[1] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 237.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 178.
[3] Zeller III. 38; Ritter IV. 277.
[4] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 231.
The two Tropes are founded on the principle that anything must
be known through itself or through something else. It cannot be
known through itself, because of the discord existing between
all things of the senses and intellect, nor can it be known
through something else, as then either the _regressus in infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow.[1]
Diogenes
Laertius does not refer to these two Tropes.
In regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of judgment,
Sextus has well remarked in his introduction to them, that they
are included in the eighth, or that of relation.[2]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 178-179.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 39.
_The Tropes of Aetiology_. The eight Tropes against causality
belong chronologically before the five Tropes of Agrippa, in the
history of the development of sceptical thought. They have a
much closer connection with the spirit of Scepticism than the
Tropes of Agrippa, including, as they do, the fundamental
thought of Pyrrhonism, _i.e._, that the phenomena do not reveal
the unknown.
The Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they denied that
the phenomena are signs capable of being interpreted, or of
revealing the reality of causes. It is impossible by a research
of the signs to find out the unknown, or the explanation of
things, as the Stoics and Epicureans claim. The theory of
Aenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes
against aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows:[1]
"There are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who
believe in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion."
This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller explanation of it given later on by Sextus.[2] If phenomena are
not signs of the unknown there is no causality, and a refutation
of causality is a proof of the impossibility of science, as all
science is the science of causes, the power of studying causes
from effects, or as Sextus calls them, phenomena.
It is very noticeable to any one who reads the refutation of
causality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus,[3] that there is
no reference to the strongest argument of modern Scepticism,
since the time of Hume, against causality, namely that the
origin of the idea of causality cannot be so accounted for as to
justify our relying upon it as a form of cognition.[4]
[1] _Myriob._ 170 B. 12.
[2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 207.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 180-186.
[4] Ueberweg _Op. cit._ p. 217.
The eight Tropes are directed against the possibility of knowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested against in all
his Tropes, the ten as well as the eight.[1] They are written
from a materialistic standpoint. These Tropes are given with
illustrations by Fabricius as follows: I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen,
it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to
phenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance of
the planets by a musical proportion.
II. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given for
the same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain
the inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source,
while there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or the
action of the sun.
III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causes
presented do not show any order, as for example, the motion of
the stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does not
take into account the order that reigns among them.
IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way
as phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as the
appearance of images in a dark room.
V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree
with their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but not
with common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atoms
like Epicurus, by homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and
form like Aristotle.
VI. Theories are accepted which agree with individual hypotheses, and others equally probable are passed by, as
Aristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection of
vapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory of
the universe.
VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only
with individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit
like Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which was
incompatible with the necessity which he advocated.
VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equally inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the
attraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some.[2]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 98.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z.
Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but he
gives a _resumé_ of the general arguments of the Sceptics
against aetiology,[1] which has less in common with the eight
Tropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subject
by Sextus later,[2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to
show [Greek: mêden einai aition]. Although the Tropes of Aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character,
it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so
prominent with Sextus, between the signs [Greek: hypomnêstika]
and [Greek: endeiktika],[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his
argument on the subject with the general assertion,
[Greek:
Sêmeion ouk einai],[4] and proceeds to introduce the logical
consequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of the
Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the _Hypotyposes_,
by Sextus:--"A cause in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhaps
not possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogether
disagree."[5]
It is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of
these Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that causality has only a
subjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an
argument against its real existence, and the same argument is
used by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of
thought.[6]
Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false and
sophistical,[7] but as Maccoll has well said, they are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and are
directed against the false method of observing facts through the
light of preconceived opinion.[8] They have, however, a stronger
critical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency of
the thought of Aenesidemus.
[1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98.
[2] _Hyp._ III. 24-28.
[3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 151.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 96.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 185.
[6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 77.
[7] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 507.
[8] Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 88.
CHAPTER IV.
_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus._
A paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which has
given rise to much speculation and many different theories, is
the comparison which Sextus makes of Scepticism with the philosophy of Heraclitus.[1] In this paragraph the statement is
made that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri ton
Ainêsidêmon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy
of Heraclitus, because the doctrine that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the
way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality
applicable to the same thing.[2] [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainêsidêmon elegon hodon einai tên skeptikên agôgên epi tên
Hêrakleiteion philosophian, dioti proêgeitai tou tanantia peri
to auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As the
Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans come from this to
the more positive doctrine that they are in reality so.[3]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 210.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 210.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 210.
