THE IMPORT OF ‘HUMAN DIGNITY’
4.1. Having examined Rawls’s and Dworkin’s views, I will explicate the decisive presumptions that are prevalent in these views, so that the discussion can be broadened. This also affords the opportunity to evaluate such presumptions. Dworkin’s position could be supplemented by a notion such as ‘human dignity’, while Rawls’s perspective, which focuses on reason, may benefit from an examination from a Kantian stance. Such an extension of the discussion would be desirable in any event, since I would not limit the research to an exegesis of the works of these authors, which serve merely as starting points here, albeit important ones. The first explication is presented in the present chapter and consists in an examination of ‘human dignity’, while the next chapter provides the Kantian stance just adumbrated.
‘Human dignity’ has many defenders. Rather than to provide an overview here, I will concentrate on one author and expand the discussion from there. The author in question is George Kateb, since in his work Human Dignity, ‘human dignity’ is not just, as is the case with many of its protagonists1, an assumption or presumption necessary to argue some philosophical outlook, but features itself as the object of inquiry. I will first scrutinize the arguments Kateb amasses2. The result of this process bears on the position of other thinkers as well, so that the relevance of what is brought to the fore in this chapter is not limited to his presentation. In order to make the practical relevance of the discussion clear, I will subsequently refer to some representative legislation in which the phrase ‘human dignity’ appears.
4.2. One way to consolidate the rights of their bearers is to seek a justification in their being human as a special element. Incidentally, in this case – as in any similar argument – the justification will succeed rather than precede the actual status quo, since the discussion arises only within a society the presence of which is a condition for it to arise at all3. (Whether it be governed democratically or not is not irrelevant for this issue, but not crucial.) I will initially focus here on Kateb’s Human Dignity, which aspires to an encompassing theory on mankind’s place in the world, and to designate the consequences this has for the evaluation of mankind.
4.3. Kateb’s work is brought to the fore here as an example of a theory that tries to accommodate for certain human qualities while at the same time providing a scheme that protects the interests of those that lack them. It is, as I will indicate, in my view, a typical example of a theory that wants too much, so to speak: it is unwilling to sacrifice what is special in humanity but fails to accept the consequences of this premise when it is pressed to do so, thus leaving an account that may be considered inconsistent or even void.
The outline of Human Dignity is presented thus: “I wish to go to the extent of saying that the human species is indeed something special, that it possesses valuable, commendable uniqueness or distinctiveness that is unlike the uniqueness of any other species. It has higher dignity than all other species, or a qualitatively different dignity from all of them. The higher dignity is theoretically founded on humanity’s partial discontinuity with nature. Humanity is not only natural, whereas all other species are only natural. The reasons for this assertion, however, have nothing to do with theology or religion.
I therefore work with the assumption that we can distinguish between the dignity of every human individual and the dignity of the human species as a whole. With that assumption in place, I make another assumption, that the dignity of every individual is equal to that of every other; which is to say that every human being has a status equal to that of all others. […] All individuals are equal; no other species is equal to humanity. These are the two basic propositions that make up the concept of human dignity. The idea that humanity is special comes into play when species are compared to one another from an external and deindividualized (though of course only human) point of view. When we refer to the dignity of the human species, we could speak of the stature of the human race as distinguished from the status of individuals”4.
4.4. Kateb’s notion of ‘human dignity’ is an intricate one, incorporating status and stature5 (as mentioned above). One wonders, though, what could prompt such an amalgam. If there were merely a need to underline the special contributions individuals (are able to) accomplish, the stature aspect would obviously be a superfluous addition. The benefit – if that is what this is – of such a conception is, in any event, that it includes those who cannot claim any merit; for them the stature aspect is the crucial element. A clear downside of this element is its vagueness, which may be precisely what accounts for its success to accommodate those that lack a status in the actual sense (to contrast it with the author’s conception of this word). (I must be a bit harsh here, since even this word’s meaning is hollowed out by the author, who clearly does not want to acknowledge the relevance of any qualities that are not evenly divided among human beings.)
