Parmenides by Plato. - HTML preview

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79

Parmenides

Yes, the greatest number.

Then we were wrong in saying just now, that Is there any of these which is a part of being, being was distributed into the greatest number and yet no part?

of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more Impossible.

than the one, into parts equal to the one; the one But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be is never wanting to being, or being to the one, one, and cannot be none?

but being two they are co-equal and co-extensive.

Certainly.

Certainly that is true.

Then the one attaches to every single part of The one itself, then, having been broken up being, and does not fail in any part, whether great into parts by being, is many and infinite?

or small, or whatever may be the size of it?

True.

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, But reflect:—Can one, in its entirety, be in many but the one itself distributed by being, must also places at the same time?

be many?

No; I see the impossibility of that.

Certainly.

And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a it cannot be present with all the parts of being, whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for unless divided.

are not the parts contained by the whole?

True.

Certainly.

And that which has parts will be as many as And that which contains, is a limit?

the parts are?

Of course.

Certainly.

Then the one if it has being is one and many, 80

Parmenides

whole and parts, having limits and yet unlim-How?

ited in number?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside Clearly.

the whole.

And because having limits, also having extremes?

True.

Certainly.

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

And if a whole, having beginning and middle Yes.

and end. For can anything be a whole without And the one is all its parts, and neither more these three? And if any one of them is wanting nor less than all?

to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

No.

And the one is the whole?

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, Of course.

middle, and end.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and the It will.

one is all of them and the whole, and they are all But, again, the middle will be equidistant from contained by the whole, the one will be contained the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?

by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

Yes.

That is true.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rec-But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—

tilinear or round, or a union of the two?

neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them.

True.

For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there And if this is the case, it will be both in itself were any one in which it was not, it could not be and in another too.

in all the parts; for the part in which it is want-81

Parmenides

ing is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, How?

how can it be in them all?

The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being It cannot.

in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for same, which is itself.

if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater True.

would be in the less, which is impossible.

And that which is ever in the same, must be Yes, impossible.

ever at rest?

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more Certainly.

than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never Certainly.

in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being motion?

a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

True.

Very true.

Then the one being always itself in itself and The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, must always be both at rest and in mo-other, but regarded as being all its parts, is in tion?

itself; and therefore the one must be itself in it-Clearly.

self and also in another.

And must be the same with itself, and other Certainly.

than itself; and also the same with the others, The one then, being of this nature, is of neces-and other than the others; this follows from its sity both at rest and in motion?

previous affections.