Sophist – Plato
Or he may be descended from the acquisitive and cleaning and other humble processes, some art in the combative line, through the pugna-of which have ludicrous names. Not that dialec-cious, the controversial, the disputatious arts; tic is a respecter of names or persons, or a de-and he will be found at last in the eristic section spiser of humble occupations; nor does she think of the latter, and in that division of it which dis-much of the greater or less benefits conferred putes in private for gain about the general prin-by them. For her aim is knowledge; she wants to ciples of right and wrong.
know how the arts are related to one another, And still there is a track of him which has not and would quite as soon learn the nature of hunt-yet been followed out by us. Do not our house-ing from the vermin-destroyer as from the gen-hold servants talk of sifting, straining, winnow-eral. And she only desires to have a general ing? And they also speak of carding, spinning, name, which shall distinguish purifications of the and the like. All these are processes of division; soul from purifications of the body.
and of division there are two kinds,—one in which Now purification is the taking away of evil; and like is divided from like, and another in which there are two kinds of evil in the soul,—the one the good is separated from the bad. The latter of answering to disease in the body, and the other the two is termed purification; and again, of to deformity. Disease is the discord or war of purification, there are two sorts,—of animate opposite principles in the soul; and deformity is bodies (which may be internal or external), and the want of symmetry, or failure in the attain-of inanimate. Medicine and gymnastic are the ment of a mark or measure. The latter arises from internal purifications of the animate, and bath-ignorance, and no one is voluntarily ignorant; ing the external; and of the inanimate, fulling ignorance is only the aberration of the soul mov-28
Sophist – Plato
ing towards knowledge. And as medicine cures been cleaned out; and the soul of the Great King the diseases and gymnastic the deformity of the himself, if he has not undergone this purifica-body, so correction cures the injustice, and edu-tion, is unclean and impure.
cation (which differs among the Hellenes from And who are the ministers of the purification?
mere instruction in the arts) cures the ignorance Sophists I may not call them. Yet they bear about of the soul. Again, ignorance is twofold, simple the same likeness to Sophists as the dog, who is ignorance, and ignorance having the conceit of the gentlest of animals, does to the wolf, who is knowledge. And education is also twofold: there the fiercest. Comparisons are slippery things; but is the old-fashioned moral training of our forefa-for the present let us assume the resemblance thers, which was very troublesome and not very of the two, which may probably be disallowed successful; and another, of a more subtle nature, hereafter. And so, from division comes purifica-which proceeds upon a notion that all ignorance tion; and from this, mental purification; and from is involuntary. The latter convicts a man out of mental purification, instruction; and from in-his own mouth, by pointing out to him his instruction, education; and from education, the consistencies and contradictions; and the conse-nobly-descended art of Sophistry, which is enquence is that he quarrels with himself, instead gaged in the detection of conceit. I do not how-of quarrelling with his neighbours, and is cured ever think that we have yet found the Sophist, of prejudices and obstructions by a mode of treat-or that his will ultimately prove to be the de-ment which is equally entertaining and effectual.
sired art of education; but neither do I think that The physician of the soul is aware that his pa-he can long escape me, for every way is blocked.
tient will receive no nourishment unless he has Before we make the final assault, let us take 29
Sophist – Plato
breath, and reckon up the many forms which he knows? ‘Impossible.’ Then what is the trick of has assumed: (1) he was the paid hunter of his art, and why does he receive money from his wealth and birth; (2) he was the trader in the admirers? ‘Because he is believed by them to goods of the soul; (3) he was the retailer of them; know all things.’ You mean to say that he seems (4) he was the manufacturer of his own learned to have a knowledge of them? ‘Ye s . ’
wares; (5) he was the disputant; and (6) he was Suppose a person were to say, not that he would the purger away of prejudices—although this lat-dispute about all things, but that he would make ter point is admitted to be doubtful.
all things, you and me, and all other creatures, Now, there must surely be something wrong in the earth and the heavens and the gods, and the professor of any art having so many names would sell them all for a few pence—this would and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very numbe a great jest; but not greater than if he said ber of them imply that the nature of his art is not that he knew all things, and could teach them in understood? And that we may not be involved in a short time, and at a small cost. For all imita-the misunderstanding, let us observe which of his tion is a jest, and the most graceful form of jest.
