the two; another and another followed, until the entire family lay before
me, and a whole legion of jars covered the table and surrounding shelves;
the odor had become a pleasant perfume; and even now, the sight of an
old, six-inch, worm-eaten cork brings fragrant memories.
The whole group of haemulons was thus brought in review; and, whether
engaged upon the dissection of the internal organs, the preparation and ex-
amination of the bony framework, or the description of the various parts,
Agassiz’s training in the method of observing facts and their orderly ar-
rangement was ever accompanied by the urgent exhortation not to be con-
tent with them.
“Facts are stupid things,” he would say, “until brought into connection
with some general law.”
12
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
Chapter 2. The Nature of Learning: Recognition of Different Perspectives
At the end of eight months, it was almost with reluctance that I left these
friends and turned to insects; but what I had gained by this outside ex-
perience has been of greater value than years of later investigation in my
favorite groups.4
Facts and Theories
And we may add to Agassiz’s statement, “General Laws are ‘stupid’ things
until brought into connection and interrelation with philosophical theo-
ries.”
Generally speaking, when we seek facts, we are not looking for objects
in the world, instead we are genuinely attempting to discover what is true
or what is the case about an event or an object. In other words, much
of the time, “fact” is used as a suitable paraphrase for “true statement.”5
Some of the time, however, facts are thought to be independent of a world
view since newly proposed theories not only can conform to some well-
established facts but also can imply the existence of hitherto unknown
facts. Whether or not such a view of the relation of facts to theories is
entirely true or not, it is true that many facts are dependent on theories
for their existence. Hence, it is somewhat simplistic to suppose one must
always seek facts in order to explain some puzzling state of affairs be-
cause what is the case or what is true is often theory-dependent. Some-
what surprisingly, we will discover that almost always our view of the
facts “changes” as the theories that imply them change.
Another way to illustrate the difficulties involved with just seeking the
facts in order to account for the way things are, is to realize that in any
given situation, we simply cannot collect all the facts, even though our
initial presumption is we should leave no stone unturned. For example, if
we were to try to explain how this page got in this book, we would not go
about seeking every related fact before we invoke possible theories of how
this “page-event” occurred. The number of facts concerning this page are
limitless.
4.
Samuel H. Scudder, “In the Laboratory With Agassiz”, Every Saturday, (April 4,
1974) 16, 369-370.
5.
Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press,
1960, 44.
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
13
Chapter 2. The Nature of Learning: Recognition of Different Perspectives
Specifically, it is a fact that each letter of each word is a specific distance
from any given letter of another word. Each letter is a measurable dis-
tance from any given object in the universe—for example, the distance to
a ballerina on a New York stage.6 The facts relevant to the state of affairs
described as “the page being in the book” increase and change over time
as the ballerina moves, and, of course, the facts change as we uncomfort-
ably fidget while considering the implications of this example. Therefore,
we are able to collect as many facts as we please and still not have them
all.
In order to make sense of a given state of affairs in the world, we must se-
lect only some of the facts—presumably, the relevant and important ones.
But how can we know beforehand which of the facts will be relevant and
important? We need some sort of criterion or rule for selection. In other
words, in order to find the relevant facts, we need a theory or at least a
few ruling assumptions involving what is appropriate in situations similar
to this one. We find out the specific relevant facts by applying a theory in
order to determine what facts we think should be considered in our expla-
nation. At this point our discussion may have become a bit too abstract for
an introductory philosophy reading. Perhaps, a specific example can clar-
ify by illustrating the point of what is meant by saying “facts are normally
theory-dependent.”
Facts Are Often Theory-Dependent
Suppose you and your astronomer-friend are camping along the
Appalachian Trail in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia. As you
awake at dawn from the first sound of stirring wildlife, you sleepily
notice a rosy, picturesque sunrise.7 With a bit of alarm you anticipate
rain showers and a muddy hike ahead. As you rouse your friend, you
comment, “Look at that sunrise; we’re in for trouble.” Assume, moreover,
your friend dimly responds with a slow yawn, “I see the sun, but there is
no sunrise today or, for that matter, any day.”
6.
Newton’s law of gravitation is “Every object in the universe attracts every other
object with a force directed along the line of centers of the two objects that is propor-
tional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the
separation of the two objects.”
7.
“Red in the morning is a sailor’s sure warning.”
