These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and admit that every individual thing has its own only a few of the difficulties in which we are in-determinate idea which is always one and the volved if ideas really are and we determine each same, he will have nothing on which his mind one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power what may be said against them will deny the very of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particu-existence of them—and even if they do exist, he larly noted.
will say that they must of necessity be unknown Very true, he said.
to man; and he will seem to have reason on his But, then, what is to become of philosophy?
side, and as we were remarking just now, will be Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?
very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted I certainly do not see my way at present.
with very considerable ability before he can learn Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this that everything has a class and an absolute es-arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to desence; and still more remarkable will he be who fine the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas discovers all these things for himself, and hav-generally, without sufficient previous training. I ing thoroughly investigated them is able to teach noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talk-them to others.
ing here with your friend Aristoteles, the day I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; before yesterday. The impulse that carries you and what you say is very much to my mind.
towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, but there is an art which is called by the vulgar fixing his attention on these and the like difficul-idle talking, and which is often imagined to be ties, does away with ideas of things and will not useless; in that you must train and exercise your-64
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self, now that you are young, or truth will elude I mean, for example, that in the case of this your grasp.
very hypothesis of Zeno’s about the many, you And what is the nature of this exercise, should inquire not only what will be the conse-Parmenides, which you would recommend?
quences to the many in relation to themselves That which you heard Zeno practising; at the and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself same time, I give you credit for saying to him and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of that you did not care to examine the perplexity the many, but also what will be the consequences in reference to visible things, or to consider the to the one and the many in their relation to them-question that way; but only in reference to ob-selves and to each other, on the opposite hypoth-jects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.
esis. Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no be the consequences in either of these cases to difficulty in showing by this method that visible the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other things are like and unlike and may experience things, in relation both to themselves and to one anything.
another, and so of unlikeness; and the same holds Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that good of motion and rest, of generation and de-you should go a step further, and consider not struction, and even of being and not-being. In a only the consequences which flow from a given word, when you suppose anything to be or not hypothesis, but also the consequences which flow to be, or to be in any way affected, you must from denying the hypothesis; and that will be look at the consequences in relation to the thing still better training for you.
itself, and to any other things which you choose,—
What do you mean? he said.
to each of them singly, to more than one, and to 65
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all; and so of other things, you must look at them this roundabout progress through all things is in relation to themselves and to anything else the only way in which the mind can attain truth which you suppose either to be or not to be, if and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join you would train yourself perfectly and see the in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the real truth.
process again which I have not heard for a long That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of time.
which you speak, and I do not quite understand When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, ac-you; will you take some hypothesis and go cording to Antiphon’s report of him, said, that through the steps?—then I shall apprehend you he himself and Aristoteles and the whole com-better.
pany entreated Parmenides to give an example That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a of the process. I cannot refuse, said Parmenides; man of my years.
and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.
his old age, against his will, he fell in love, com-Zeno answered with a smile:—Let us make our pared himself to an old racehorse, who was about petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the in saying that you are hardly aware of the ex-course he knew so well—this was his simile of tent of the task which you are imposing on him; himself. And I also experience a trembling when and if there were more of us I should not ask I remember through what an ocean of words I him, for these are not subjects which any one, have to wade at my time of life. But I must in-especially at his age, can well speak of before a dulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are large audience; most people are not aware that alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be 66
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our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this labo-And what is a whole? would not that of which rious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take no part is wanting be a whole?
my own hypothesis the one? and consider the Certainly.
consequences which follow on the supposition Then, in either case, the one would be made either of the being or of the not-being of one?
up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as By all means, said Zeno.
having parts?
And who will answer me? he said. Shall I pro-To be sure.
pose the youngest? He will not make difficulties And in either case, the one would be many, and and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; not one?
and his answers will give me time to breathe.
True.
I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
Aristoteles; for I am the youngest and at your It ought.
service. Ask, and I will answer.
Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be Parmenides proceeded: 1.a. If one is, he said, a whole, and will not have parts?
the one cannot be many?
No.
Impossible.
But if it has no parts, it will have neither begin-Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot ning, middle, nor end; for these would of course be a whole?
be parts of it.
Why not?
Right.
Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
But then, again, a beginning and an end are Yes.
the limits of everything?