characteristics is the most prominent. Above all Now the painter is a man who professes to make things he is a disputant. He will dispute and teach all things, and children, who see his pictures at others to dispute about things visible and invis-a distance, sometimes take them for realities: ible—about man, about the gods, about politics, and the Sophist pretends to know all things, and about law, about wrestling, about all things. But he, too, can deceive young men, who are still at can he know all things? ‘He cannot.’ How then a distance from the truth, not through their eyes, can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who but through their ears, by the mummery of 30
Sophist – Plato
words, and induce them to believe him. But as not-being is.’ And the words prove themselves!
they grow older, and come into contact with re-Not-being cannot be attributed to any being; for alities, they learn by experience the futility of his how can any being be wholly abstracted from pretensions. The Sophist, then, has not real knowl-being? Again, in every predication there is an edge; he is only an imitator, or image-maker.
attribution of singular or plural. But number is And now, having got him in a corner of the the most real of all things, and cannot be attrib-dialectical net, let us divide and subdivide until uted to not-being. Therefore not-being cannot be we catch him. Of image-making there are two predicated or expressed; for how can we say ‘is,’
kinds,—the art of making likenesses, and the art
‘are not,’without number?
of making appearances. The latter may be illus-And now arises the greatest difficulty of all. If trated by sculpture and painting, which often not-being is inconceivable, how can not-being be use illusions, and alter the proportions of figures, refuted? And am I not contradicting myself at in order to adapt their works to the eye. And the this moment, in speaking either in the singular Sophist also uses illusions, and his imitations are or the plural of that to which I deny both plural-apparent and not real. But how can anything be ity and unity? You, Theaetetus, have the might an appearance only? Here arises a difficulty of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, which has always beset the subject of appear-if you can, to find an expression for not-being ances. For the argument is asserting the exist-which does not imply being and number. ‘But I ence of not-being. And this is what the great cannot.’ Then the Sophist must be left in his Parmenides was all his life denying in prose and hole. We may call him an image-maker if we also in verse. ‘You will never find,’ he says, ‘that please, but he will only say, ‘And pray, what is 31
Sophist – Plato
an image?’ And we shall reply, ‘A reflection in falsehood, or false opinion, or imitation, with-the water, or in a mirror’; and he will say, ‘Let out falling into a contradiction. You observe how us shut our eyes and open our minds; what is unwilling I am to undertake the task; for I know the common notion of all images?’ ‘I should that I am exposing myself to the charge of in-answer, Such another, made in the likeness of consistency in asserting the being of not-being.
the true.’ Real or not real? ‘Not real; at least, But if I am to make the attempt, I think that I not in a true sense.’ And the real ‘is,’ and the had better begin at the beginning.
not-real ‘is not’? ‘Yes.’ Then a likeness is reLightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides ally unreal, and essentially not. Here is a pretty and others told us tales about the origin of the complication of being and not-being, in which universe: one spoke of three principles warring the many-headed Sophist has entangled us. He and at peace again, marrying and begetting chil-will at once point out that he is compelling us to dren; another of two principles, hot and cold, contradict ourselves, by affirming being of not-dry and moist, which also formed relationships.
being. I think that we must cease to look for him There were the Eleatics in our part of the world, in the class of imitators.
saying that all things are one; whose doctrine But ought we to give him up? ‘I should say, begins with Xenophanes, and is even older.
certainly not.’ Then I fear that I must lay hands Ionian, and, more recently, Sicilian muses speak on my father Parmenides; but do not call me a of a one and many which are held together by parricide; for there is no way out of the difficulty enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meet-except to show that in some sense not-being is; ing. Some of them do not insist on the perpetual and if this is not admitted, no one can speak of strife, but adopt a gentler strain, and speak of 32
Sophist – Plato
alternation only. Whether they are right or not, name of nothing or of itself, i.e. of a name. Again, who can say? But one thing we can say—that they the notion of being is conceived of as a whole—in went on their way without much caring whether the words of Parmenides, ‘like every way unto we understood them or not. For tell me, a rounded sphere.’ And a whole has parts; but Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean that which has parts is not one, for unity has no by their assertion of unity, or by their combina-parts. Is being, then, one, because the parts of tions and separations of two or more principles?
being are one, or shall we say that being is not a I used to think, when I was young, that I knew whole? In the former case, one is made up of all about not-being, and now I am in great diffi-parts; and in the latter there is still plurality, viz.
culties even about being.
being, and a whole which is apart from being.
