on such a ‘moral’ faculty because of the difficulties that the alternative, starting with a ‘moral’ one, demonstrated in the first chapters, brings with it (although this is a welcome aspect), but rather because I have seen no need to resort to the latter. It would have no added value, and would, accordingly, merely needlessly complicate matters.
The starting point is, in any liberal democratic state, basic equality, and its corollary, prescriptive equality, which is in turn concretized by formal equality, indicating which beings are to enjoy the rights stipulated by formal equality. ‘Basic equality’ may be specified in many ways, depending on the criteria to deem beings basically equal. What I have argued is that basic rationality is the specification that is to be preferred to any other specification in a liberal democratic state. It means that those who are basically rational are, on the basis of prescriptive equality, to be treated equally. Rationality must be acknowledged as the decisive criterion by and, simultaneously, for those who are rational (i.e., for themselves) as this provides the optimal guarantee that they will continue to enjoy the rights they consider important. Another criterion, based on, e.g., religious characteristics, does not provide the same guarantee. Apart from that, a failure to include (groups of) people who are rational is likely to lead to claims to the same rights from such people, perhaps by violent means, making them antagonists towards those already enjoying these rights. That this is no mere thought experiment is clear from the example provided in section 6.10.
The main question, whether equality and freedom are necessary constituents of a liberal democratic state, can be answered as follows. Material equality is no such necessary constituent, but formal equality is, meaning that citizens should be treated equally, based on basic equality and its corollary, prescriptive equality. In determining what this entails, I have opted for the middle ground between two extremes, avoiding on the one hand the possibility of one specific sort of (basic) equality and some exact extent of freedom, and on the other hand the possibility that ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ may be defined in any way.
The former option would have resulted in a standard whose neatness would have come at the price that its uselessness would be evinced on account of its procrustean character, leaving no room for the specifics inherent in individual liberal democratic states, while the latter would in fact demonstrate the opposite of what I have argued: if these concepts can indeed be defined in any way, it has only be shown that something, whatever it may be, must be present in a liberal democratic state, which would be an obviously unsatisfactory outcome in this case as such a simple state of arbitrariness may be reached through a far less extensive analysis than the one presented here, making it redundant and a waste of effort.
To conclude, basic equality has proved to be a somewhat flexible and abstract concept, while basic rationality is the specification that is the only viable candidate once it has been acknowledged; it may be replaced by another specification, although I find it hard to imagine what this might be. Another aspect of basic equality appears to be that those who are basically equal are, in a liberal democratic state, themselves the ones who decide who must be treated (formally) equally, through prescriptive equality.
As for freedom: I have tried to be as nuanced as possible in demarcating its realm, so as to do justice to the various complications involved in its implementation in a liberal democratic state. The result that was reached can be summarized as follows: freedom of expression should exist, limited only by what the ignore principle dictates: only actions that can be reasonably ignored by those who are basically equal should be allowed. The inclusion of the adverb ‘reasonably’ means that in this case, too, no absolute standard is proffered, the ignore principle being in need of the societal context in order to be concretized.
Some of the ideas presented here have the character of a ‘framework or a ‘blueprint’: no definite specification is provided. This appeared most prominently, perhaps, in the case of basic equality, but the ignore principle is another important instance. The fact that these aspects of a liberal democratic state were presented thus is advantageous in that it affords the necessary room, at least in the second instance just mentioned, to realize various concretizations, thus accounting for the specific characteristics of each state, but this does mean that some issues are not decisively answered. Whether others deem themselves capable to provide such answers in advance I do not know, but I would in any event not know how to do so without resorting to a model of the liberal democratic state a manifestation corresponding to which one would have a hard time locating other than in one’s own imagination, such a manifestation being as simple as it is unrealizable.
An important issue that has arisen is the scope of the state’s aspirations. There are two positions that one may take regarding this issue. One may, opting for the first position, consider it a task of the state to realize a ‘correct’ (or ‘true’) or even a ‘moral’ conception of politics, indicating, for example, in what fundamental respects people are equal and limiting or discouraging, from such a consideration, conceptions with a conflicting outlook, which can be found in certain worldviews (or comprehensive doctrines, to use Rawls’s phrase). I consider theories such as those of Rawls, Dworkin and Habermas examples of such a denomination. The differences between these theories are considerable, but what they share in common is that they incorporate ‘moral’ elements in their political theories. In Dworkin’s case, this follows most clearly from the way he defines ‘liberty’, distinguishing it from – negative – freedom, demanding that citizens should in each case respect other citizens’ rights. This means that some viewpoints are excluded from the outset.
