What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
which is simply a relation of one man to another.
In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or But there is also an idea of mastership in the any one who maintains the existence of absolute abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery essences, will admit that they cannot exist in us.
in the abstract. These natures have nothing to No, said Socrates; for then they would be no do with us, nor we with them; they are concerned longer absolute.
with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do True, he said; and therefore when ideas are you see my meaning?
what they are in relation to one another, their Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
essence is determined by a relation among them-And will not knowledge—I mean absolute knowl-selves, and has nothing to do with the resem-edge—answer to absolute truth?
blances, or whatever they are to be termed, which Certainly.
are in our sphere, and from which we receive And each kind of absolute knowledge will an-this or that name when we partake of them. And swer to each kind of absolute being?
the things which are within our sphere and have Yes.
the same names with them, are likewise only But the knowledge which we have, will answer relative to one another, and not to the ideas which to the truth which we have; and again, each kind have the same names with them, but belong to of knowledge which we have, will be a knowl-themselves and not to them.
edge of each kind of being which we have?
What do you mean? said Socrates.
Certainly.
I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have Parmenides:—A master has a slave; now there is not, and cannot have?
nothing absolute in the relation between them, No, we cannot.