14
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
Chapter 2. The Nature of Learning: Recognition of Different Perspectives
What do you say? Is your friend’s statement sensible? Presumably his eye-
sight is just as good as yours, and evidently he is looking where you are
looking. Yet, your friend is apparently claiming he does not see what you
see. You see the sunrise; he apparently is stating he does not. Now, is there
any chance you could be mistaken? Let’s pause just a moment and see if
this exchange makes any sense.
You do see the sun rising today, and you have seen it rise countless times
in the past. Your friend, however claims not only is there no sunrise today,
but there has never been a sunrise. Is this disagreement a misunderstanding
over the meaning of words, a misunderstanding due to personal feelings,
or a misunderstanding concerning relevant facts at hand? Also, assuming
we know what kind of dispute it is, how should we go about resolving it?
Sunrise in Smoky Mountains, Clingman’s Dome, NC
You would have to be a gentle person to think this far without suspect-
ing, perhaps in some exasperation, that your friend is half-asleep, does not
know what he is saying, or has some other kind of brain-trouble. However,
in order to make this disagreement a bit more interesting, let us further
suppose that your friend is beginning to warm up to the strange looks you
are giving him and proposes a bet. If you can convince him that the sun is
rising after all, he will prepare all meals and wash all utensils for the re-
mainder of the camping trip; if not, then you will prepare all the remaining
meals and wash the utensils.
Would you take the bet? Only a cursory look at the remains of the previous
night’s repast might be sufficient to convince you to accept the wager.
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
15
Chapter 2. The Nature of Learning: Recognition of Different Perspectives
After all, everybody knows the sun rises every morning whether we see
it or not.8 It is difficult to resist the payoff; you accept the bet and begin
thinking about proving your case.
From the reading. . .
“I see the sun, but there is no sunrise today. . . ”
On the one hand, how do you go about proving such an obvious and well-
known truism? If you proceed somewhat systematically, you might first
begin by getting clear and obtaining agreement about the meaning of any
key terms in the dispute. Most important, what does “sunrise” mean? Once
the significant terms are defined, then facts can be sought to verify the
hypothesis. Let us suppose your friend will reply something along the lines
of “sunrise” means “the usual daily movement above the eastern horizon
of the star which is the center of our solar system.” Second, you might
seek to show him that the facts correspond exactly to his definition. That
is, while eagerly anticipating his preparing of breakfast, you simply point
out the observation that the sun is rising above the horizon, as expected.
Finally, you could note that no undue feelings or attitudes have shaped
your position on this issue and cloud the judgments and observations of
either you or your friend, the other disputant.
On the other hand—let’s say you are beginning to be hungry—no telling
how long your dim-witted friend will hold out before admitting that he
actually does see the sun rising in the sky. O.K., the sun does move rather
slowly. Why not put the burden of proof on him? Let him prove that the sun
is not rising. We often take the approach of assuming we are right if our
beliefs cannot be disproved.9 Thus, here in the Blue Ridge Mountains you
8.
Note the argumentum ad populum.
9.
Note how this presumption, as well as the friend’s original bet could be viewed
as an example of an ad ignorantiam fallacy. If a statement or a point of view cannot be proved beyond a shadow of doubt, then that statement or point of view cannot
be known to be mistaken. The ad ignorantiam fallacy occurs whenever it is asserted that if no proof of a statement or argument exists, then that statement or argument
is incorrect. The error in reasoning is seen when we realize nothing can be validly
concluded from the fact that if you can’t prove something right now, then the opposite
view must be true.
16
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
Chapter 2. The Nature of Learning: Recognition of Different Perspectives
put the question directly to your friend. “What could you possibly mean
by saying, ‘The sun doesn’t rise and isn’t rising right now’? Just look!”
Your friend sleepily replies, “Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in
the east as dawn?”10
Alas, you probably remember that Tycho Brahe, as well as most other
folks at the time, thought that the earth was the center of the heavens.
Kepler was one of the first persons to regard the earth as revolving around
the sun. If the earth moves around the sun, then it appears as though your
friend is correct. The sun does not really rise, the earth turns. Even worse,
he’s apparently right when he said the sun has never risen.