The difficulties are brought to the fore by Kateb’s insistence to consider uniqueness to be “[…] the element common to status and stature […]”6. This becomes apparent when it is somewhat concretized: “[…] the dignity of the human species lies in its uniqueness in a world of species. I am what no one else is, while not existentially superior to anyone else; we human beings belong to a species that is what no other species is; it is the highest species on earth – so far”7. Still, if Kateb is, as would appear to be the case, not willing to make choices, and, in other words, to single out one or more actual criteria on the basis of which the human species’s ‘dignity’ would subsequently be defended, it is simply the bare fact of belonging to this species that is decisive, namely (presumably) having certain physical characteristics, making the decisive element an arbitrary one. Once Kateb reaches the point where he starts to list the characteristics that are unique to human beings, it is clear that he dismisses such a way out (and rightly so, for the reason just mentioned), but he does not provide another solution: “All the traits and attributes are based in the body, but none is reducible to a merely biological phenomenon with an exclusively biological explanation. They all establish that humanity is partly nonnatural”8.
It is not reason (in whatever sense) that is crucial, as this would exclude those that are seriously cognitively impaired, and would easily force a modification of this outlook, either conferring ‘dignity’ on those animals that exhibit more intelligence than these individuals, or denying these individuals ‘dignity’. Neither of these options is open to Kateb, which makes the vagueness of his definitions all the more problematic9. It also makes it suspicious, to phrase it thus: it is almost as if the theory were constructed with the agenda in mind to create a ‘safe haven’ for every human being, while being able to justify a different treatment for animals (whose suffering, not belonging to a species that is unique, is less important than that of mankind10). This becomes apparent, e.g., when Kateb says, committing an obvious argumentum ad consequentiam: “[…] we should not speak as if at any time degraded human beings are no longer human; to do so would justify the treatment inflicted on them”11.
Taylor’s analysis is similarly problematic: “[…] men and women are the beings who exhibit certain capacities which are worthy of respect. The fact that we ascribe rights to idiots, people in a coma, bad men who have irretrievably turned their back on the proper development of these capacities, and so on, does not show that the capacities are irrelevant. It shows only that we have a powerful sense that the status of being a creature defined by its potential for these capacities cannot be lost”12. In such cases as those that are mentioned, however, the most credible position is that the potential is indeed lost, and that the very nature of the creature has changed in a decisive way, for otherwise one should be forced to acknowledge that some faith, i.e., an unfounded view (which may in this case be expressed by the phrase wishful thinking), is decisive. If one notices the irrevocable loss of the capacities that are deemed necessary to conclude that the being in question merits respect, the only defensible conclusion is that such respect, and a fortiori its particular status, along with the special rights that accompany it, can no longer credibly be acknowledged, at least not in the way indicated above.
4.5. On the basis of the foregoing, it appears difficult, if not downright impossible, to delineate, within this frame of thought, a domain to which human beings exclusively belong on account of a non-trivial trait. This may be called a lower limit when it comes to seeking a contrast with those species that (supposedly) lack (this sort of) ‘dignity’. The upper limit, by contrast, lies in the acknowledgement of the non-existence of a special standing for those human beings that are endowed with extraordinary qualities (at least at the level of analysis with which I am concerned. Kateb does not overlook the differences between individual human beings). Still, he seems to need precisely the achievements of such individuals to buttress the special position of mankind: “[…] equal individual status is shored up by the great achievements that testify to human stature because […] they rebut the contention that human beings are merely another species in nature, and thus prepare the way for us to regard every person in his or her potentiality”13.
‘Great achievements’ would in fact plead inequality among human beings (since the greatness of such achievements is acknowledged by contrasting them with achievements of others that are not great). The uniqueness of the species can, accordingly, only be said to follow from the achievements of great individuals (or at least not from the acts of each individual), forgoing here the matter what factors constitute the acts of such individuals; in the most extreme cases (people that are significantly cognitively impaired), individuals are not even capable of performing unique accomplishments. It must be granted that Kateb connects the great achievements to human stature14 rather than to the status of individuals, so that individuals may be said to ‘share’ in the achievements: they are of the same species as the ‘great’ individuals and might be considered, from this perspective, to achieve great things if the circumstances had been different, whereas an animal would (presumably) never be able to, e.g., compose music or cure a disease.