This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have affirmed
between Scepticism and the philosophy of Heraclitus is earnestly
combated by Sextus, who declares that the fact that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same
thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but a fact which presents
itself to all men, and not to the Sceptics only. No one for
instance, whether he be a Sceptic or not, would dare to say that
honey does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to
those who have the jaundice, so that Heraclitus begins from a
preconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps to
the other schools of philosophy as well.[1] As the statement
concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard
to the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, then
Scepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus
than to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use
common subject matter. "But we are afraid that the Sceptical
School not only does not help towards the knowledge of the
philosophy of Heraclitus, but even hinders that result.
Since
the Sceptic accuses Heraclitus of having rashly dogmatised,
presenting on the one hand the doctrine of
'conflagration' and
on the other that 'contradictory predicates are in reality
applicable to the same thing.'"[2] "It is absurd, then, to say
that this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it
conflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the Sceptical
School is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus."[3]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 211.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 212.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 212.
This is not the only place in the writings of Sextus which
states that Aenesidemus at some time of his life was an advocate
of the doctrines of Heraclitus. In no instance, however, where
Sextus refers to this remarkable fact, does he offer any explanation of it, or express any bitterness against Aenesidemus, whom he always speaks of with respect as a leader
of the Sceptical School. We are thus furnished with one of the
most difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem of
reconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus of the teachings of Heraclitus with his position in the Sceptical
School.
A comparison with each other of the references made by Sextus
and other writers to the teachings of Aenesidemus, and a consideration of the result, gives us two pictures of Aenesidemus which conflict most decidedly with each other. We
have on the one hand, the man who was the first to give Pyrrhonism a position as an influential school, and the first to
collect and present to the world the results of preceding
Sceptical thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of
[Greek: epochê], and perhaps in part their author, and the
author of the eight Tropes against aetiology.[1] He develops his
Scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor the
intellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality.[2] He
denied the possibility of studying phenomena as signs of the
unknown.[3] He denied all possibility of truth, and the reality
of motion, origin and decay. There was according to his teaching
no pleasure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good.
He
denied the possibility of finding out the nature of things, or
of proving the existence of the gods, and finally he declared
that no ethical aim is possible.
[1] _Hyp._ I. 180.
[2] Photius 170, B. 12.
[3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 40.
The picture on the other hand, presented to us by Sextus and
Tertullian, is that of a man with a system of beliefs and
dogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy of Heraclitus. In
strange contradiction to his assertion of the impossibility of
all knowledge, he advocates a theory that the original substance
is air,[1] which is most certainly a dogma, although indeed a
deviation from the teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sextus
seemed unconscious, as he says, [Greek: to te on kata ton
Hêrakleiton aêr estin, hôs physin ho Ainêsidêmos].
Aenesidemus
dogmatised also regarding number and time and unity of the
original world-stuff.[2] He seems to have dogmatised further
about motion,[3] and about the soul.[4]
If Sextus' language is taken according to its apparent meaning,
we find ourselves here in the presence of a system of beliefs
which would be naturally held by a follower of the Stoic-Heraclitan physics,[5] and absolutely inexplicable from
the standpoint of a man who advocated so radical a Scepticism as
Aenesidemus. Sextus in the passage that we first quoted,[6]
expresses great indignation against the idea that Scepticism
could form the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, but he does
not express surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus personally, or offer any explanation of the apparent contradiction; and while his writings abound in references to
him as a respected leader of the Sceptical School, he sometimes
seems to include him with the Dogmatics, mentioning him with the
[Greek: dogmatikôn philosophôn].[7] In fact, the task of presenting any consistent history of the development of thought
through which Aenesidemus passed is such a puzzling one, that
Brochard brilliantly remarks that possibly the best attitude to
take towards it would be to follow the advice of Aenesidemus
himself, and suspend one's judgment altogether regarding it. Is
it possible to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as
Aenesidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions?
[1] _Adv. Math._ X. 233.
[2] _Adv. Math._ IX. 337; X. 216.
[3] _Adv. Math._ X. 38.
[4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 349.
[5] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 33.
[6] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.
[7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; X. 215.
