Platos Gorgias
CALLICLES: Yes.
CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself.
SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?
SOCRATES: Well, but people say that a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle, and I should not CALLICLES: To be sure.
like to have the argument going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little longer, and put the SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to head on.
chastise her?
CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that CALLICLES: Yes.
you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you.
SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which SOCRATES: But who else is willing?I want to finish the you were just now preferring?
argument.
CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either wish that you would ask some one who does.
talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?
SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, Two men be improved or to subject himself to that very chastisement spoke before, but now one shall be enough? I suppose of which the argument speaks!
that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only I CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.
and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off according to my own notion. But if any of you think that I in the middle?
arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose 130
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and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the which we are good? To besure. And we are good, and all supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but good things whatever are good when some virtue is present if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.
in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them until you have completed the argument; and this appears to not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain very much like to hear what more you have to say.
that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her him an Amphion in return for his Zethus; but since you, own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temper-if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are ate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefac-have you any?
tors on the tablets of my soul.
CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow.
CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.
SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the tem-SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the perate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the oppo-argument:Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the site condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleas-bad soul. Very true.
ant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both 131
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in relation to the gods and to men;for he would not be acting so that he may have temperance and justice present temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper.
with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unre-In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in strained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them lead-his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who ing a robbers life. Such a one is the friend neither of God does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true.
nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temper-incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship.
ate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom care about geometry.Well, then, either the principle that you were applaudingthe intemperate who is the opposite the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I temperance, and the miserable miserable by the posses-affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm sion of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise the consequences? All the consequences which I drew be-temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his fore, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse him-need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, self and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and whether private individual or city, are in need of punish-that to this end he should use his rhetoricall those conse-ment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punish-quences are true. And that which you thought that Polus ment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, 132
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Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of am ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met justice, has also turned out to be true.
any one who could say otherwise, any more than you can, And now, these things being as we have said, let us pro-and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if ceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity than this greatest of evils (compare Republic), in an unjust of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an man not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,he may the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils?
away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill And will not the worst of all defences be that with which a me; a condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace.
man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?
My answer to you is one which has been already often re-
and next will come that which is unable to avert the next peated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them.
wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and Am I not right Callicles?
to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the CALLICLES: Yes, quite right.
doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed doing injustice and the suffering injusticeand we affirm and riveted by us, if I may use an expression which is cer-that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser tainly bold, in words which are like bonds of iron and ada-evilby what devices can a man succeed in obtaining the mant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will 133
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to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape or the equal and companion of the ruling power.
injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?
CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.
CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.
SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is to be most the friend of him who is most like to himlike the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him from do-to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to this?
ing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he be CALLICLES: I should.
unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclu-SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, sion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong he may be expected to fear any one who is his superior in against their will?
virtue, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.
CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.
CALLICLES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?
SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and CALLICLES: Certainly.
will never seriously regard him as a friend.
SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering CALLICLES: That again is true.
injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think that such an art is SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same 134
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character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the CALLICLES: True.
same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by injure him with impunity:is not that so?
the power which he thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the greatest evil to CALLICLES: Yes.
him?
SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, may become great and formidable, this would seem to be Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who the wayhe will accustom himself, from his youth upward, imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, not imitate him and take away his goods?
and will contrive to be as like him as possible?
SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have CALLICLES: Yes.
heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has as you and your friends would say, the end of becoming a a mindthe bad man will kill the good and true.
great man and not suffering injury?
CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing?
CALLICLES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury?
shows: do you think that all our cares should be directed to Must not the very opposite be true,if he is to be like the prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him? Will arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you and not be punished?
advise me to cultivate?