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“Laches” - Plato
LACHES: Certainly not.
NICIAS: Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer ought to know only the NICIAS: And do you suppose that the physician signs of things that are about to come to pass, or any other artist knows this, or any one indeed, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or vic-except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and tory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest; but hope? And him I call the courageous.
to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, by the soothsayer than by one who is no sooth-Laches?
sayer.
LACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speak-LACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias would ing, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but be at, Socrates; for he represents the courageous one of them can know to whom to die or to live is man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you any other character, unless he means to say that he are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a sooth-is a god. My opinion is that he does not like hon-sayer nor courageous?
estly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the NICIAS: What! do you mean to say that the sooth-difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, sayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?
Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appear-LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?
ance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing 35
“Laches” - Plato
in a court of law there might have been reason in so you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge doing; but why should a man deck himself out with of the grounds of hope and fear?
vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?
NICIAS: I do.
SOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and SOCRATES: And not every man has this knowl-not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us edge; the physician and the soothsayer have it not; ask him just to explain what he means, and if he and they will not be courageous unless they acquire has reason on his side we will agree with him; if it—that is what you were saying?
not, we will instruct him.
NICIAS: I was.
LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough.
SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as the proverb says, SOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and and therefore he could not be courageous.
my question will do for both of us.
NICIAS: I think not.
LACHES: Very good.
SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but 36
“Laches” - Plato
because I think that he who assents to your doc-they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only fear-trine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds less and senseless. Do you imagine that I should of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast call little children courageous, which fear no dan-is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a gers because they know none? There is a difference, leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is but a few human beings ever know by reason of a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no fore-must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and thought, are very common qualities possessed by a monkey, have equally little pretensions to cour-many men, many women, many children, many age.
animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term ‘courageous’ actions which I call rash;—my LACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is courageous actions are wise actions.
truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be LACHES: Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seek-whether you will have the boldness, in the face of ing to deprive of the honour of courage those whom universal opinion, to deny their courage.
all the world acknowledges to be courageous.
NICIAS: Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any NICIAS: Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; other things which have no fear of dangers, because for I am quite willing to say of you and also of 37
“Laches” - Plato
Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you of courage is worthy of examination.
are courageous and therefore wise.
LACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates.
LACHES: I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.
SOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let SOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to fancy that you are not aware of the source from apply your mind, and join with me in the consider-which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this ation of the question.
from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to LACHES: I will if you think that I ought.
be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort.
SOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, LACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of to begin again. You remember that we originally such niceties is a much more suitable employment considered courage to be a part of virtue.
for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her.
NICIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great states-SOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a man is likely to have a great intelligence. And I think part; and there were many other parts, all of which that the view which is implied in Nicias’ definition taken together are called virtue.