Doesn’t it seem that by now our culture would have this simple fact en-
trenched in our ordinary language? We do see the sun rise; we do believe
the sun rises. Aren’t these facts? Accordingly, both you and your friend do
not really have the same visual experience since your conceptual interpre-
tation of what you see differs from what he sees. Even though the patterns
of light and color are the similar for you and him, what you experience
is largely dependent on the theoretical perspective from which you view
the event. Just as we cannot know a foreign language only by listening, so
also we cannot know the sun rises only by seeing. It is not at all unusual
for two skilled investigators to disagree about their observations, if each is
interpreting the the data or “facts of the case” according to different con-
ceptual frameworks.11 Just as your mind-set affects what you see, so also
your awareness of other mental perspectives can affect what you know.
The learning of new perspectives is what, in large measure, philosophy is
all about.
From the reading. . .
“We find out the specific relevant facts by applying a theory in order
to determine what facts we think should be considered in our explana-
tion.”
10. For a detailed analysis of this question, see Norwood Russell Hanson’s Patterns
of Discovery, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 5.
11. Frederick Grinnell. The Scientific Attitude. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978, 15.
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
17
Chapter 2. The Nature of Learning: Recognition of Different Perspectives
Solar System, BNSC © HMG
Related Ideas
Project
Gutenberg
(http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext04).
The
Project Gutenberg EBook of Louis Agassiz as a Teacher A compilation
by Lane Cooper of descriptions of Agassiz’s teaching methods by several
well known former students.
Topics Worth Investigating
1. What is a fact? What are the different kinds of facts? Can we be mis-
taken about the facts? Do facts change with new discoveries? Are
facts discovered or are they constructs of theories?
2. In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein indicates
the aim of philosophy is “To shew the fly the way out of the
fly-bottle.”12 In what ways is this precisely the same problem facing
Samuel Scudder when he sits before Hæmulon elegans? What is the
difference between finding a method and using a method?
3. If the same state of affairs is seen from two different conceptual
frameworks, are there different facts involved? How can facts
implied by different theories be compared? Can one structurally
“translate” from theory to theory?
12. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan, 1953,
§309.
18
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
Chapter 3
The Nature of Philosophical
Inquiry
Ideas of Interest From “Nature of
Philosophical Inquiry”
Messier 81, NASA, JPL
1. How is philosophy provisionally defined in this chapter?
2. In what ways does Alexander Calandra’s “Barometer Story” illustrate
the philosophical approach to a practical problem? What do you think
is the difference between thinking about the methods for solving a
19
Chapter 3. The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry
problem and applying a method for solving a problem?
3. What are some of the differences between philosophy and science?
4. Briefly characterize the main branches of philosophy.
5. Do you think the kinds of distinct things that exist in the universe
are independent of the concepts we use for description? Consider the
following koans: “Where does my fist go when I open my hand?”
“Where does my lap go when I stand up?”
From the reading. . .
“. . . some people characterize a philosophical problem as any question
that does not have a well-established method of solution, but that defi-
nition is undoubtedly too broad.”
Characterization of Philosophy
One reasonably good beginning characterization of philosophy is that phi-
losophy is the sustained inquiry into the principles and presuppositions of
any field of inquiry. As such, philosophy is not a subject of study like other
subjects of study. Any given field of inquiry has philosophical roots and ex-
tensions. From the philosophy of restaurant management to philosophy of
physics, philosophy can be characterized as an attitude, an approach, or
perhaps, even a calling, to ask, answer, or even just comment upon certain
kinds of questions. These questions involve the nature, scope, and bound-
aries of that field of interest. In general, then, philosophy is both an activity
involving thinking about these kinds of ultimate questions and an activity
involving the construction of sound reasons or insights into our most basic
assumptions about the universe and our lives.
Quite often, simply asking a series of “why-questions” can reveal these
basic presuppositions. Children often ask such questions, sometimes to
the annoyance of their parents, in order to get a feel for the way the world
works. Asking an exhaustive sequence of “why-questions” can reveal prin-
ciples upon which life is based. As a first example, let us imagine the fol-
20
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
Chapter 3. The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry
lowing dialogue between two persons as to why one of them is reading
this philosophy book. Samantha is playing “devil’s advocate.”
Samantha: “ Why are you reading Reading for Philosophical Inquiry?”
Stephen: “It’s an assigned book in philosophy, one of my college courses.”
Samantha: “Why take philosophy?”
