Then will the same ever be in the other, or the But if they are not other, either by reason of other in the same?
themselves or of the other, will they not alto-They will not.
gether escape being other than one another?
If then the other is never in the same, there is They will.
nothing in which the other is during any space of Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; time; for during that space of time, however small, otherwise it would not have been not-one, but the other would be in the same. Is not that true?
would have been in some way one.
Yes.
True.
And since the other is never in the same, it can Nor can the not-one be number; for having num-never be in anything that is.
ber, it would not have been not-one at all.
True.
It would not.
Then the other will never be either in the not-Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, one, or in the one?
would it not in that case partake of the one?
Certainly not.
It would.
Then not by reason of otherness is the one other If then, in every point of view, the one and the than the not-one, or the not-one other than the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part one.
or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part No.
or whole of the one?
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other No.
than one another, if not partaking of the other.
But we said that things which are neither parts How can they be?
nor wholes of one another, nor other than one 84
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another, will be the same with one another:—so Yes.
we said?
In virtue of the affection by which the one is Yes.
other than others and others in like manner other Then shall we say that the one, being in this than it, the one will be affected like the others relation to the not-one, is the same with it?
and the others like the one.
Let us say so.
How do you mean?
Then it is the same with itself and the others, I may take as an illustration the case of names: and also other than itself and the others.
You give a name to a thing?
That appears to be the inference.
Yes.
And it will also be like and unlike itself and the And you may say the name once or oftener?
others?
Yes.
Perhaps.
And when you say it once, you mention that of Since the one was shown to be other than the which it is the name? and when more than once, is others, the others will also be other than the one.
it something else which you mention? or must it Yes.
always be the same thing of which you speak, And the one is other than the others in the same whether you utter the name once or more than once?
degree that the others are other than it, and nei-Of course it is the same.
ther more nor less?
And is not ‘other’ a name given to a thing?
True.
Certainly.
And if neither more nor less, then in a like de-Whenever, then, you use the word ‘other, ’
gree?
whether once or oftener, you name that of which 85
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it is the name, and to no other do you give the Yes.
name?
And the other to the same?
True.
True again.
Then when we say that the others are other And the one was also shown to be the same than the one, and the one other than the others, with the others?
in repeating the word ‘other’ we speak of that Yes.
nature to which the name is applied, and of no And to be the same with the others is the op-other?
posite of being other than the others?
Quite true.
Certainly.
Then the one which is other than others, and And in that it was other it was shown to be the other which is other than the one, in that like?
the word ‘other’ is applied to both, will be in Yes.
the same condition; and that which is in the same But in that it was the same it will be unlike by condition is like?
virtue of the opposite affection to that which Yes.
made it like; and this was the affection of other-Then in virtue of the affection by which the ness.
one is other than the others, every thing will be Yes.
like every thing, for every thing is other than The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it every thing.
will not be the opposite of the other.
True.
True.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
Then the one will be both like and unlike the 86
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others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in Of course.
so far as it is the same.
Again, how far can the one touch or not touch Yes, that argument may be used.
itself and others?—consider.
And there is another argument.
I am considering.
What?
The one was shown to be in itself which was a In so far as it is affected in the same way it is whole?
not affected otherwise, and not being affected True.
otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is And also in other things?
like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is Yes.
otherwise, and being otherwise affected is un-In so far as it is in other things it would touch like.
other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would True.
be debarred from touching them, and would Then because the one is the same with the oth-touch itself only.
ers and other than the others, on either of these Clearly.
two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both Then the inference is that it would touch both?
like and unlike the others?
It would.
Certainly.
But what do you say to a new point of view?
And in the same way as being other than itself Must not that which is to touch another be next and the same with itself, on either of these two to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place grounds and on both of them, it will be like and nearest to that in which what it touches is situ-unlike itself?
ated?