MENO: How can it be otherwise?
another in desiring good, he must be better in SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?
the power of attaining it?
MENO: Yes, indeed.
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miser-SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, able and ill-fated?
virtue would appear to be the power of attaining MENO: I should say not, Socrates.
good?
SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the man-be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires ner in which you now view this matter.
evil; for what is misery but the desire and pos-SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you session of evil?
say is true from another point of view; for very MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, likely you may be right:—You affirm virtue to be and I admit that nobody desires evil.
the power of attaining goods?
SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just MENO: Yes.
now that virtue is the desire and power of attain-SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are ing good?
such as health and wealth and the possession of MENO: Yes, I did say so.
gold and silver, and having office and honour in SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the de-the state—those are what you would call goods?
sire of good is common to all, and one man is no MENO: Yes, I should include all those.
better than another in that respect?
SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the MENO: True.
hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than power of getting silver and gold; and would you 41
Meno
add that they must be gained piously, justly, or MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.
do you deem this to be of no consequence? And SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and justice, temperance, and the like, were each of dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
them a part of virtue?
MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holi-SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which ness, or some other part of virtue, as would ap-you mock me.
pear, must accompany the acquisition, and with-MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
out them the mere acquisition of good will not SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver be virtue.
virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
gave you a pattern according to which you were SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and to frame your answer; and you have forgotten silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or an-already, and tell me that virtue is the power of other, or in other words the want of them, may attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice be equally virtue?
you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
MENO: True.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own ad-is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and missions, that virtue is doing what you do with a want of them, but whatever is accompanied by part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is de-you to be parts of virtue.
void of justice is vice.
MENO: What of that?