Stephen: “Well, philosophy fulfills the humanities elective.”
Samantha: “Why do you need that elective?”
At this point in the dialog, a growing resemblance to the insatiable curios-
ity of some children is beginning to be unmistakable. We continue with
the cross-examination.
Stephen: “I have to fulfill the humanities elective in order to graduate.”
Samantha: “Why do you want to graduate?”
Stephen: “What? Well, I’d like to get a decent job which pays a decent
salary.”
Samantha:“Well, why, then, do you want that?”
Undoubtedly, at this point, the conversation seems artificial because for
some persons, the goal of graduating college is about as far as they have
thought their life through, if, indeed, they have thought that far—and so for
such persons this is where the questioning would have normally stopped.
Other persons, however, can see beyond college to more basic ends such
as Stephen’s want of an interesting vocation with sufficient recompense,
among other things. Even so, we have not yet arrived at the kind of ba-
sic presuppositions we have been talking about for Stephen’s life, so we
continue with Samantha’s questioning.
Stephen: “What do you mean? A good job which pays well will enable me
the resources to have an enjoyable life where I can do some of the important
things I want to do.”
Samantha: “Why do you want a life like that?”
Stephen: “Huh? Are you serious?”
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
21
Chapter 3. The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry
When questions finally seem to make no sense, very often, we have
reached one of those ultimate fundamental unquestioned assumptions. In
this case, a basic principle by which Stephen lives his life seems to be
based on seeking happiness. So, in a sense, although he might not be
aware of it at the moment, he believes he is working toward this goal
by reading this textbook. Of course, his choice of a means to obtain
happiness could be mistaken or perhaps even chosen in ignorance—in
which case he might not be able to obtain what he wants out of life. If
the thought occurs to you that it is sometimes the case that we might
not be mistaken about our choices and might actually be choosing
knowledgeably and even so might not achieve what we desire, then you
are already doing philosophy.
If we assume that Samantha is genuinely asking questions here and has
no ulterior motive, then it is evident that her questions relate to a basic
presupposition upon which Stephen is basing his life. Perhaps, she thinks
the quest for a well-paying job is mistaken or is insufficient for an excellent
life. Indirectly, she might be assuming that other fundamental values are
more important. If the questioning were to continue between Samantha
and Stephen, it quite possibly could go along the lines of attempting to
uncover some of these additional presuppositions upon which a life of
excellence can be based.
In philosophy these kinds of questions are often about the assumptions,
presuppositions, postulates, or definitions upon which a field of inquiry
is based, and these questions can be concerned with the meaning, signif-
icance, or integration of the results discovered or proposed by a field of
inquiry.1
For example, the answer “Gravity” is often thought to be a meaningful
answer to the question, “Why do objects fall in the direction toward the
center of the earth?” But for this answer to be meaningful we would have
to know what gravity is. If one were to answer “a kind of force,” or “ an
1.
Our
characterization
here
omits
what
are
sometimes
termed
the
“antiphilosophies” such as postmodernism, a philosophy opposing the possibil-
ity of objectivity and truth, and existentialism, a group of philosophies dismissing
the notion that the universe is in any sense rational, coherent, or intelligible. The
characterization of philosophy proposed in the text is provisional and is used as a
stalking horse for the discipline.
22
Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction
Chapter 3. The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry
attraction” between two objects, then the paraphrase gives no insight into
the nature of what gravity is, for the paraphrase is viciously circular.
Many scientists hold the view that, “If we know the rules, we consider that
we ‘understand’ the world.”2 The rules for gravity are:
. . . every object in the universe attracts every other object with a force which
for any two bodies is proportional to the mass of each and varies inversely as
the square of the distance between them.
. . . an object responds to a force by accelerating in the direction of the force
by an amount that is inversely proportional to the mass of the object. . . 3
Yet, there must be more to understanding gravity than this. Consider a
mentalist who stands before a door and concentrates deeply. Suppose the
door opens, and no one, neither scientist nor magician, is able to see how
the mentalist accomplishes the opening of the door. So we ask, “How did
you do that?”
The mentalist responds, “Smavity.”
We reply, “What is ‘smavity’?”
The mentalist says, “Smavity is a force—an attraction between me and the
door.”
The scientist on the scene observes and measures:
The mentalist attracts the door with a force which b