Let us proceed first to the examination of be-And being, if not all things, lacks something of ing. Turning to the dualist philosophers, we say the nature of being, and becomes not-being. Nor to them: Is being a third element besides hot can being ever have come into existence, for and cold? or do you identify one or both of the nothing comes into existence except as a whole; two elements with being? At any rate, you can nor can being have number, for that which has hardly avoid resolving them into one. Let us next number is a whole or sum of number. These are interrogate the patrons of the one. To them we a few of the difficulties which are accumulating say: Are being and one two different names for one upon another in the consideration of being.
the same thing? But how can there be two names We may proceed now to the less exact sort of when there is nothing but one? Or you may iden-philosophers. Some of them drag down every-tify them; but then the name will be either the thing to earth, and carry on a war like that of 33
Sophist – Plato
the giants, grasping rocks and oaks in their is the common nature which is attributed to hands. Their adversaries defend themselves them by the term “being” or “existence”?’
warily from an invisible world, and reduce the And, as they are incapable of answering this substances of their opponents to the minutest question, we may as well reply for them, that fractions, until they are lost in generation and being is the power of doing or suffering. Then flux. The latter sort are civil people enough; but we turn to the friends of ideas: to them we say, the materialists are rude and ignorant of dialec-
‘ You distinguish becoming from being?’ ‘Ye s , ’
tics; they must be taught how to argue before they will reply. ‘And in becoming you partici-they can answer. Yet, for the sake of the argu-pate through the bodily senses, and in being, by ment, we may assume them to be better than thought and the mind?’ ‘Yes.’ And you mean they are, and able to give an account of them-by the word ‘participation’ a power of doing or selves. They admit the existence of a mortal liv-suffering? To this they answer—I am acquainted ing creature, which is a body containing a soul, with them, Theaetetus, and know their ways and to this they would not refuse to attribute better than you do—that being can neither do qualities—wisdom, folly, justice and injustice. The nor suffer, though becoming may. And we rejoin: soul, as they say, has a kind of body, but they do Does not the soul know? And is not ‘being’
not like to assert of these qualities of the soul, known? And are not ‘knowing’ and ‘being either that they are corporeal, or that they have known’ active and passive? That which is known no existence; at this point they begin to make is affected by knowledge, and therefore is in distinctions. ‘Sons of earth,’ we say to them, motion. And, indeed, how can we imagine that
‘if both visible and invisible qualities exist, what perfect being is a mere everlasting form, devoid 34
Sophist – Plato
of motion and soul? for there can be no thought same thing, e.g. white, good, tall, to man; out of without soul, nor can soul be devoid of motion.
which tyros old and young derive such a feast of But neither can thought or mind be devoid of amusement. Their meagre minds refuse to predi-some principle of rest or stability. And as chil-cate anything of anything; they say that good is dren say entreatingly, ‘Give us both,’ so the good, and man is man; and that to affirm one of philosopher must include both the moveable and the other would be making the many one and immoveable in his idea of being. And yet, alas!
the one many. Let us place them in a class with he and we are in the same difficulty with which our previous opponents, and interrogate both of we reproached the dualists; for motion and rest them at once. Shall we assume (1) that being are contradictions—how then can they both ex-and rest and motion, and all other things, are ist? Does he who affirms this mean to say that incommunicable with one another? or (2) that motion is rest, or rest motion? ‘No; he means to they all have indiscriminate communion? or (3) assert the existence of some third thing, differ-that there is communion of some and not of oth-ent from them both, which neither rests nor ers? And we will consider the first hypothesis moves.’ But how can there be anything which first of all.
neither rests nor moves? Here is a second diffi-
(1) If we suppose the universal separation of culty about being, quite as great as that about kinds, all theories alike are swept away; the pa-not-being. And we may hope that any light which trons of a single principle of rest or of motion, or is thrown upon the one may extend to the other.