The conjecture that he was first a Heraclitan Stoic, and later a
Sceptic, which might be possible, does not offer any explanation
of Sextus' statement, that he regarded Scepticism as a path to
the philosophy of Heraclitus. Nor would it be logical to think
that after establishing the Sceptical School in renewed influence and power, he reverted to the Heraclitan theories as
they were modified by the Stoics. These same theories were the
cause of his separation from the Academy, for his chief accusation against the Academy was that it was adopting the
dogmatism of the Stoics.[1] The matter is complicated by the
fact that Tertullian also attributes to Aenesidemus anthropological and physical teachings that agree with the
Stoical Heraclitan doctrines. It is not strange that in view of
these contradictory assertions in regard to the same man, some
have suggested the possibility that they referred to two different men of the same name, a supposition, however, that no
one has been able to authoritatively vindicate.
Let us consider briefly some of the explanations which have been
attempted of the apparent heresy of Aenesidemus towards the
Sceptical School. We will begin with the most ingenious, that of
Pappenheim.[2]
Pappenheim claims that Sextus was not referring to Aenesidemus
himself in these statements which he joins with his name. In the
most important of these, the one quoted from the _Hypotyposes_,[3] which represents Aenesidemus as claiming that
Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, the
expression used is [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainêsidêmon], and in
many of the other places where Sextus refers to the dogmatic
statements of Aenesidemus, the expression is either
[Greek: hoi
peri ton Ainêsidêmon], or [Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath'
Hêrakleiton], while when Sextus quotes Aenesidemus to sustain
Scepticism, he uses his name alone.
[1] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 16.
[2] _Die angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos_, Berlin 1889.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.
Pappenheim thinks that Sextus' conflict was not with the dead
Aenesidemus, who had lived two centuries before him, but with
his own contemporaries. He also seeks to prove that Sextus could
not have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus
from any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by the ancients, nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which
could well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Diogenes
mentions any such book.
Pappenheim also makes much of the argument that Sextus in no
instance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part of Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his alleged
teachings, but in referring to him personally he always speaks
of him with great respect.
Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic of Sextus was
against contemporaries, those who accepted the philosophy of
Heraclitus in consequence of, or in some connection with, the
teachings of Aenesidemus. He entirely ignores the fact that
there is no trace of any such school or sect in history, calling
themselves followers of "Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus,"
but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in
Alexandria at the time of Sextus, where so many different sects
were found. Sextus use Aenesidemus' name in four different
ways:--alone, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidêmon], [Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath' Hêrakleiton], and in one instance
[Greek: hoi
peri ton Ainêsidêmon kath' Hêrakleiton].[1]
[1] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8.
Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries
against whom Sextus directed his arguments had written a book
entitled [Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath' Hêrakleiton], to prove the
harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus, and that it was from
this book that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he
introduced with that formula. He claims, further, that the
passage quoted from _Hypotyposes I._ even, is directed against contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs of
the harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus on the connection
of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the
Sceptics: "Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same
thing," with the apparent deduction from this, that
"Contrary
predicates in reality apply to the same thing." Sextus wishes,
according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that
they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus does not report
Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrines
of Heraclitus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor
consequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, these
dogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but
refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Sceptics
while they accepted the teachings of Heraclitus. Sextus naturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preserve
Pyrrhonism pure.
Brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of Aenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question.[1]
He starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which we
shall consider later, that Aenesidemus had passed through one
change of opinion already when he severed his connection with
the New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such a
change has already made us familiar with, he adds a third.
Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different
beliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims
that such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is
logical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem
from the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but
rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings
of Heraclitus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the
extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The
Sceptic says, "Contradictory predicates are apparently applicable to the same thing," and Aenesidemus accepts the
Heraclitan result--"Contradictory predicates are in reality
applicable to the same thing." From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus
would seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying
that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. He
does not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it incomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would
naturally ask, "Whence come these contradictory appearances?"
After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he
doubts. The system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he
accepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the
soul because they are an expression of reality.
[1] Brochard _Op. cit._ 272.
As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he does
not find that the statement of Heraclitus disproves this, but
rather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existence
of science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it.
Brochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus
should have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras
was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion,
Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory
predicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of the
foundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him a
Sceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves his
rank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School.
Coming now to the opinion of Zeller,[1] we find that he advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of Sextus.
The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simple
fact that Sextus had not understood Aenesidemus; and as Tertullian and Sextus agree in this misconception of the views
of Aenesidemus, they must have been misled by consulting a
common author in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what
Aenesidemus said of Heraclitus with his own opinion.
Zeller
maintains that the expression so often repeated by Sextus--[Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath' Hêrakleiton]--shows that some
one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Heraclitus'
doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many
authorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justify
his quotations fr