“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied Of course not.
with this answer. By heaven, and shall I tell you And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, inasmuch He will not.
as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him—
Neither can he love that which he does not de-or rather let me try another way of putting the sire?
matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which He cannot.
he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?
his like which he would not suffer from himself?
Clearly not.
And if neither can be of any use to the other, how What place then is there for friendship, if, when can they be loved by one another? Can they now?
absent, good men have no need of one another (for They cannot.
even when alone they are sufficient for themselves), And can he who is not loved be a friend?
and when present have no use of one another? How Certainly not.
can such persons ever be induced to value one an-But say that the like is not the friend of the like other?
in so far as he is like; still the good may be the They cannot.
friend of the good in so far as he is good?
And friends they cannot be, unless they value one True.
another?
But then again, will not the good, in so far as he Very true.
is good, be sufficient for himself? Certainly he will.
But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being de-And he who is sufficient wants nothing—that is ceived in all this—are we not indeed entirely wrong?
implied in the word sufficient.
How so? he replied.