Platos Symposium
Nay, replied Socrates, I would have you con-tion. For the possessors of these qualities, sider whether ‘necessarily’is not rather the Agathon, must be supposed to have their respec-word. The inference that he who desires sometive advantages at the time, whether they choose thing is in want of something, and that he who or not; and who can desire that which he has?
desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my Therefore, when a person says, I am well and judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, true. What do you think?
and I desire simply to have what I have—to him I agree with you, said Agathon.
we shall reply: ‘You, my friend, having wealth Very good. Would he who is great, desire to be and health and strength, want to have the con-great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?
tinuance of them; for at this moment, whether That would be inconsistent with our previous you choose or no, you have them. And when you admissions.
say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, True. For he who is anything cannot want to is not your meaning that you want to have what be that which he is?
you now have in the future?’ He must agree with Very true.
us—must he not?
And yet, added Socrates, if a man being strong He must, replied Agathon.
desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be Then, said Socrates, he desires that what he swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in has at present may be preserved to him in the that case he might be thought to desire some-future, which is equivalent to saying that he thing which he already has or is. I give the ex-desires something which is non-existent to him, ample in order that we may avoid misconcep-and which as yet he has not got: 67
Platos Symposium
Very true, he said.
He assented.
Then he and every one who desires, desires And the admission has been already made that that which he has not already, and which is fu-Love is of something which a man wants and ture and not present, and which he has not, and has not?
is not, and of which he is in want;—these are the True, he said.
sort of things which love and desire seek?
Then Love wants and has not beauty?
Very true, he said.
Certainly, he replied.
Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the And would you call that beautiful which wants argument. First, is not love of something, and of and does not possess beauty?
something too which is wanting to a man?
Certainly not.
Yes, he replied.
Then would you still say that love is beautiful?
Remember further what you said in your Agathon replied: I fear that I did not under-speech, or if you do not remember I will remind stand what I was saying.
you: you said that the love of the beautiful set in You made a very good speech, Agathon, replied order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed Socrates; but there is yet one small question things there is no love—did you not say some-which I would fain ask:—Is not the good also the thing of that kind?
beautiful?
Yes, said Agathon.
Yes.
Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one.
Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and the good?
not of deformity?
I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon:—