Rawls’s and Habermas’s positions, discussed in chapters 14 and 15, respectively, likewise demarcate a domain beyond which no freedom of expression may be tolerated. Rawls seeks to establish a position beyond all comprehensive doctrines (worldviews), while being acceptable to all, but that position itself constitutes a comprehensive view. This outcome is not surprising, given the fact that, as was argued in chapter 12, a neutral stance with regard to freedom of expression cannot be taken lest it be devoid of content and thus be reconcilable with any and, paradoxically, simultaneously no view, let alone a worldview. This does not mean that the state itself must adhere to a worldview but rather that every way to determine the scope of freedom of expression, and thus to specify what may and may not be expressed, is based on non-neutral considerations. This outcome may seem close to what Rawls argues, but a crucial difference is that he bases his account on ‘moral powers’ citizens are supposed to have, leading him to maintain that not all comprehensive doctrines are acceptable but only reasonable ones. It is because of this element of ‘moral powers’ and its corollary that Rawls’s own position qualifies as a comprehensive doctrine.
Habermas’s theory is arguably more complex than Rawls’s, and at first sight seemingly more nuanced, as he is willing to take the interests of religious worldviews seriously. Yet what he demands of citizens is, all things considered, more demanding. After all, what Rawls considers necessary for a worldview to be acceptable is that it is reasonable, which means that it must adhere to a ‘moral’ outlook. Habermas, on the other hand, departs from this, while mistaken, still carefully delineated minimal concession citizens are required to make, and stresses the need for an ‘epistemic stance’, meaning that religious citizens must reconsider their tenets in the light of scientific developments. This means that not only the ‘moral’ aspects of world– views are involved, but – at least in some cases – the very bases on which they rest. Such a demand is both intrusive and more extensive than is warranted in a liberal democratic state (not being restricted to the minimum demanded in a liberal democratic state, expressed through the ignore principle).
Given the problems this first position presents, then, I prefer the second possibility, whose claims are modest in comparison. It does not seek after the ‘truth’ of any worldview but is content when it has been determined what the necessary conditions for the existence and continuance of a liberal democratic state are, accommodating the rights of those clinging to various – and mutually conflicting – worldviews, and, in accordance with what was said in chapter 13, keeping the intrusions from the public domain on the private ones to a minimum. In a liberal democratic state, a political outlook neither can nor should provide the answers citizens seek to find from their worldviews. Politics’ only ambition in a liberal democratic state should be to find the optimal way to let citizens live together peacefully, while respecting certain rights and procedures (as long as the liberal democratic state in question itself remains in existence). Whether metaphysical claims stemming from (religious) tenets are correct (or ‘correct’) cannot be decided by politics, just as it is not qualified to answer the question of whether any race is superior in any way to another, or any other such issue. If answers to such questions are forthcoming, they must be scientific, religious or philosophical in nature, and not political. To consider politics able or necessary to fulfill such a role is to take a stance that is both unrealistic and totalitarian. It must limit itself to mitigating harm and the harmful effects of acts of expression, in accordance with the ignore principle.
Stability and freedom seem to be negatively correlated, both within a liberal democratic state and with respect to the question of its continuance. Within a liberal democratic state, the freedom of its citizens cannot be boundless, since the harm that may result from it must be taken seriously lest those who are affected resist the harm in undesirable ways. That it is necessary to balance freedom and harm in a liberal democratic state is clear; such a task is most aptly carried out by using the ignore principle. At the same time, no ‘moral’ appeal is to be made to citizens to force them to acknowledge that people are equal in any sense except for what basic equality indicates in order to meet the standards of prescriptive equality; nothing more may be demanded of citizens than their willingness to treat people formally equally. As for the continuance of a liberal democratic state, it cannot be guaranteed on the basis of my account, but, as was pointed out in chapter 16, the introduction of ‘militant democracy’ will do little if anything to remedy this (provided one would want to do so in the first place), and, apart from that, the concept suffers from a lack of consistency and persuasiveness.
These observations do not lead to the outcome that stability is any less attainable in my account than in competing ones, which do emphasize the need to acknowledge people’s equality or to ban parties that would undermine the liberal democratic state. I know of no more stabilizing factor than self-interest, which is decisive here. With respect to the acknowledgment of basic rationality, the role of self-interest is clear from the following. If a majority of citizens should want to withhold rights from some of them, they would thereby acknowledge the admissibility to discriminate between citizens, and if such a situation is allowed, they cannot know whether they themselves should one day fall victim to a variation of the discrimination they have themselves installed, this being the case if they belong to a relevant minority, which may lead to being withheld political or legal rights. As for the possibility to dissolve a liberal democratic state, if those who would be willing to do so act rationally, they will have to take into account that the rights they presently enjoy would cease or may at least be jeopardized, and if they do not act rationally, the state already consists of a (qualified) majority of such citizens and must be considered, in terms of realizing a liberal democratic state, a total loss, at least for the foreseeable future.
It has been demonstrated that rationality is a crucial characteristic to realize a stable liberal democratic state, without the need, evidenced in some alternatives, to resort to theories that cannot be corroborated – either on the basis of experience or through simple semantic analyses –, ‘rationality’ in the sense used by me being a straightforward notion, meaning that it is both universally acceptable and easily applicable by anyone willing to critically and constructively respond to the problems with which liberal democratic states are continuously confronted.