apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.
Pleasure./Offence.
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such
things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, ( à Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.
Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of Evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or
lesse Displeasure and Offence.
Pleasures of sense./Pleasures of the Mind. Joy, Paine, Griefe.
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be
called Pleasures of Sense, (The word sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the
body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things;
whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures of the Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner,
Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of
consequences, and are called GRIEFE.
These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are
diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire.
Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them
together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.
Hope.
For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
Despaire.
The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.
Feare.
Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.
Courage.
The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistence, COURAGE.
Anger.
Sudden Courage, ANGER.
Confidence.
Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.
Diffidence.
Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.
Indignation.
Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury,
INDIGNATION.
Benevolence./Good Nature.
Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD
NATURE.
Covetousnesse.
Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because
men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire
in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are
sought.
Ambition.
Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the
reason before mentioned.
Pusillanimity.
Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
Magnanimity.
Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.
Valour.
Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.
Liberality.
Magnanimity, in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY.
Miserablenesse.
Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked,
or disliked.
Kindnesse.
Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.
Naturall Lust.
Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURALL LUST.
Luxury.
Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.
The Passion of Love./Jealousie.
Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.
Revengefulnesse.
Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own,
REVENGEFULNESSE.
Curiosity.
Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man: so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other
Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by prædominance, take
away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of
delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short
vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.
Religion./Superstition./True Religion.
Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed,
RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we
imagine, TRUE RELIGION.
Panique Terrour.
Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the Fables,
that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth, there is alwayes in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Example; every one
supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng,
or multitude of people.
Admiration.
Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to Man, because it excites the
appetite of knowing the cause.
Glory./Vainglory.
Joy, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is
the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or onely supposed by
himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly
given; because a well grounded Confidence begetteth Attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.
Dejection.
Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJECTION of mind.
The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of
Gallant Persons; and is corrected oftentimes by Age, and Employment.
Sudden Glory./Laughter.
Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is
incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced
to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And
therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great
minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare
themselves onely with the most able.
Sudden Dejection./Weeping.
On the contrary, Sudden Dejection, is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by
such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: And
they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and
Children. Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others
for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both
Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man
Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.
Shame./Blushing.
Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth it selfe in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in
young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: In old men it is a
signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.
Impudence.
The Contempt of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
Pitty.
Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of
this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: And therefore for Calamity arriving from great
wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity. those have least
Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
Cruelty.
Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens great
harmes, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.
Emulation./Envy.
Griefe, for the successe of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equall or exceed him, is called EMULATION: But
joyned with Endeavour to supplant, or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.
Deliberation.
When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, concerning one and
the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or
omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we
have an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it;
sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes
and Fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call
DELIBERATION.
Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be
changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think
such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate;
not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.
This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, is no lesse in other living
Creatures then in Man; and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.
Every Deliberation is then sayd to End, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to
our Appetite, or Aversion.
The Will.
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhæring to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation, must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will
therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an
Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the
last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites, make any action Voluntary; then
by the same Reason all intervenient Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary; and
so one and the same action, should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.
By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from Covetousnesse,
Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their
beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are
voluntary actions.
Formes of Speech, in Passion.
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly
different from those, by which wee expresse our Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions
may be expressed Indicatively; as I love, I feare, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which neverthelesse are not
affirmations, unlesse it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the
Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words; but
Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is
Imperative; as Do this, forbeare that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbeare, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of VainGlory, of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other language of the Passions I find none: For Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech;
but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.
These formes of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but
certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them,
have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance,
motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aimes, which we otherwise know the man to have.
Good and Evill apparent.
And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good
and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill
effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very
seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so farre as a man seeth, if the Good in
those consequences, be greater than the Evill, the whole chaine is that which Writers call
Apparent, or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the Evill exceedeth the Good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himselfe; and is able when he will, to give
the best counsell unto others.
Felicity.
Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For
there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life it
selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without
Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall
no sooner know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of
Schoole-men Beatificall Vision is unintelligible.
Praise./Magnification./
The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is
PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing, is MAGNIFYING.
And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a mans Felicity, is by the Greeks called
, for which wee have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the
present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.
CHAP. VII.
Of the Ends, or Resolutions of DISCOURSE.
OF all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End
for that time.
Judgement, or Sentence final./Doubt.
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not
be, or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the
chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Præsumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the
truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the Will; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Finall Sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT.
No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for
the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge
of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall.
No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know
absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be,
That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to
another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
Science./Opinion./Conscience.
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of
Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, and of these again
into Syllogismes; the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind
by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words,
which is commonly called SCIENCE. But if the first ground of such Discourse, be not
Definitions; or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End
or Conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in
absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men,
know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is
as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one
another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak
against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of
Conscience, has been alwayes hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men
made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and
secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand
witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never
so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that
reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they
think so.
Beliefe. Faith.
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other
contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of
another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he
doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And
the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, in the man; Beleefe, both of the man, and of the truth of what he sayes. So that in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To have faith in, or trust to, or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I beleeve
in; as also the Latine, Credo in; and the Greek,
are never used but in the
writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, I beleeve him; I trust him: I
have faith in him; I rely on him; and in Latin, Credo illi; fido illi: and in Greek,
:
and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastique use of the word hath raised many disputes about
the right object of the Christian Faith.
But by Beleeving in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so
believe in God, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not;
which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not
all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.
From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true,
from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason,
but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the
speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith;
and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe
that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe,
our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And
they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of
the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he
relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written by Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Cæsar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Cæsar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings;
whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.
CHAP. VIII.
Of the VERTUES commonly called INTELLECTUALL; and their contrary DEFECTS.
Intellectuall Vertue defined.
VERTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and
consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized.
And by Vertues INTELLEC