of a plurality of immutable ideas—all alike have Leaving them for the present, let us enquire the ground cut from under them; and all creators what we mean by giving many names to the of the universe by theories of composition and 35
Sophist – Plato
division, whether out of or into a finite or infi-only what notes and letters, but what classes nite number of elemental forms, in alternation admit of combination with one another, and what or continuance, share the same fate. Most ridicu-not. This is a noble science, on which we have lous is the discomfiture which attends the oppo-stumbled unawares; in seeking after the Soph-nents of predication, who, like the ventriloquist ist we have found the philosopher. He is the Eurycles, have the voice that answers them in master who discerns one whole or form pervad-their own breast. For they cannot help using the ing a scattered multitude, and many such wholes words ‘is,’ ‘apart,’ ‘from others,’ and the like; combined under a higher one, and many entirely and their adversaries are thus saved the trouble apart—he is the true dialectician. Like the Soph-of refuting them. But (2) if all things have com-ist, he is hard to recognize, though for the oppo-munion with all things, motion will rest, and rest site reasons; the Sophist runs away into the ob-will move; here is a reductio ad absurdum. Two scurity of not-being, the philosopher is dark from out of the three hypotheses are thus seen to be excess of light. And now, leaving him, we will false. The third (3) remains, which affirms that return to our pursuit of the Sophist.
only certain things communicate with certain Agreeing in the truth of the third hypothesis, other things. In the alphabet and the scale there that some things have communion and others are some letters and notes which combine with not, and that some may have communion with others, and some which do not; and the laws all, let us examine the most important kinds according to which they combine or are sepa-which are capable of admixture; and in this way rated are known to the grammarian and musi-we may perhaps find out a sense in which not-cian. And there is a science which teaches not being may be affirmed to have being. Now the 36
Sophist – Plato
highest kinds are being, rest, motion; and of And motion is not being, but partakes of being, these, rest and motion exclude each other, but and therefore is and is not in the most absolute both of them are included in being; and again, sense. Thus we have discovered that not-being they are the same with themselves and the other is the principle of the other which runs through of each other. What is the meaning of these all things, being not excepted. And ‘being’ is words, ‘same’ and ‘other’? Are there two more one thing, and ‘not-being’ includes and is all kinds to be added to the three others? For other things. And not-being is not the opposite sameness cannot be either rest or motion, be-of being, but only the other. Knowledge has many cause predicated both of rest and motion; nor branches, and the other or difference has as yet being; because if being were attributed to many, each of which is described by prefixing both of them we should attribute sameness to the word ‘not’ to some kind of knowledge. The both of them. Nor can other be identified with not-beautiful is as real as the beautiful, the not-being; for then other, which is relative, would just as the just. And the essence of the not-beau-have the absoluteness of being. Therefore we tiful is to be separated from and opposed to a must assume a fifth principle, which is univer-certain kind of existence which is termed beau-sal, and runs through all things, for each thing tiful. And this opposition and negation is the notis other than all other things. Thus there are five being of which we are in search, and is one kind principles: (1) being, (2) motion, which is not of being. Thus, in spite of Parmenides, we have (3) rest, and because participating both in the not only discovered the existence, but also the same and other, is and is not (4) the same with nature of not-being—that nature we have found itself, and is and is not (5) other than the other.
to be relation. In the communion of different 37
Sophist – Plato
kinds, being and other mutually interpenetrate; continue to argue that there is no such thing as other is, but is other than being, and other than the art of image-making and phantastic, because each and all of the remaining kinds, and there-not-being has no place in language. Hence arises fore in an infinity of ways ‘is not.’ And the arthe necessity of examining speech, opinion, and gument has shown that the pursuit of contradic-imagination.
tions is childish and useless, and the very oppo-And first concerning speech; let us ask the same site of that higher spirit which criticizes the question about words which we have already words of another according to the natural mean-answered about the kinds of being and the let-ing of them. Nothing can be more ters of the alphabet: To what extent do they ad-unphilosophical than the denial of all commun-mit of combination? Some words have a mean-ion of kinds. And we are fortunate in having es-ing when combined, and others have no mean-tablished such a communion for another reason, ing. One class of words describes action, another because in continuing the hunt after the Soph-class agents: ‘walks,’ ‘runs,’ ‘sleeps’ are exist we have to examine the nature of discourse, amples of the first; ‘stag,’ ‘horse,’ ‘lion’ of and there could be no discourse if there were no the second. But no combination of words can be communion. For the Sophist, although he can formed without a verb and a noun, e.g. ‘A man no longer deny the existence of not-being, may learns’; the simplest sentence is composed of still affirm that not-being cannot enter into dis-two words, and one of these must be a subject.
course, and as he was arguing before that there For example, in the sentence, ‘Theaetetus sits,’
could be no such thing as falsehood, because which is not very long, ‘Theaetetus’ is the sub-there was no such thing as not-being, he may ject, and in the sentence ‘Theaetetus flies,’