If this reasoning is carried through consistently, those individuals who are unable to contribute in such a way should not be considered human beings. The alternative consists in including such beings, at the expense of the disappearance of the demarcation line (the lower limit just mentioned) between human beings and animals. This is not what Kateb would argue, focusing on the fact of being human: “There are people who are so disabled that they cannot function. Does the idea of dignity apply to them? Yes, they remain human beings in the most important respect. If they cannot actively exercise many or any of their rights they nevertheless retain a right to life, whatever their incapacities (short of the most extreme failures of functioning)”15.
It is not surprising that Kateb finds himself in a split, which can only be considered to be a dilemma, although he does not himself describe it as such16: “I am not saying that when we regard any particular individual we should see in him or her an embodiment or personification of the whole human record, and by that conceit inflate the person into the species, or even allow the full range of demonstrated human capacity to bestow its aura on any given human being or on all human beings equally. No, we deal here with the stature of the species, carrying with it a past that grew out of other species and will be extended indefinitely into the future. But the fact remains that every individual has all the uniquely human traits and attributes that the human record shows. The human record shows and will show, however, a cumulative display of these traits and attributes that surpasses any individual and any particular group or society”17.
On the one hand, individuals are not the personification of the human record (so that the individuals whose mental capacities are exceeded by those of some animals are included – at the same time, a supposedly common ground (the very human record) between ‘great’ individuals and these individuals is lost), but on the other hand, every individual has all the decisive traits and attributes to include him (which is easily refuted on the basis of experience).
4.6. What does all this mean for the issue of granting rights? Kateb says: “Two kinds of equality are involved when the state recognizes and respects human rights. First, there is moral equality, and second, there is the equal status of every individual”18. The first sort of equality is difficult to maintain in light of the preceding analysis. The second sort of equality, the equal status of every individual, by contrast, can be defended, but in order to eliminate the difficulties pointed out above, another foundation (or, rather, a foundation) must be provided. This is what I will attempt to do in my own alternative. For now, I will broaden the inquiry with regard to the topic at hand, examining whether ‘human dignity’ may serve as a basis to grant rights.
The problem with ‘human dignity’, it seems, is that it is an honorific rather than a description, so that the reason why ‘dignity’ should be bestowed on human beings remains to be clarified19. One may contrast this with an honorific bestowed on, e.g., athletes who have shown extraordinary accomplishments. They are praised for this, and in this consists the honorific: the honorific is based on some quality or performance considered exceptional by some20. Crucially, such an honorific can only have a meaning if the reason for it to be bestowed can be contrasted with situations in which it would be out of place. The honorific is bestowed on athletes who show, as I said, extraordinary accomplishments. They are ‘extra’-‘ordinary’ (beyond the ordinary) in the sense that ordinary people (or the athletes with whom they compete) cannot (or, in any event, do not) perform such feats. If a medal were to be awarded to anyone who is able to walk, e.g., the number of people lauded would be so great that it would lose its meaning. The contrast with others not able to act thus is lacking in this latter case21.
In the case of ‘human dignity’, the problem seems to be that everyone who is a human being (a person) is eo ipso qualified a proper candidate to have ‘dignity’ bestowed on him. There is no contrast (not even with those who lack reason, who are still treated with ‘dignity’ (if they cannot fend for themselves, they are not simply abandoned, which would probably mean their death, but are taken care of in special institutions)). (There is, to be sure, a more fundamental contrast, namely with non-humans (animals).) If there is no criterion to bestow an honorific (such as ‘dignity’), the honorific itself loses all meaning22. As Hegel says, to say that persons are equals is an empty, tautological statement (“ein leerer tautologischer Satz”) as long as ‘person’ has not been specified and thus remains an abstraction23.
An alternative would be not to focus on the ‘human’ part of ‘human dignity’ but rather to deem a characteristic decisive that some may be said to exhibit and which others lack, such as rationality. If rationality in the sense of a (mere) theoretical faculty is the focal point, some may be inclined to speak of ‘worth’, but in this case, the differences between individuals would have to be stressed. This is what Pojman does when he says: “Contrary to the egalitarians, and in spite of the widespread acceptance of the ‘egalitar