Impossible.
Then the others are neither like nor unlike the Then the one will not be in the others as a one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the if they were like and unlike, or had in them like-others, and has no parts?
ness and unlikeness, they would have two na-Impossible.
tures in them opposite to one another.
Then there is no way in which the others can That is clear.
partake of the one, if they do not partake either But for that which partakes of nothing to parin whole or in part?
take of two things was held by us to be impos-It would seem not.
sible?
Then there is no way in which the others are Impossible.
one, or have in themselves any unity?
Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor There is not.
both, for if they were like or unlike they would Nor are the others many; for if they were many, partake of one of those two natures, which would each part of them would be a part of the whole; be one thing, and if they were both they would but now the others, not partaking in any way of partake of opposites which would be two things, the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, and this has been shown to be impossible.
nor part.
True.
True.
Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, Then the others neither are nor contain two or nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of be-three, if entirely deprived of the one?
coming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor True.
less, nor equal, nor have they experienced any-106
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thing else of the sort; for, if they are capable of They are entirely opposed.
experiencing any such affection, they will par-And suppose a person to say:—If greatness is ticipate in one and two and three, and odd and not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, even, and in these, as has been proved, they do does he not mean, whenever he uses such an not participate, seeing that they are altogether expression, that ‘what is not’ is other than other and in every way devoid of the one.
things?
Very true.
To be sure.
Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and And so when he says ‘If one is not’ he clearly also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other means, that what ‘is not’ is other than all oth-things.
ers; we know what he means—do we not?
Certainly.
Yes, we do.
2.a. Well, and ought we not to consider next When he says ‘one,’ he says something which what will be the consequence if the one is not?
is known; and secondly something which is other Yes; we ought.
than all other things; it makes no difference What is the meaning of the hypothesis—If the whether he predicate of one being or not-being, one is not; is there any difference between this for that which is said ‘not to be’ is known to be and the hypothesis—If the not one is not?
something all the same, and is distinguished from There is a difference, certainly.
other things.
Is there a difference only, or rather are not the Certainly.
two expressions—if the one is not, and if the not Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, one is not, entirely opposed?
what are the consequences? In the first place, as 107
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would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the True.
very meaning of the words, ‘if one is not,’ would Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since not be known.
it is not; but the one that is not may or rather True.
must participate in many things, if it and noth-Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could ing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor not be described as different from the others?
the one that is not is supposed not to be, and we Certainly.
are speaking of something of a different nature, Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowl-we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that edge; for in speaking of the one as different from the one that is not and nothing else is not, then the others, we do not speak of a difference in the it must participate in the predicate ‘that,’ and others, but in the one.
in many others.
Clearly so.
Certainly.
Moreover, the one that is not is something and And it will have unlikeness in relation to the partakes of relation to ‘that,’ and ‘this,’ and others, for the others being different from the
‘these,’ and the like, and is an attribute of ‘this’; one will be of a different kind.
for the one, or the others than the one, could not Certainly.
have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or And are not things of a different kind also other relative of the one that is not have been or been in kind?
spoken of, nor could it have been said to be any-Of course.
thing, if it did not partake of ‘some,’ or of the And are not things other in kind unlike?
other relations just now mentioned.
They are unlike.