Certainly.
it is named and expressed, and everything of this For all these reasons, then, the one is and be-kind which appertains to other things appertains comes older and younger than itself and the oth-to the one.
ers, and neither is nor becomes older or younger Certainly, that is true.
than itself or the others.
Yet once more and for the third time, let us Certainly.
consider: If the one is both one and many, as we But since the one partakes of time, and partakes have described, and is neither one nor many, and of becoming older and younger, must it not also participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is partake of the past, the present, and the future?
one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it Of course it must.
is not one, at times not partake of being?
Then the one was and is and will be, and was Certainly.
becoming and is becoming and will become?
But can it partake of being when not partaking Certainly.
of being, or not partake of being when partaking And there is and was and will be something of being?
which is in relation to it and belongs to it?
Impossible.
True.
Then the one partakes and does not partake of And since we have at this moment opinion and being at different times, for that is the only way in knowledge and perception of the one, there is which it can partake and not partake of the same.
opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
True.
Quite right.
And is there not also a time at which it assumes Then there is name and expression for it, and being and relinquishes being—for how can it have 99
Parmenides
and not have the same thing unless it receives And whenever it becomes like and unlike it and also gives it up at some time?
must be assimilated and dissimilated?
Impossible.
Yes.
And the assuming of being is what you would And when it becomes greater or less or equal call becoming?
it must grow or diminish or be equalized?
I should.
True.
And the relinquishing of being you would call And when being in motion it rests, and when destruction?
being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely I should.
be in no time at all?
The one then, as would appear, becomes and is How can it?
destroyed by taking and giving up being.
But that a thing which is previously at rest Certainly.
should be afterwards in motion, or previously in And being one and many and in process of be-motion and afterwards at rest, without experi-coming and being destroyed, when it becomes encing change, is impossible.
one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases Impossible.
to be one?
And surely there cannot be a time in which a Certainly.
thing can be at once neither in motion nor at And as it becomes one and many, must it not rest?
inevitably experience separation and aggrega-There cannot.
tion?
But neither can it change without changing.
Inevitably.
True.