FOOTNOTES:
INTRODUCTION
1 In the case of equality, this is somewhat nuanced; I will argue below that some sort of equality is indeed necessary in any form of government.
2 R. DWORKIN, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 4 (cf. p. 366). Similarly, in Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 67, he says: “[…] I shall use the word ‘liberty’ to describe the set of rights that government should establish and enforce to protect people’s personal ethical responsibility properly understood. I shall use the word ‘freedom’ in a more neutral way, so that any time the government prevents someone from acting as he might wish, it limits his freedom.”
3 For example, Narveson, though using ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ interchangeably, seems to consider ‘liberty’ the more ‘neutral’ notion and ‘freedom’ the more value-laden one (“The Right to Liberty is incompatible with the Right to Equality”, pp. 124-129).
4 R. DWORKIN, Sovereign Virtue, p. 125.
5 “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others”, I. BERLIN, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, § 1 (p. 169).
6 J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Ch. 8 (p. 24).
7 G. W. F. HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, e.g., § 4 (p. 50), § 10 (pp. 62, 63), § 11 (p. 63), § 15 (pp. 66-68), § 29 (p. 79).
8 T. H. GREEN, “Lecture on ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’”, pp. 199, 200.
9 Cf. D. RAE, Equalities, p. 132: “In any real historical context no single notion of equality can sweep the field. Because the structure of human societies is complicated, equality must be complicated if it is to approach practice.” Dworkin similarly observes: “People can become equal (or at least more equal) in one way with the consequence that they become unequal (or more unequal) in others”, Sovereign Virtue, p. 11.
10 The presence of this right is explained by the fact that the conditions for democracy to exist are explored, among which (in states characterized by representative democracy)(ex natura rei) the right to vote features prominently.
11 Together these rights constitute an important segment of the whole of civil and political rights. (I do not deal with all of these rights, as some of them, such as the right to fair trial, are associated with the rule of law rather than with liberal democracy.) Incidentally, it may be argued that the rule of law is an essential part of liberal democracy (e.g., M. PLATTNER, “From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy”, p. 121; F. ZAKARIA, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, p. 22). Such a definition of ‘liberal democracy’ is not incompatible with what I will argue here, so that the need to take a principled stance with regard to this matter does not present itself. It may still be argued that, given the fact that I will establish whether freedom is a necessary constituent of a liberal democratic state, the rights considered to be part of the rule of law, such as the right to fair trial just mentioned, must also receive extensive attention. Still, I am confident that what will be said in part 2 of the inquiry, especially chapters 8, 10, 11 and 13, is sufficient to address the relevant issues that may ensue from taking these rights into consideration.
12 Cavanagh’s question “Would you really want just anyone – never mind their unsteady hands, or psychotic tendencies – to have an equal chance of becoming your dentist?” (Against Equality of Opportunity, p. 8) is of course rhetorical; in the situation that I will investigate, the same sort of question, namely, “Would you really want just anyone to be treated formally equally?”, would also be a rhetorical one, at least nearly, for there are some cases in which one must be nuanced, such as the rights of children in this respect, but the reason why it is rhetorical differs significantly from the one in the situation to which Cavanagh refers. In his case, it is obvious why not everyone should have an equal chance to become a dentist, while in mine, it will (hopefully) be obvious, to anticipate what I will argue, why (nearly) everyone should be treated formally equally.
13 This is an imprecise term (if only because economic inequality is in most cases the norm, the only issue being the degree to which such inequality should be allowed to exist), but since this is a minor issue here, I will not dwell on this. In any event, ‘economic equality’ is to be read here as ‘economic (in)equality’ unless specified otherwise.
14 Alternative approaches to those that defend material equality are, inter alia, a libertarian one (the government should restrict itself to protecting existing property rather than redistribute it) and a welfare-based one (the government should optimize citizens’ welfare (rather than goods, which is the crucial element in material equality). (R. DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, p. 297, and in detail Sovereign Virtue, especially pp. 1-183, defending equality of resources, which he considers a species of material equality (Sovereign Virtue, p. 3)). Incidentally, ‘economic equality’ may be taken to mean the same as ‘material equality’, but I have distinguished between them for the reason given above, namely, that ‘formal equality’ and ‘material equality?