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POLUS: True.
exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhe toric to thisend, SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice useful. Do you say Yes or No to that?
may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:is any other strange, though probably in agreement with your premises.
inference consistent with them?
SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.
not disproven?
SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in POLUS: Yes; it certainly is.
helping a man to excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use to SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if in-any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to deed it be our duty to harm another, whether an enemy or accusehimself above all, and in the next degree his family notI except the case of self-defencethen I have to be or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should upon my guardbut if my enemy injures a third person, bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should wrong-doer may s uffer and be madewhole; and he should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of at-of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on taining the good and the honourable; let him who has done him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of have done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let 101
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him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injus-Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your clever-tice; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the ness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word previous discussion.
or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his opin-or is he joking?
ion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist the CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to ex-profound earnest; but you may well ask him.
press surprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when under their influence, you would probably CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, reply to him, if you were honest, that you cannot help say-are you in earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, ing what your loves say unless they are prevented; and that and what you say is true, is not the whole of human life you can only be silent when they are. Now you must under-turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would ap-stand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you pear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, si-doing?
lence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my friend; neither is she SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some commu-capricious like my other love, for the son of Cleinias says nity of feelings among mankind, however varying in differ-one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philoso-ent personsI mean to say, if every mans feelings were phy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his are now wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her speciesI do not see how we could ever communicate our you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, that to do impressions to one another. I make this remark because I injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all perceive that you and I have a common feeling. For we are evils; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the lovers both, and both of us have two loves apiece:I am the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never 102
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be at one with himself, but that his whole life will be a dis-now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are cord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if a chorus which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I my-to contradict himself; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving self should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.
the advantage to be thereby gained, slowly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be deter-CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and mined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule seem to be running riot in the argument. And now you are of nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into the in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice.
same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:for he When Polus was speaking of the conventionally said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his greater disgrace because the greater evil; but convention-modesty replied that he would, because he thought that ally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of mankind in general would be displeased if he answered injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed
No; and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias had better die than live; since when he is wronged and was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the laughed at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has him-makers of laws are the majority who are weak; and they self fallen into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view wit when he conceded to you that to do is more to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the ad-the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the mission which led to his being entangled by you; and be-better of them, in order that they may not get the better of cause he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing more than his neighbours; for knowing their own inferior-103
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ity, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And there-
Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of im fore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conven-mortals;
tionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare Republic), whereas nature herself intimates this, as he says,
that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she
Makes might to be right, doing violence with high shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed est hand; as I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the without buying them (Fragm. Incert. 151 (Bockh).) superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or
I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other that without buying them, and without their being given to examples). Nay, but these are the men who act according him, he carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of na-law of natural right, and that the oxen and other posses-ture: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we sions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stron-invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the ger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for like young lions,charming them with the sound of the philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just.
philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and and a person of honour ought to know; he is inexperienced charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the or public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, that of mankind and of human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or busi-104
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ness, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, and becoming a man of liberal education, and him who when they make their appearance in the arena of philoso-neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will phy. For, as Euripides says,
never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I should
Every man shines in that and pursues that, and like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one, devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in even though he have good natural parts, becomes effemi-which he most excels, (Antiope, fragm. 20 (Dindorf).) nate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreci-creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a ates, and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of edu-am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be cation, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridicu-disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, lous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those that you, Socrates, are careless about the things of which who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, you ought to be careful; and that you who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utter-
Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a ance, which is natural to his childish years. But when I hear puerile exterior; Neither in a court of justice could some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am you state a case, or give any reason or proof, offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the Or offer valiant counsel on anothers behalf.
twang of slavery. So wh en I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me ridiculous And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same speaking out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you feeling about students of philosophy; when I see a youth are not ashamed of being thus defenceless; which I affirm thus engaged,the study appears to me to be in character, to be the condition not of you only but of all those who will 105
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carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.
one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well do:there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not hav-to do.
ing a word to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the pen-should I not rejoice to discover one of those stones with alty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of which they test gold, and the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I agreed in ap-
An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,
proving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.
who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?
despoiled by his enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of citizenship?he being a man SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears you the desired touchstone.
with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more:
CALLICLES: Why?
Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me reputation of wisdom. But leave to others these nice-in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last ties,
found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities: ought to have three qualitiesknowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I
For they will only
meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not 106
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wise as you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that truth, because they have not the same interest in me which point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are require to be submitted to any further test. For you could undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to de-their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict ceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself.
themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler en-you have all the qualities in which these others are defi-quiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for mak-cient, having received an excellent education; to this many ing,What ought the character of a man to be, and what Athenians can testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years you why I think so? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander and in youth? For be assured that if I err in my own con-of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and duct I do not err intentionally, but from ignorance. Do not Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: then desist from advising me, now that you havebegun, there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to prac-one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of phi-tise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting losophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I as-conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much sented, call me dolt, and deem me unworthy of receiving into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom might un-Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the consciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when superior should take the property of the inferior by force; I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient evi-than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?
dence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech.
aver.
Well then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that 107
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SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as CALLICLES: Yes.
the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the timewhether you meant by the superior the stron-SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which ger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you are made by them are by nature good?
seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are su-CALLICLES: Yes.
perior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or were lately saying, that justice is equality, and that to do is whether better is to be defined in the same way as supe-more disgraceful than to suffer injustice?is that so or not?
rior:this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be found to come in the superior and better and stronger the same or different?
the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus?I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same.
me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an authority.
SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?
CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also af-SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of firms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, the superior?
and that justice is equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said CALLICLES: Very true.
that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature superior class are far better, as you were saying?
when the argument is about custom?